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Section A:  Preface to the portfolio 
 
This portfolio is comprised of three sections: two pieces of clinical work and an 
empirical research project. The clinical pieces are a case study, formatted as an 
article for submission to a journal, and a combined case study and process report. 
Both have been completed during my training in counselling psychology at City 
University and illustrate my competence and emerging approach to the discipline, 
providing evidence of my knowledge and skills in theory, research and practice.  
 
Both of the clinical cases presented here took place in a primary care counselling 
setting. The client’s use of the body in unconscious communication, and links 
between psyche and soma are themes that run throughout this portfolio of work. 
Taken together, I hope that the studies demonstrate the trajectory of my training 
as I have learned to practice using psychodynamic theory in a way that feels 
authentic to me. Through supervision I have been guided towards a contemporary 
relational approach to psychoanalysis that together with object relations theory, 
forms the theoretical basis of both pieces of work.  
 
Coincidentally, both clients presented with ulcerative colitis, a disease that has 
long been of interest to psychology. One was a relatively mild case and I felt that 
the illness was a way for the client to experience feelings of loss towards himself. 
For the other client however, the severity of the disease symptoms and the drastic 
treatment that was being proposed by her doctors had become a source of great 
distress and needed to be worked with as an expression of the psychological 
trauma that preceded the physical disease. The symptoms seemed to me to be an 
embodiment of feelings that could not be tolerated, and importantly could not be 
spoken about. I describe the process of therapy with this client, who was 
mourning the suicide of her only child, and whose health was now being gravely 
threatened by ulcerative colitis. There were also cultural and language aspects to 
this work that increased its complexity. In the article, I conceptualize the client’s 
physical disease as the embodiment of her experience of psychic disintegration in 
grief. I draw on Freud’s theory to suggest that her illness can be thought of as an 
unconscious sadistic attack on herself. Tolerating her unbearable pain and not 
turning away from it became the work of our sessions and at first this was all the 
work that could be done. Through surviving this, the client’s need to be believed 
became a central theme and drove both the transference-countertransference and 
the therapeutic relationships, and I struggled to apply psychodynamic theory in a 
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way that felt therapeutic rather than persecutory. By using supervision and 
psychodynamic theory to think about this conflict in terms of what it could tell me 
about my client’s subjective experience, I was able to begin to reconcile this 
difficulty and more fully understand and therefore help her.  
 
This was not the first time that I had worked with a parent who had lost a child, 
and each time I struggled to find a way to think about how counselling psychology 
could help a person going through this most unimaginably painful of experiences. 
That this case was one of the last that I undertook during my training seemed 
somehow fitting, as I had begun my counselling psychology as a bereavement 
counsellor. I was in my mid-thirties when I began psychology and counselling 
training. Working as a counsellor with loss and bereavement provided my entry 
into a world of other peoples’ pain and it was the experience of struggling to 
survive that pain alongside those clients that sparked the desire to train further 
and understand the therapeutic process better. An interest in the way that people 
face the processes around death and dying was one of the reasons that I was 
drawn to the subject of altruistic organ donation for my research.  
 
The second piece in this portfolio is a combined case study and process report for 
a client who came to counselling at the suggestion of his doctor, and because he 
wanted to understand frequent feelings of anger and irritation. From the 
beginning, he wanted to know what the effect of his mother leaving him when he 
was three years old might have been. In the study, I suggest a formulation that 
hypothesizes that this client experienced a chronic failure of empathy in his early 
development, with the result that he is acutely sensitive to experiencing empathic 
failure as an adult. The shame and guilt that he experienced growing up made him 
feel intensely self-conscious and anxious when confronted with the idea of being 
held in mind by another individual. I experienced his difficulty over a number of 
weeks with a growing sense of unease about my own ability to reflect his feelings 
in a way that I felt was sufficiently empathic. In the extract of the session I have 
presented, I begin to respond to these therapeutic relationship difficulties, 
becoming more aware of moments in which the relationship faltered, when I failed 
to reflect to the client my experience of him in that moment. This process report is 
therefore a piece of critical reflection and learning on the here-and-now processes 
of therapy. Through writing it, I was able to improve my practice and understand 
more fully how fundamentally important here-and-now interpretations are to the 
therapeutic process. 
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The final section is a piece of in-depth qualitative research, using discourse 
analysis and a psychosocial research paradigm that to my knowledge has not 
been applied in a counselling psychology context before. This method attempts to 
bring together, in an occasionally uneasy partnership, social constructionist and 
psychoanalytic approaches to research. Although both paradigms have language 
at their heart, they make very different assumptions about what can be known 
about the subjective experience of others. However, it was important to me to find 
an epistemological approach that was not only capable of answering the research 
questions, but one that was also compatible with what I was aiming to do in my 
counselling psychology practice. Reconciling the social constructionist method of 
discourse analysis with the psychodynamic goal of understanding and making 
meaning from the unconscious experience of another individual has been a 
fascinating and challenging process.  
 
The subject matter for the research project - altruistic kidney donation - arose 
unexpectedly as the result of a placement in the renal department of a large 
teaching hospital. My role there was to deliver counselling psychology 
interventions to kidney patients. Some were finding their diagnosis difficult, or 
approaching the need for dialysis, others were struggling with being on dialysis, 
while some were facing transplant, or were post-transplant. One of the roles of the 
consultant psychologist who was my supervisor was to assess individuals who 
were spontaneously offering to donate one of their kidneys to a stranger. My 
response on learning of the existence of this small group of people was one of 
curiosity; I wanted to understand what motivated somebody to do what seemed to 
me at the time to be an extraordinary thing. But the idea of altruistic donation also 
provoked considerable anxiety in me from that first instant and I was interested in 
exploring what this anxiety might be about, and wondered to what extent it might 
exist for other people and what effect, if any, this might have on practice.   
 
Initially, I thought about exploring the relationship between psychological 
“knowledge” and power in relation to altruistic donation and the way in which 
psychological and medical assessments might be used to subjectify donors who 
come forward wanting to donate a kidney to a stranger. This pointed towards a 
Foucauldian discourse analysis, but through piloting the semi-structured interview, 
I became interested in the extra-discursive aspects of altruistic donation, the 
particularly embodied, very personal nature of the communication that was taking 
 14 
place both in the donation itself and in the research interview, and the extent to 
which, if at all, this embodied experience might be accessible for interpretation.  
 
In line with my counselling psychology practice, psychodynamic theory was used 
as a way to think about those aspects of the participants’ experiences for which 
they had no words and perhaps were choosing instead to use their bodies to 
communicate, and led to the possibility of exploring possible unconscious aspects 
of this type of organ donation. I was also concerned about the implications for my 
counselling practice if I chose a purely social constructionist method. At the time, I 
was beginning to focus on a psychodynamic model of counselling, learning to use 
my relationship with the client to make interpretations about their subjective 
experience. I felt strongly that if this relational approach to interpretation was 
guiding my practice, it made no sense to use a research epistemology that argued 
against what I felt to be the most useful way of doing therapy.  
 
The methodology I chose therefore draws on a psychosocial research paradigm. 
This posits that social and psychic accounts be treated as equally privileged 
entities, with the goal of critically exploring the complex interaction of social and 
intra-psychic factors that occurs when an individual engages with the discursive 
tools available to them. My method integrates Foucauldian and discursive 
approaches to discourse analysis with positioning theory and psychoanalytic 
thinking. It required an approach to reflexivity in interpretation that developed in 
parallel with my practice. The reflexive nature of counselling psychology, and the 
use I make of my self, therefore provides a link between interpretation in research 
and interpretation in therapeutic practice. In both, I am aiming for a potentially 
useful, constructivist understanding of an individual’s subjectivity that aids 
meaning making, yet is non-pathologising. It has been important to be able to 
justify an interpretive process that can be applied in both research and practice, 
with the difference being in the intention with which the interpretation is made.  
 
The results of a discourse analysis generated three major themes: other-oriented, 
rational and self-oriented discursive strategies. Participants used these discursive 
strategies to position themselves as concerned only with the needs of the 
recipient, to resist questioning and criticism in the interview, and to demonstrate 
the rationality of donating. Most participants rejected the possibility that some of 
their own needs might be met through donating, so discourses of the self were 
used rarely, in line with the prevailing social understanding of “altruistic” donation. 
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In contrast, medical, engineering and mechanical discourses were extensively 
drawn on, and I have suggested that one important function of these for 
participants is to separate mind and body, thereby defending against difficult 
feelings about the self, death and dying. From the theoretical perspective of a 
dynamic unconscious, participants experienced their desire to become altruistic 
donors as compelling. I conclude that the use of the term “altruistic” to describe 
living non-directed organ donation constrains available discourses and therefore 
practice, and allows for the donors to be constructed only either as saints or as 
“mad”, severely limiting what can be said, felt, thought and done by donors, 
clinicians and society.  
 
I believe that this study demonstrates the compatibility and usefulness of 
psychosocial methodology applied at the interface between the individual, the 
clinic and society. Both social constructionism and psychodynamic theory do not 
easily fall within the humanistic and phenomenological traditions of counselling 
psychology but I am drawn to the discursive as a way to take account of the 
inescapably social aspects of individual experience. I feel that this ought to form 
an integral aspect of what counselling psychology as a discipline strives to do, yet 
in addition to these social influences, I also want to attend to the internal aspects 
of a person’s experience and so draw on a critical-realist approach to social 
constructionism. In counselling practice, I have also found that I can most usefully 
understand and therefore help clients by integrating theories about the discursive 
and the unconscious. Part of the attraction of this way of practicing for me is that it 
does not make change a goal in itself, rather, change is conceptualized as coming 
about as the result of insight and understanding.   
 
My thesis is that interpretation in counselling psychology research should not end 
with language, and my goal in this portfolio has been to explore the extent to 
which it is possible to usefully interpret not only the discursive, but also the extra-
discursive aspects of inter-subjective experience. Furthermore, I argue that it is 
important to recognize that both (the discursive and extra-discursive) are co-
constructed in therapeutic practice and research, and experience, whether 
conscious or unconscious, can be communicated using the body and action. 
Psychodynamic thinking, with its focus on the unconscious, offers one way to 
theorise this communication. There may also be other means of doing this. I 
believe that the client who brings their illness symptoms to counselling, and the 
altruistic kidney donors who offer a part of themselves to a stranger are 
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communicating something important about their subjective experience. Attending 
to what is being said not just in words, but also through the body, therefore adds 
an extra dimension to relational thinking and counselling psychology practice. 
 
I hope that this portfolio demonstrates my ongoing work to become a reflexive 
practitioner who is able to give clients an experience of being understood, and so 
feel more able to bear previously intolerable feelings. I have chosen to work using 
a psychodynamic model and to extend this to my research because this approach 
best reflects of my personal understanding of the way in which we are able to 
know another person’s subjectivity. It seems to me that change is unlikely to occur 
unless we first try to understand another’s experience of being in the world, and 
that through understanding, we increase our ability to bear the inevitably painful 
aspects of the human condition. Although as counselling psychologists we strive 
to do this to the best of our ability, it will nevertheless always be an imperfect 
understanding. Learning to be in as genuine as possible a relationship to this 
struggle has shaped my personal journey to become a counselling psychologist, 






















Section B: CLINICAL ARTICLE  
(Formatted for submission to Psychodynamic Practice according to the journal’s 
Instructions for Authors – see Appendix B1) 
 




In this paper I describe a time-limited piece of work with a mother whose 
child committed suicide. The client went on to develop serious ulcerative 
colitis that I have conceptualised as the embodiment of her experience of 
disintegration in grief. Using Freud’s theory of identification with the lost 
object, I suggest that her illness represented an unconscious sadistic 
attack on herself and the identified-with lost object. Unconscious 
phantasies of harming the lost loved object resulted in guilt and resistance 
to making a link between her disease and her grief. I experienced this as a 
projective identification that made it difficult for me to work in the 
transference. Her failure to make herself better both from her disease and 
from mourning her son made her continue to feel like a victim. Being 
believed became a central theme of the work, reflecting the trauma she 
had experienced and her resulting belief that she would not be 
understood, annihilating her ability to make meaning. 
 
Keywords: Maternal mourning; identification with the lost object; ulcerative 















This paper describes one of the most emotionally demanding and complex pieces 
of therapeutic work undertaken during my Counselling Psychology training. It took 
place in my final year of training and consisted of just twelve sessions over six 
months.  
 Brice (1991) suggests that maternal mourning is essentially paradoxical – the 
mother wishes to recover from her child’s death but by completing the work of 
mourning she faces losing connection with her child entirely. Learning to work with 
my client’s interminable pain ultimately provided me with one of the most 
important pieces of learning of my training. This paper is about the struggle to find 
a way to stay in the room together and think about how it felt to mourn for my 
client’s lost child and her own lost life. Brice (1991) describes the utter psychic 
devastation of maternal mourning: “…a bereaved mother experiences her child’s 
death as an attack she can only conflictedly fight; as the death of her world, as the 
destruction of her past, present, and future, and as an identity and reality crisis” 
(p17).  
For this case, I have drawn on a relational psychoanalytic model. Layton 
(2008) describes how this model emphasises a two-person psychology and 
subjectivity is viewed as constructed both from unconscious relating to internal 
objects in phantasy and the experience of actual external relating with other 
people. Hoffman (1983) argues that the subjectivity the client brings to the 
therapeutic relationship is endlessly flexible, with each client interpreting and 
fitting their own perception of the therapist’s countertransference according to the 
needs of the moment and through their own perceptual lens. This includes the 
client’s perception of the therapist’s ability to receive and be attuned to their 
experience (Stolorow & Atwood, 1992). The client’s experience of the therapist is 
viewed therefore as plausible rather than as a distortion, and the therapeutic 
relationship is seen as co-constructed (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983). In this model 
resistance is understood as what happens at the boundary between what can be 
made conscious and what has to remain unconscious in the therapeutic 
relationship, and is a response to the client’s perception of being received 







B.3. The case 
The setting was an NHS Primary Care Trust Counselling and Psychotherapy 
service. The client, Mariam1, had a diagnosis of acute ulcerative colitis for which 
drug treatment had been unsuccessful and for which the only remaining treatment 
option was surgery to remove her colon. Mariam had been referred to the 
counselling service by a hospital Psychiatrist because of the difficulty she was 
having in deciding whether to undergo the surgery her doctors were advising. The 
Psychiatrist had assessed Mariam and decided that she was not suitable for 
intensive psychotherapy with him because she was pre-occupied with her physical 
illness and would instead benefit from a more “supportive arrangement”. This was 
Mariam’s third psychotherapy referral in under than a year; she had previously 
had nine sessions with another Psychiatrist training in psychotherapy. I imagined 
that she might be feeling angry, rejected and bewildered at having to begin again 
with yet another counsellor. I also felt a twinge of narcissistic irritation as though 
what I offered was somehow less meaningful than the Psychiatrist’s.  
When I collected Mariam from the waiting room for our first session I met a 
dark-haired woman with a gravely beautiful but tired-looking face. She wore jeans 
and minimal jewellery and make-up. She spoke softly in accented English that 
was mostly fluent although occasionally she would search for a word. She took 
her seat in the therapy room, and after I had introduced myself, she told me how 
difficult it was for her to attend appointments because of the severity of her 
ulcerative colitis. She seemed anxious that I understand this.  
Her disease caused intensely painful and distressing symptoms. She took 
six different kinds of medication in an unsuccessful attempt to reduce the 
ulceration in her colon. She told me how she bled internally almost continuously, 
and so was prone to infection, anaemia and exhaustion. She described how 
ashamed she felt about her symptoms, which left her feeling dirty and depressed 
about her appearance. She could not bear the thought of the operation to remove 
her colon, even though this would take way her symptoms completely, because it 
would leave her with a stoma, an opening from her small intestine to the outside of 
her abdomen, and a bag to collect waste. By the time she came to see me, the 
operation was on indefinite hold. She said that could not imagine being naked in 
front of her husband with such a thing. She cried fearful tears like a child as she 
                                                        
1 All names and biographical/personal identifying details have been changed throughout in 
order to preserve confidentiality. 
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described these feelings. I wondered then whether her illness performed a 
function of some sort and therefore could not be let go of.  
Her colitis had begun suddenly, six years previously, when Mariam had 
been to her country intending to visit the grave of her son, Saeed. Mariam had not 
at that time, or any time since, been able to visit her only child’s grave. She said 
that she had been afraid that she would “lose control”. My sense as she described 
this was of a fear of total disintegration and her symptoms were a physical 
representation of the loss of control of what was inside her. Mariam came to the 
UK shortly after Saeed’s death, where she had married again, an older man of the 
same nationality.  
Saeed had committed suicide twelve years before by hanging himself. He 
was twelve years old. Mariam had divorced his father when Saeed was eight 
because of extreme physical and verbal abuse in the marriage. She described her 
ex-husband as violent and extremely paranoid. He did not believe that Saeed was 
his son and would accuse Mariam of infidelity, telling her she was a toilet for 
everybody to come to. She thought that he might kill her and worried about what 
would happen to Saeed if she died.  
In the two years between their separation and divorce, Saeed lived with 
Mariam and she described this time as the happiest of her life. She adored having 
her child with her but felt that he missed his father. After the divorce, the law 
required Saeed to live with his father while Mariam stayed at her parents’ home in 
another city. She visited Saeed as often as she could at weekends and for 
holidays. In that first session she said that she wished that Saeed’s father had 
killed him, rather than that he had killed himself, because then she would have 
someone to blame.  
As Mariam told me of Saeed’s suicide, I experienced a sense of her total 
internal destruction and as she cried, I couldn’t stop myself from crying too. I felt 
momentary panic as this was happening, concerned that she might experience 
me as unable to contain her grief. I tried to reflect on whether my tears were a 
genuine response to Mariam, or whether they reflected my imagined grief about 
what it would feel like for one of my own children to die in this way. I was 
particularly troubled by the idea of a child so distressed that they would kill 
themself. This aspect of it felt counter-transferential. I was dimly aware that I must 
not use this process of reflection as an excuse to unconsciously turn inward and 
away from Mariam as a way to avoid her unbearable grief. The only conclusion I 
was able to reach at the time was that Mariam’s story was so desperately sad that 
not to be affected by it seemed perverse.  
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Over time, I was able to think about Mariam’s grief as belonging (mostly) to 
her. Having worked through this process alone and in supervision, in later 
sessions when tears came to my eyes I was less afraid to show her how her story 
affected me. Mariam knew how difficult I found the work, and would apologise to 
me from time to time, yet it was not until the final minutes of the last session, as 
we were saying goodbye, that she asked me whether I was a mother.  
Mariam told me that she was not suicidal but gave a slow smile as she told 
me that sometimes, when she was feeling her worst, she felt that her son had 
shown her “a way out”. This seemed comforting for her. From the beginning then, 
Mariam brought to our sessions the work of endings – the ending of the life of her 
beloved only child, the ending of her health and hopes for the future, the many 
endings she had had with previous therapists, and since this was time-limited 
therapy, looming over us, the end of our own relationship.  
Mariam said she wanted to know why her feelings of grief had not 
lessened in twelve years. I thought of Bion’s (1959) theory of containing, in which 
feelings that are too powerful to be tolerated may be split off and projected into the 
therapist, whose job it is to keep them and change them into a form that can 
ultimately be safely re-introjected by the client. I offered Mariam twelve sessions, 
the most I was able to offer a client without further discussion with the clinical 
head of service.  
 
B.4. Resisting links between physical illness and grief 
Mariam described how she had feared that if she stood at Saeed’s grave, she 
would “lose control”. The image I had of her child’s body in the ground felt almost 
unbearable at that moment. I thought about how her idea of losing control was 
being embodied (Brice, 1991) through the symptoms of her ulcerative colitis. Her 
internal bleeding was like a physical representation of the grief that was private 
and hidden. She vehemently rejected the operation that would relieve her of her 
crippling symptoms but would leave her with her grief; visible, shameful and awful.  
Mariam was proud of her professional scientific background and secular 
beliefs. She had read widely about her illness and knew of the alleged links 
between ulcerative colitis and chronic psychological stress. Despite knowing this 
intellectually, she was resistant to it. She told me that her doctors all advised her 
to try to relax and to reduce stress with counselling, but in the overwhelming 
context of her grief this felt absurd to her. She withheld information about Saeed 
from her medical doctors. If they asked whether she had children, she would tell 
them only that she had had a son but he had died. In that first session I asked 
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tentatively whether she felt that there was any link between her illness and her 
grief but she resisted this fiercely, angrily, saying that it would be like blaming 
Saeed, which was intolerable for her, otherwise it was criticism of herself, which 
was only slightly more bearable. 
Through this resistance, I understood that a major task of the therapy 
would be to try to find a way to conceptualise and make links between her feelings 
about her illness and her loss; she seemed to need to them keep close but 
separate. In “Mourning and Melancholia”, Freud (1917) describes the process 
through which Mariam has taken the loss of Saeed inside herself, so that he has 
become part of her and thus cannot be mourned. By identifying with the lost object 
in this way, directing guilt and shame at herself through the mechanism of her 
ulcerative colitis, she is also harming Saeed, according to Freud (1917), punishing 
him for leaving her. Mariam has unconsciously set up a distorted version of reality 
in which Saeed’s suicide cannot be accepted. Her ulcerative colitis and refusal of 
the treatment that would rid her of the symptoms are a disavowal of his death and 
most importantly, of the way he died.  
Implicit for Mariam in rejecting a psychosomatic link was the idea that if 
she was doing this to herself, she ought therefore be able to stop it and make 
herself better. Consciously, she desperately wanted to get better but her illness 
was connecting her to unprocessed traumatic memories. In Mariam’s own words, 
she continued to feel like a victim and a failure for not having the capacity to effect 
change within herself. In the fourth session she told me sorrowfully, angrily; “I get 
worse and worse”, and said that she “hated” herself for this.  
My supervisor helped me to theorise my position in the therapeutic 
relationship as needing to find a way to think about these links because Mariam 
could not, with the aim of her being eventually able to integrate and experience 
emotions associated with the traumatic experiences.  
Mariam felt persecuted and feared that her good internal objects would be 
taken from her. This was brought into our sessions through her angry feelings 
about her treatment. She often said that she was not being helped medically, had 
to wait, or attend multiple appointments. This made her furious with her second 
husband because they were unable to afford private medicine, which she 
imagined would have allowed her access to better treatment. In her theory of guilt 
and reparation, Klein (1948) suggests that links between external and internal 
danger situations are related to the unconscious fear of having destroyed the 
good object. Unconscious phantasies about having harmed the loved object lead 
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to guilt, which has to be experienced before reparation to the loved object can 
occur, a state that is associated with the depressive position (Klein, 1948).  
 
B.5. Being believed – resisting interpretation 
The absolute necessity of being believed became a central theme of the middle 
part of the therapy. Mariam had experienced a catastrophic failure by people in 
the past to believe her when she had told them that Saeed was in danger from his 
father. She explained that she had always “known” that he would harm their child. 
She says that he had bought Saeed the pull-up bar and rope with which he hung 
himself and she was certain that he put the idea into Saeed’s mind.  
Therapy took on a pattern of Mariam attending for one or two sessions and 
then missing the next one or two. She never managed to come to more than two 
appointments in a row but would always telephone to cancel. I felt that she was 
letting me know that she needed me even when she could not face coming. This 
continued throughout the entire contract and often the reason given was that she 
felt too ill, or had clashing appointments. Towards the end she was able to tell me 
that once she had been unable to come because she had felt ashamed.  
In the fourth session, as part of a discussion about how ill she was feeling 
and how difficult it had been for her to attend, she told me that although I “might 
not believe” her, she had had only two hours sleep the previous night. I felt that 
her need in that moment was for me to show her that I really did see how ill she 
was, so I said, “I believe you”. She was silent for a few moments then began to 
cry. After some time, I asked her if it was thinking about feeling ill that was making 
her cry, or something else, and she answered: “That you believe me”. Britton 
(1988) describes how a client’s need for agreement is high if they do not expect to 
be understood, reflecting “a desire for understanding from the primary object” 




Mariam’s memories of her abusive marriage, Saeed’s suicide and her 
current illness are experienced by her as traumatic and psychically fragmenting 
(Layton, 2008). In her study of psychological trauma, Herman (1992) describes 
how the core experience is one of disempowerment, suggesting; “…that at the 
moment of trauma, almost by definition, the individual’s point of view counts for 
nothing…The traumatic event thus destroys the belief that one can be oneself in 
relation to others” (p53). Britton (1988) suggests that the experience of being 
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misunderstood in such a fundamental way annihilates the possibility of being able 
to establish meaning for the self. The effects of the domestic abuse suffered by 
Mariam that culminated in the suicide of her son haunted her.  
In these sessions, my dominant countertransference feelings were a sense 
that Mariam was searching for help, from the doctors, from herself and from me, 
but that she was not finding it. I experienced a counter-transferential feeling of the 
therapy being stuck. To illustrate this, in the fifth session, Mariam came feeling ill 
and furious, telling me about a medical doctor who had seemed to her to be 
refusing to give her an iron infusion for her anaemia, and in addition, she said that 
the doctor had repeatedly wanted to know what Mariam had been “told” about her 
illness by a previous psychotherapist. As I listened, I wondered what she was 
telling me with this story. I thought about whether she experienced me as also 
refusing to help her. I felt that I was being attacked by Mariam. Bion (1959) 
describes a psychotic part of personality that wants to destroy “anything which is 
felt to have the function of linking one object with another” (p87). My 
understanding was that the doctor’s behaviour had touched on two areas of 
unconscious pain for Mariam. She had experienced her as refusing to give her 
what she needed, and worse, as intrusive and disbelieving. Herman (1992) says: 
“Trauma forces the survivor to relive all her earlier struggles over autonomy, 
initiative, competence, identity and intimacy” (p52).  
Now, I too was depriving her of something she needed, which was to help 
her to feel better. According to Winnicott (1971), the therapist has to be able to 
survive destructive attacks, and only by experiencing the therapist as an object 
‘out there’, existing separately from projection, can change occur. Object 
destruction leads to subject recognition (although this is never permanently 
achieved, much like Klein’s depressive position) and this developmental goal is re-
enacted in the therapeutic relationship (Winnicott, 1971). Benjamin (1990) 
suggests that mutual recognition may nevertheless be struggled against because 
the subject/other may disagree, and this is experienced as threatening. 
Mariam then associated to a previous therapy, at the end of which she had 
felt that her reason for missing the final session had not been believed by the 
therapist. After listening to this, I said to Mariam that I felt that she was telling me 
to believe her when she told me things and not to impose my interpretations on 
her because when people did not believe her, the most terrible thing happened. I 
felt that Mariam’s illness and her grief were inextricably connected; her illness was 
allowing her to experience her grief.  
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B.7. Using supervision - containment 
At first, I used supervision as a container for my own sadness and feelings of 
helplessness. In the first three or four sessions, facing what felt like an onslaught 
of grief, I was overwhelmed and deskilled by the level of distress that Mariam 
brought. I experienced what Herman (1992) describes as “countertransference 
helplessness” (p141) and felt unable to place my trust in the therapeutic 
relationship. I took these misgivings to supervision where we thought together 
about the importance at this stage of being able to contain and think about 
Mariam’s feelings about her illness and her grief, informed by Bion’s (1959) theory 
of containment of projective identifications.  
Later, I experienced countertransference feelings of anger. I expressed 
these angry feelings in supervision. This enabled me to work through them safely 
outside the therapeutic relationship and offer them back to Mariam as an 
interpretation of her own anger at the hopeless situation she found herself in, in 
terms of her health and her experience of continuing, debilitating mourning for her 
son.  
After the fifth session, in which I experienced Mariam telling me not to 
interpret her, but to believe her, I worked with my supervisor to try to incorporate 
her resistance into the formulation and therapeutic plan. We thought about how 
words had the capacity to be extremely hurtful for Mariam and of my reluctance to 
interpret as a projective identification (Klein, 1946). Although I had become 
became more able to contain Mariam’s distress, I was now colluding with her with 
my own defensive avoidance of thinking about how painful inner experiences 
might be linked (Aron, 1991). My supervisor noticed that as I described my 
feelings of being reluctant to make links, how I felt that by doing what she had 
asked me not to – by working in the transference - I was in some way betraying 
Mariam.  I understood from this that I need to be able to do exactly what Mariam 
could not, which was to use the transference to be able to think about her guilt, 
shame and distress.  
 
B.8. Allowing links  
In the sixth session we were able to experience for the first time together the full 
weight of the guilt and regret that she felt about her son’s suicide. It seemed to me 
that all the previous sessions had been working up to this moment, as though she 
had been rationing her distress, weighing up how much I was able to tolerate.  
Mariam told me that the previous night she dreamt about Saeed for the 
first in a long time. In her dream she had asked Saeed why he hadn’t asked her 
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for help and he replied that he had come to her but she hadn’t been able to help 
him. Mariam told me how this dream was related to events in “real life” when 
Saeed had asked her once if he could return to live with her. Mariam did not think 
that her father and older brother would allow it and she needed their permission. 
She was hesitant in responding to Saeed, a hesitation she felt that he must have 
picked up. She said that she had decided that if Saeed ever did ask to live with 
her again, she would stand up to everyone and insist that he be allowed to come, 
but he never asked again, and she said she hated herself. She said that in her 
dream Saeed had been alive and she felt happy, suggesting Klein’s (1940) 
interpretation of an unconscious refusal to accept his death. I felt a constriction 
and heaviness in my chest that embodied the weight of her grief, shame and 
regret.  
Mariam said that for twelve years she had been telling herself that it was 
not her fault but that she did not really believe this. She still felt like a victim of her 
ex-husband but did not want to be and wanted to know how to forgive herself. She 
felt devastated by the thought that Saeed would have been disappointed in her. I 
said that it seemed as though that she was never going to find a way to think 
about this in a way that was bearable for her. After this, Mariam became calmer 
and thoughtful, leaving long pauses between speaking. She wanted to know 
whether I thought that Saeed had forgiven her. She asked; “Why didn’t I try, why 
was I waiting?”  
I wondered if there was something almost sadistic in Mariam’s cycle of 
self-punishment and that she was getting some unconscious satisfaction from it. 
Freud (1917) describes how the lost loved object is taken in and integrated with 
the ego so that self-criticism and hatred is also criticism and punishment of the 
lost object. Mariam’s ongoing suffering through her illness and rejection of 
treatment may have afforded her a degree of unconscious “sadistic satisfaction” 
(Freud, 1917).  
I suggested to Mariam that she seemed to be blaming herself both for 
what had happened and also for continuing to feel guilty about it all these years 
later. I hoped that this might offer a way to make a link between her grief and her 
illness, something I had struggled to do up to that point. I said that she felt sad 
and angry with herself for being ill. She agreed, then said she did not want to be a 
victim any more but didn’t know how to get rid of the feelings of self-blame, hatred 
and regret. It felt as though the feelings of guilt and grief were unbearable for her 
to keep inside herself and she had to expel them but needed a place where she 
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knew they could be safely kept. Mariam said that did want to get rid of those 
feelings because her son was gone and she would like to forgive herself.  
After a long pause, she said that she felt as though she was always 
waiting for something that might bring her hope, but that when she looked at it, 
she saw there was no hope. Mariam then sat silently for a minute or two, and 
appeared to be thinking hard. I thought about how sad this jettisoning of hope was 
for her. Freud (1917) describes “normal” mourning in which a “respect for reality” 
eventually returns (p244). And after a long pause, Mariam laughed and said that 
she had been in the waiting room when I had arrived that afternoon and that she 
had felt sorry for me because she was my first client. I responded that it was 
difficult to see how much pain she was in but that I was glad that she came. She 
said; “Thank you” and it felt as though something had shifted for her. Her 
phantasy that I would not be able to tolerate her pain had been made conscious.  
 
B.9. Bringing anger and shame into the sessions 
The content of our sessions changed after this. Mariam brought her feelings of 
disappointment at her current life situation. She had married again after coming to 
the UK but she and her husband were now financially insecure and he was also 
physically unwell. She was unhappy with the relationship and felt that once again 
any promise of happiness that she might have dared hope for had been lost. She 
was frustrated that other people thought that her life was materially good when in 
fact she felt that they were poor. It felt stifling to her.  
She said that she had always been concerned about what other people 
thought of her and described how she felt deeply uncomfortable talking about the 
physical side of her marriage with me. I asked whether she was worried about 
what I would think and she replied that she wasn’t but almost immediately said 
that yes, she was, wondering aloud why she had denied it. She said that if she 
was sad, people assumed that it was only for Saeed, but it wasn’t always about 
him, she also felt sad for the circumstances of her own life. She was beginning to 
be able to feel sorry for herself and care for herself. 
Mariam became increasingly angry in our sessions, saying that it felt as 
though her whole life she had been waiting for things to get better, but they never 
did, and she asked me whether I thought she was unrealistic to want this. She 
wanted to feel whole. As we were approaching the last two sessions, I said that 
perhaps she felt angry that I had also failed her; that the therapy would end and 
nothing would have changed. It did feel to me as though nothing had changed, 
and that I had not been able to help. My supervisor helped me to see that 
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Mariam’s anger was itself change, and that I must try to continue to hold it for her 
for the remainder of our work.  
 
B.10. The ending 
Mariam’s work will go on through the rest of her life. The task of coming to terms 
with her son’s suicide can never be completed (Brice, 1991). We made it to the 
last session, and this felt like an achievement in itself. I did not want to let her go. 
She declined the offer of an onward referral within the service.  
 In our last session Mariam arrived with all her photographs of Saeed to show 
me. My initial response was a feeling of horror at the thought of having to see her 
dead child. It felt important that we look at him together. She sobbed violently and 
said she missed him. Klein (1940) describes how crying in mourning is a way of 
expelling bad feelings and objects, creating a greater feeling of internal freedom 
and giving the experience of sorrowful internal objects that share her grief and are 
therefore comforting, like “kind parents” (p359).  
I thanked her for bringing the photographs. After about thirty minutes, she 
put them on the table between us, where they remained for the rest of the 
session. Mariam said that it was difficult for her to say goodbye, and remembered 
that she had never had the chance to say goodbye to Saeed. She said that she 
was sorry that she had given me such a sad and difficult piece of work.  
 Working in the transference with Mariam felt at times to be an imposition of 
my own ideas rather than a true mutual understanding. This ambivalence is 
recognised by Howard (2010) who sees it as a struggle for developing therapists 
to come to terms with their “power and significance” for their clients (p92). 
Hoffman (1983) says that the therapist works to let the client know that they are 
not so threatened by the countertransference that they cannot work, and are able 
to provide a relationship that departs from the client’s usual transference-
countertransference interaction. By thinking about what was happening in the 
space between us, what Symington (1986) describes as the truth that exists 
between therapist and client, I hoped that Mariam would begin to experience her 
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Section C: Combined case study and process report  
 
“Focusing on process with a narcissistically injured client” 
 
This case study and process report describes a six-month-long piece of work with 
a client who came to counselling following a medical diagnosis, because he 
wanted to understand the feelings of destructive anger and irritation that he 
experienced towards other people. From the beginning, he wanted to know 
whether his current unhappiness was connected to his mother having left him 
when he was three years old.  
 
The extract presented in this report took place halfway through the contract after a 
supervision session in which I was helped to clarify the formulation and the 
transference-countertransference relationship. Up until this point, I had been 
finding it difficult to communicate to the client my understanding of his pain. My 
intention in describing this process was therefore to examine the extent to which I 
was able to translate the theory that was discussed in supervision into practice. It 
highlighted for me how difficult yet critical it is to strive for consistently empathic 
relating with a narcissistically injured client (Mollon, 1993).  
 
C.1. Theoretical framework  
 
For this case, I drew on my developing understanding of relational psychoanalytic 
theory. This approach emphasises a two-person psychology and a co-constructed 
view of the therapeutic relationship (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983). Safran (2002) 
argues that the aim of therapy is to collaboratively focus on exploring the here-
and-now transference and counter-transference with less emphasis placed on 
traditional transference interpretations of the drive and structural approach or 
object relations schools. The therapist uses their countertransference to 
understand the client’s subjective experience (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983). 
Clarkson & Nuttall (2000) describe this model of countertransference as all 
“feelings, fantasies and thoughts” that the therapeutic relationship produces in the 
therapist. It’s theoretical origins lie with Klein’s (1946) notion of projective 
identification as an unconscious communication (Clarkson & Nuttall, 2000).  
 
Stern et al. (1998) propose that therapeutic change occurs through inter-
subjective moments that occur between client and therapist and alter the client’s 
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implicitly learned ways of being in relationship. Safran (2002) suggests that the 
aim of short-term relational psychodynamic therapy is to give the client a 
generalisable way of understanding their experience. This is achieved through the 
development of mentalizing skills; a stance also proposed by Allen, Fonagy & 
Bateman (2008) that emphasises attending to process over content and 
understanding that relating to others is reflected in mental states. 
 
Relational psychoanalysis is theoretically pluralist (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983) 
and Rizq (2010) suggests that this makes for a particularly good fit with the 
pluralist, constructivist and phenomenological epistemology of Counselling 
Psychology. For this case I have found it useful to integrate Mollon’s (1993) idea 
of the “fragile self”, which is based on Kohut’s (1977) self-psychology. Kohut 
(1977) argues that a selfobject is formed when an infant internalises the adult 
carer’s “experience” of them (p. 353). Mollon (1993) suggests that if a mother is 
unable to allow her infant’s omnipotence, in what is essentially a failure of 
empathy, narcissistic injury will occur. This will result in an unavailable selfobject 
and is expressed in narcissistic characteristics such as absence of self-esteem, 
high self-consciousness and underlying unconscious shame (Mollon, 1993).  
 
Bollas (1987) also uses the concept of the client’s relationship to the self as an 
object. He describes the process by which infants transfer to themselves aspects 
of maternal (or other) care and become their own internal object, which is 
conceptually similar with Kohut’s (1977) selfobject. Thus for Bollas (1987), the 
mother becomes the “transformational object” (1987, p60) and he suggests that 
the goal of the therapeutic relationship is to allow the client to express his 
relationship with himself as an object and through doing so, “receive his own 
discourse” (p62).  
 
C.2. Context, referral and presenting problem 
 
The client, James2, self-referred to an NHS Primary Care counselling service at 
the suggestion of his GP following a diagnosis of ulcerative colitis. Psycho-
neuroimmunology research links ulcerative colitis with chronic psychological 
stress (Goodhand, Wahed & Rampton, 2009). Stern (2010) describes the need for 




 All names and biographical/personal identifying details have been changed throughout in 
order to preserve confidentiality. 
 37 
bowel disorders, which he says are often characterised by feelings of shame, 
sadism and disgust. He suggests that the goal of such therapy is to provide 
patients with the opportunity “…to make links between bodily symptoms and their 
inner worlds” (Stern, 2010, p130).  
 
After a telephone assessment with a service wellbeing advisor James was 
referred to me for psychodynamic counselling. In the telephone assessment he 
said that his mother had left him when he was a three-year-old and he wanted to 
use the counselling to think about how this may have affected him. He particularly 
mentioned the strong feelings of anger and irritation that he often experienced. He 
completed measures for depression and anxiety and his levels of risk were 
assessed and considered to be low. He mentioned that he drank around 40 units 
of alcohol a week and acknowledged that this was probably excessive and that he 
planned to reduce it.  
 
C.3. Personal details and the first session 
 
When James arrived for our first session, I met a tall, slim man in his forties with a 
long melancholy face. His manner was understated and he seemed guarded. He 
talked about the diagnosis of ulcerative colitis about which he did not seem to 
know very much, nor wished to. He said only that he was afraid that the condition 
would worsen and that he could die from it, which he found frightening. The 
symptoms of the disease were embarrassing for him.  
 
He said that he had had a lot of stress in his life over the previous two years, 
related principally to a financial matter. He spoke of his emotional pain in a 
bemused, almost affectless, detached monotone. The content - his feelings of 
anger and bitterness - were so at odds with the manner of his talk that I found I 
was simultaneously appalled and fascinated. It was as though he was telling the 
story of another person, and I felt gripped by the narrative. Later, I thought that 
these counter-transference feelings reflected his critical need to keep me 
interested so that I would not leave him. He unconsciously understood that people 
were drawn to this damaged part of him, yet he needed to hold them at arm’s 
length, where he could not be hurt if they left. 
 
His rage was most often directed at strangers and he said that sometimes he felt 
as though he wanted to hurt people, although he had never acted on this. Instead 
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his destructive impulses appeared to be directed inwards, on his own body. At the 
end of the first session he said that he had “liked” taking about his difficulties and 
seemed suddenly cheerful in what I felt was quite a sadistic manner, as though I 




Hinshelwood (1995) suggests focusing a psychoanalytically informed assessment 
on the client’s descriptions of object relations in his present life, his early years 
and the therapeutic relationship. James was at the end of a complex divorce 
settlement, having separated from his wife seven years ago at her instigation. 
They had three children; two girls and a boy, the youngest girl Kate, who is 16, 
was the only “normal” one, according to James. He said that the middle child 
Gemma was “mad like her mother”, and the oldest is a boy, who is 22, whom 
James described as not very bright and always getting himself into “trouble”. 
James was also a grandfather, although he had never seen the child, a baby his 
son had with an ex-girlfriend from whom he was estranged. James saw his 
children only rarely, seeming to find them very difficult to be with. He had spent 
many of the years when the children were young working for weeks at a time 
abroad, and said that he found this escape from family life a relief.  
 
James has a partner of five years, Anne, a widow with two boys. He felt supported 
and loved by Anne, and was committed to the relationship but was constantly on 
guard for signs that she may leave him. Anne’s two fatherless boys irritated 
James intensely when they were boisterous or loving. If they showed affection 
towards him, he said that he felt that he could not stand it; it made him 
“squeamish, anxious…like I can’t watch it, I want it to stop”. He said that he did 
not want to be close to them, although they were “good boys” and he felt sorry for 
the fact that they had lost their father, he was not interested in taking on that role. 
Although he lived with them for some of the week, he would not let them kiss him 
goodnight at bedtime, insisting instead that they shake hands. 
 
His now-dead Grandparents, his youngest daughter Kate and his partner Anne, 
were the only good objects in James’ life. On the whole, he experienced other 
people as persecutory and difficult to understand. He was utterly perplexed by his 
ex-wife and two older children, feeling attacked and frightened by them. He could 
not understand their behaviour, which seemed chaotic to him, and he described in 
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horrified terms their disregard for property and the family home that he had 
carefully created with the proceeds of his work. He told me of a current fantasy 
that he had of going to live on a remote Scottish island, completely alone. 
 
In the first session, James told me that his mother left him when he was three 
years old. He said that he remembered the morning that he was told that he would 
be going to stay with his (paternal) grandparents. He was an only child and from 
that day until he left home in his early twenties, he remained with them. Initially his 
father also lived with James and his grandparents, but when James was six, his 
father also left to work abroad, returning from time to time, and later remarrying. 
His mother never came back and he did not hear from her again, except once 
when he was 12, when she appeared and took him out for the day, promising that 
they would go out again soon.  He remembers her buying him a present – a slide 
rule that he chose, and feeling intensely happy about this, but he never heard 
from his mother again. He wondered whether she was still alive. When I asked 
whether he had asked his grandparents or father about her, he said that he never 
did, and could not think why, saying that it had never occurred to him. At first, 
James had idealised his father but now he felt disillusioned and disappointed by 
his lack of interest in him ever since he had remarried and had two more children 
when James was still a child.  
 
His most frequent fantasy that he brought to the sessions in relation to his mother 
was that she had died and left him money. He described his grandparents as kind 
but old-fashioned in their approach to child-rearing, and described his childhood 
as “happy”, although it seemed that he spent most of his time playing alone. The 
family were financially comfortable, and money is important to James, reminding 
me of Bollas’ (1987) idea of the transformational object, in which money and 
things can become transformational objects, just as people can, and how in 
seeking out transformational objects, the emotional experience of the early 
transformational object relating is recreated.  
 
C.5. Rationale for psychodynamic counselling 
 
James wanted to know whether his present difficulties might be linked to his early 
losses, which pointed towards a psychodynamic approach. James met the 
conditions that Lemma (2003) suggests are necessary for psychodynamic 
counselling. These include adequate ego strength, as evidenced by the fact that 
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James functioned in his daily life and was able to work and maintain some level of 
relationships. He demonstrated impulse control and frustration tolerance by not 
acting on his angry fantasies. He was able to consider tentative interpretations 
without regression (Lemma, 2003).  
 
C.6. Contract and psychological counselling plan 
 
Initially, we contracted to meet weekly for 5 sessions because I was due to take 
my summer break. I suggested that we use this time to try to gain an 
understanding of his problems and to decide together at the end of it whether to 
extend to a longer piece of work. I was then able to offer a further five months of 
counselling to James. I found working with James compelling and believed that he 
would be able to benefit. I thought about how this was a likely to be 
countertransference response to his unconscious experience of feeling that he 




James’ affects, behaviour and defences suggested narcissistic injury during 
childhood (Mollon, 1993). This formulation presumes that James did not 
experience an empathic response to his primary narcissism, leading to an 
unavailable selfobject (Kohut, 1977). Mollon’s (1993) account of disturbances of 
the self describes James’ de-personalisation, helplessness, self-consciousness, 
shame and rage. These feelings defend against a disorientated self-response to 
experiencing others as un-empathic (Mollon, 1993). In this state, his awareness of 
himself as seen by others is foremost in his attention and his subjective 
experiencing self is pushed into the background.  
 
I also found it useful to think about a Kleinian formulation of schizoid object 
relating that posits that James’ unconscious phantasies are of having destroyed 
his mother (Klein, 1946). Klein (1946) describes how in schizoid object relating, 
there is a “shrinking from people in order to prevent both a destructive intrusion 
into them and the danger of retaliation by them” (p13). This is described by 
Lemma (2003) as a bad internal object that is experienced as un-survivable; to 
protect the ego it has to be split off and obliterated internally, or projected outward.  
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These two formulations are consistent, according to Greenberg & Mitchell (1983), 
who argue that narcissistic and schizoid formulations have been applied in the 
literature to broadly similar patients and reflect not different causes of distress, but 
the affiliations of the theorists who use them. Winnicott’s (1965) theory of 
psychosomatic illness also suggests that James’ medical symptoms function as 
defensive splitting, protecting him from psychological pain.  
 
C.8. Key content issues in the therapy 
 
Shame 
After a few sessions, James revealed his uncomfortable feeling that his family 
may have always withheld information from him about the reason for his mother 
leaving. In an early session, he tentatively offered a fantasy; that a mother would 
only leave her child because the child was bad. He based this on his observations 
of mothers, telling me in a bewildered tone: “Mothers just don’t leave their 
children”. He said that he could not understand why his mother had not contacted 
him in all these years. He said haltingly; “…maybe there was something 
so…wrong…with having me there, or something…perhaps”. I felt that James 
unconsciously experienced himself as a monster who drove his mother away and 
destroyed her. Mollon (1993) says that believing a parent has gone because the 
self is not loveable is “mortifying” and narcissistically wounding (p51). When I 
observed how terrible it was for him to feel that he was bad and that this was why 
his mother had left him, he reported a dream-like sensation he used to have as a 
very young child in bed. He said that while still awake, just before he fell asleep he 
would feel as though the door and the walls of his bedroom were closing in on him 
very fast, then going away and coming back in; the “room seemed to be coming in 
on top of me” and he remembered how frightened he felt.  
 
After telling me about this sensation, or dream, James described his fantasy that 
his mother could have died and left him money, and then changed the subject to 
football. After a pause, he asked me whether we were getting closer to a cure. I 
was taken aback by the abrupt change in direction and asked him what he thought 
we needed to “cure”. He laughed then and said that he had just been joking, 
which gave me an opportunity to reflect to him that when we talked about his 
mother and difficult feelings were in the room, he would change the subject, 
turning it into a joke about what we were doing together. I wondered what it might 
be like for him if we were to stay with those difficult feelings and he replied that he 
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“might start crying or something” and that he tried not to think about things too 
much in case he became upset “or something”. I wondered what the “or 
something” was for him. He then said that he did not see the point of getting upset 
and that he wasn’t even sure what there was to be upset about.  
 
After returning from a break in the therapy, between weeks five and six, James 
talked about his fear of dying from his ulcerative colitis. He said that at least if he 
died, he would not have to go to other people’s funerals, and therefore he would 
not have to be left by others. He worried about what he would do with his 
possessions if he died. I felt that he had found the break disturbing, and was 
telling me that he was wondering who to give his thoughts and feelings to. He 
valued them and wanted them to go to the ‘right’ people.  
 
Being held in mind made James uncomfortable and embarrassed and he 
experienced being seen by other people as shameful. A recurring theme from 
school and adult life that he described was of feeling acutely self-conscious. He 
felt excruciatingly self-conscious about meeting people and could not bear his 
family talking about things he had done in the past. I said that it was as if he could 
not think about himself. He described a feeling of dissociation that he said was like 
watching himself as if he was in a film. I felt that his experience of shame meant 
that James experienced relationships as completely unpredictable, vulnerable to 
rupture and endings (that he might somehow be the cause of) and that it was 
difficult for him to approach himself in his mind.  
 
His unconscious fear of abandonment was enacted in two ways. One was in a 
seductive transference relationship in which I experienced him as a profoundly 
compelling storyteller. He would ask whether I thought he was wasting my time 
(was I also going to leave him?). I felt that he was unconsciously working to 
maintain my attention through a projective identification (Klein, 1946). A parallel 
process was being enacted in my need to take the work to supervision frequently, 
where a good supervisory alliance helped me to think about transference and 
counter-transference were being enacted in the therapeutic dyad (Howard, 2010).  
 
The second way that he avoided me was through contempt. He would tell me with 
a smirk, that he liked having “his own shrink”. I felt that he was avoiding any 
emotional contact with me and simultaneously making me feel toyed with, 
diminished and unimportant, perhaps the way he did in relationships. I felt 
 43 
uncomfortable and irritated and wondered to myself whether we should continue 
with the therapy, whether it was helpful for him. 
 
Being a son and a father 
 
James’s relationship with his father was another source of pain for him. He 
described how as a boy, his father and uncle had included him, such as during 
times when they would work on their cars in the garage of the family home. He 
remembered how he had loved being with them, hearing his uncle’s stories of 
nights out with girlfriends, and thinking to himself that one day he would be “just 
like him”. His father remarried after a few years and James said that his 
stepmother had never liked him. He would spend some of his school holidays with 
them but remembers being left alone for most of the days while his father was at 
work. He felt that nobody was interested in him. His relationship with his father 
was being painfully recreated in his relationship with his own three children. He 
increasingly made links between his experience of being a son to a father whom 
he experienced as uninterested in him and his own shortcomings as a father. In 
session 10 he said: “My dad was a rubbish dad, I’ve been a rubbish dad”. It was 
one of the few times when he appeared to be close to tears. It was as if he did not 
know how to be a father to his children and found his role in their lives confusing. 
His partner had never met his children and they did not know about her, although 
he said that she desperately wanted to meet them, he was unable to reconcile his 
present and past lives. 
 
Anger  
James described feelings of anger and irritation frequently. Often this was directed 
at his partner’s two sons. In session 8, he said that he physically could not stand it 
when they cried. He could not allow himself to feel sorry for these boys, I felt, 
because that might mean that he would have to extend his sorrow towards 
himself, who was not just fatherless, but motherless too. He would also describe 
how anybody who was rude, and bad drivers, would also make him furiously 
angry. He could not tolerate people who seemed unpredictable, describing how a 
drunk or perhaps mentally unwell man on the tube for instance made him feel 
unbearably embarrassed and almost desperately violent towards the stranger. He 
said that he “could not cope with weird situations”. It seemed that the idea of a 
mind so visibly disordered, or in pieces, was intolerable to him.  
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C.9. Difficulties in the work 
 
This anger and fear came into the transference after the summer break when 
James excitedly described to me, in more vivid terms than he usually spoke, his 
violent fantasy of attacking “chavs” or “hoodies” on street corners; he wanted to 
“get revenge” and “take out some of these people”. I felt deeply uncomfortable 
and anxious in the countertransference, as though I was the one being taunted, 
attacked in some way, and that he was angry with me. It felt as though I was 
trying hard to reach James, but was failing, causing me to experience my own 
shame at my shortcomings as a therapist.  
 
Around the mid-point of our six-month contract, I began worry that I was unable to 
work in the transference with James. I felt compelled to listen only, as though I 
was being kept out of the relationship, unable to let him know that I could see and 
hear how much pain he carried with him, unable to interpret my empathic 
countertransference effectively, effectively paralysed by his rage and contempt. I 
found it difficult to think about and describe to James what was going on between 
us in the sessions. I realised with a shock that in our relationship I felt voyeuristic, 
and that I was being drawn into participating in James’ sadistic attacks on himself. 
I had an image of an empty space inside James, something missing at the centre 
of him that was being kept that way deliberately.  
 
C.10. Changes in the formulation 
 
Safran (2002) suggests that a formulation should emerge out of a cycle of 
understanding situated in the therapeutic relationship. My feelings of voyeurism 
led to a centrally important development in the formulation. Mollon (1993) 
suggests that the therapist’s empathic failure will be experienced by the client as 
fatally disorientating, leading to a sado-masochistic element entering the 
therapeutic relationship as the client’s shameful self-conscious feelings come to 
the fore and are projected.  
 
A few sessions before another scheduled break, James told me that he was 
pleased and proud of the fact that he had not “lost” his mind. That he would “hate 
to lose his mind”. I understood from this that he experienced this as a very real 
possibility. He felt that he might literally become mindless, like the drunk man on 
the train, and this thought was horrifying to him.  
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C.11. Lead in to the session and extract 
 
This extract is from session 13. James has been describing how he experiences 
his eldest daughter, Gemma (22), as “manipulative”, illustrating how he 
experiences people as persecutory. I was trying to hold the formulation in mind 
but not impose it on him, as Casement (1985) cautions. My aim in the session is 
to reflect James’ process to allow him to experience a greater sense of integration 
of the subjective and objective self (Mollon, 1993).  
 
C: Client  





C1: She [Gemma] phoned up the other week, last week and she keeps in touch 
with me, she phones, sends me texts or phones up and she phones me up and 
then she’ll be talking and I can tell within 30 seconds what sort of, the way she is. 
She told me she hadn’t got any money and she hadn’t got any money for a week 
and she really needed some money because she was at the, almost overdr-, past 
her overdraft and she’s in a lot of debt anyway, she doesn’t give her grandmother 
any money. She lives with her grandmother so, she was telling me this, but I just 
didn’t even think well, my first reaction was, I don’t quite trust you with this, I think 
there’s something going on because I just find her like I think she’s, all the money 
she probably spent on makeup or dresses or something like that, I don’t trust, I 
don’t trust her in a way about it all, but eventually I said ok, how much are you 
overdrawn, right what’s, ok, so, I sent her two hundred pounds and that would 
clear her overdraft and give her a hundred pounds for the week, but it felt, I was 
more thinking I don’t know if I trust her about all this sort of thing, I’m not sure 
what’s going on with her [Sighs heavily].  
 
CP1: That feeling of not knowing what somebody wants, or what’s really going on, 
I’ve noticed that’s a hard thing for you isn’t it, it it’s a difficult feeling for you to 
have.  
 
Comm 1: James’ description suggests Mollon’s (1993) un-empathic internal 
object. His deep sigh tells me that he is struggling. In the counter-transference I 
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feel resistance to the experience of thinking about this. I am trying to describe his 
conflict in terms of the emotions he is currently experiencing. This interpretation 
could have been improved if I had situated it in the here-and-now, such as: “I’m 
noticing that this is a difficult feeling for you to be having right now”.  
 
C2. [Sighs, and speaks very softly] Yeah.  
 
CP2: It makes you feel lost in some way, like you’re not sure what you, what’s 
expected of you.  
 
Comm 2: I feel that James experiences not knowing in relationships, either how to 
feel or what to do and say and like now, he becomes excessively self-conscious, 
concerned with how he is being perceived. This suggests an inability to empathise 
both with others and himself, reflecting Mollon’s (1993) theory of narcissistic 
disturbance in clients who have lost parents in early childhood. My intention is to 
describe his process to promote mentalizing so that James experiences himself 
subjectively (Allen et al., 2008). This intervention could have been improved if I 
had linked it to what was happening between us in the therapeutic relationship 
(Safran, 2002). 
 
C3: [Sighing] Yeah, I, I just have a bit of a distrust in what Gemma does, and I can 
quite believe she has no money, but I find it very hard to offer any sympathy or 
show any emotion with her.  
 
CP3: Is that what’s difficult, is that what bothers you, ‘cos as you were talking I 
was thinking it wouldn’t, for a father not to trust his daughter not to spend her 
money on clothes and makeup, that wouldn’t be unusual would it.  
 
Comm 3: His voice breaks a little when he says “but”. He is telling me something 
important about the way he feels about his daughter and also himself. I believe he 
is saying he can’t be sympathetic because it’s too painful for him to think about 
these feelings. I am thinking how unconsciously they are too threatening to his 
psychic integrity so he defends himself by shutting down.   
 
I hypothesise that he projects his bad internal object into Gemma, which now 
threatens to come back and attack him (Klein, 1946). He experiences Gemma and 
himself as “a secret and undiscovered murderer” (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983, 
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p.127). I think he is letting me know that he wants sympathy and emotion from me 
and I’m concerned that James experiences me as insufficiently empathic here, 
exacerbated by that fact that I interrupt him. It would have been better if I had said 
nothing at this point and allowing him to stay in touch with his feelings. In 
describing Klein’s (1946) theory of object relating, Lemma (2003) says that a bad 
internal object tends to make us feel criticised and suspicious. This seems to be 
reflected in my process here too, making me momentarily lose contact with him 
here.  
 
C4: [laughs] yeah, I know, yeah.  
 
CP4: But it’s the next stage isn’t it, it’s this idea that you don’t let yourself feel 
anything for her [Cl: no] I think, which is possibly the difficulty.  
 
Comm 4: He laughs obligingly but I wonder whether this is compliance (Winnicott, 
1984). I feel sad that my response to him was un-empathic and am wondering 
why this is happening. It would have been better if I had been able to reflect this to 
him by saying something like, “Just then, it seems that I wasn’t understanding 
enough of how uncomfortable these feelings are for you”. Mollon (1993) warns 
that empathic failure must be guarded against when working with narcissistically 
injured clients because they “have internalised the absence of an empathic 
response in the form of the presence of an un-empathic internal object” (p.60).  
 
C5: It’s wor-, worn me down a bit, from when she was maybe 12 or 13, and I think 
her Mum was also involved in this whole mental situation where things were going 
ridiculously bad, phoning up ambulances, phoning up police saying she was being 
abused, all these sorts of things going on, and I was like, and I really wanted to 
resolve this and it made me have a knot in my stomach when I got a phone call, 
worried it was about Gemma and my, really really concerned about her, wanting 
to know if I could help her, we went to people about it and, then she’d be out 
drinking and smoking, we bought her a new bike for Christmas, within two days 
it’d been stolen, she’d been out with some lads and they’d taken the bike and then 
suddenly I just thought, enough is enough, I really don’t want to be involved in this 
whole situation, then my wife, had enough and then I just said, right, that’s it.  
 
CP5: It’s, you seemed afraid as you were talking then, when you were describing 
those situations with Gemma, and it seems that Gemma touches something in 
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you which is very, very uncomfortable and frightening, something about her 
behaviour elicits a response in you which is, is, like fear.  
 
Comm. 5: I am thinking that the frightening bad object is perceived unconsciously 
as both in him and Gemma. Greenberg & Mitchell (1983) say that in Kleinian 
theory loss is experienced as having been caused by destructiveness and as 
retaliation for infantile hateful behaviour. 
 
In response to me reflecting the difficult feeling of not caring for his daughter, 
James reels out a list of Gemma’s activities, showing how overwhelmed he is 
feeling. He also links these feelings to his ex-wife, and I hypothesise that before 
Gemma, it was probably her who was perceived as containing the bad object and 
therefore as attacking. I experience how scared James feels as he describes 
Gemma’s transgressions, how out of control it all seems to him. He breathes out 
heavily when I say  “afraid” and again makes a noise when I say “uncomfortable 
and frightening”. Mollon (1993) suggests that helplessness is related to shame.  
 
C6: It was a lot of fear for me, when things were going like that it was just a start 
of my life when suddenly I’d had this family and everything was nice and 
everybody was happy and I had a lovely home and then suddenly things suddenly 
changed in the family and it made everybody really upset in the family and it, it 
just got out of control and, and I’d just, you know, try and resolve things but I’d go 
away to work in Ireland and then got phone calls about the police had been round, 
she’s been doing this, she’s doing that, and that’s like oh no, why, why is it 
happening, and er, so I’ve really, after all of this going on for a number of years, 
and then still hearing things later on for example, about a year ago, Joan [his ex-
wife] said to me oh yeah, “she’s got some er, pen-pals she writes to”, and “pen-
pals yeah”, “yeah, they’re in prison”, “they’re in prison! [laughs disbelievingly], wri-, 
writing to people in prison”, so I said, “What’s this about?” “Oh they’re alright, 
there’s nothing wrong with them”. “What are they in prison for?” “Oh it’s nothing.” 
[inaudible] Oh, oh, no, [laughs sadly] I don’t want to hear any more of this rubbish. 
So, er, then I hear things like, oh yes she’s, “I don’t live at Grandma’s any more, I 
live at this, this guys house”. I said, “this guys house?” “Yeah, this guy he’s older 
he’s nice, he’s really nice.” “Is he your boyfriend?” “No he’s not my boyfriend.” “Is 
he gay?” “No he’s not gay.” I said, “How old is he?” “Thirty-six”. Oh, I really don’t 
need to hear this sort of thing and it’s like, I’d probably shock you if I said I’ve 
really become so numb to it all, and lack of emotion.  
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CP6: You think I would be shocked if you said that. 
 
Comm 6: The word “suddenly’ is being used a lot, suggesting James felt 
bewildered by what was happening. He sounds very sad as he takes up the 
theme of fear and things being out of control. His description suggests that just as 
he was beginning to feel protected from the bad, destroying internal object 
through his material possessions and family, it came back to attack him. Gemma 
pen-pal prisoners are the bad attacking things “out there”. He exclaims twice how 
he “doesn’t want to hear this”, telling me it generates feelings in him that are 
intolerable. His comment about how I would probably be shocked suggests that in 
the transference he believes I find him unacceptable. I respond by paraphrasing 
because if I say nothing he might experience me as assenting. Allen et al. (1998) 
suggest that a better response might be to say that I was not aware of feeling 
shocked and then explore together how he has reached this conclusion.  
 
C7: I think you’d be shocked if I said I’m that numb to it all. 
 
CP7: You don’t care any more.  
 
Comm 7: I interrupted, cutting him off. In the countertransference I am 
experiencing his transferential need for me to contain his feelings (Mollon, 1993) 
but I interrupted his process in my attempt to rescue him and make myself feel 
better. This is an example of my agenda impacting on the session. It would have 
been better if I had waited to see whether he had more to say.  
 




Comm 8: In C8 he agrees and from the tone of his voice this does not seem to be 
compliant transference. I feel relieved that my too-early intervention in CP7 does 
not seem to have caused too much damage to the therapeutic alliance, but I am 
still wondering what might have been said. This reflects the ongoing tension I am 
experiencing in trying to adopt the active stance advocated by Allen et al. (2008) 
and leaving James enough space for his unconscious to work.  
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C9: I could see, I could imagine her being a prostitute, I think, it wouldn’t surprise 
me in the slightest, you know, I’d think, fair enough, s’alright, whatever you wanna 
do, I’ve told her that once she tried this emotional thing, I went round to my 
mother-in-law’s house, who’s still very friendly with me and I’d mentioned that I’d 
walked into the house and then suddenly there was this, oh no actually it was 
another time, there was a big argument about something and I’d heard, Joan’s 
mum, mother-in-law said, “Oh yes she’s been terrible recently she’s been 
ridiculous and so badly behaved I’ve really had enough of this whole thing 
James”, and I was like why, what’s going on, what’s going on, anyway next minute 
there’s a big kerfuffle and there’s all this shouting and Gemma’s there saying, “I 
don’t need to live here, I can go and live, I can go and live with my friend, my 
friend”, whatever he’s called, such a body, and I said, “Fine”. “Yeah, he’ll give me 
money if I go up to stay with him.” I said, “Fine”. “Yeah I’ll go up there now”. I says, 
“Come on, I’ll give you a lift up there”. I would have taken her up there, I really 
don’t care, but I’ve been driven to that and it, it’s just so…I, but, the same time, 
I’ve seen bits of her where she’s been so nice and I’ve just had a conversation 
with her and she’s talked and she’s been normal, I mean it might sound daft to say 
she’s not normal but when you’ve seen what I’ve seen.   
 
CP9: To you it feels not normal.  
 
Comm 9: He is struggling to contain feelings about bad and good objects being 
contained in a person (Klein, 1952). I am thinking that James cannot tolerate 
ambivalence in relationships, a reflection of his paranoid-schizoid position. I 
interject too soon in my anxiety for him to experience me as empathic. The 
emotion is evident in his voice and the atmosphere in the room feels highly 
charged as though the feelings he is experiencing are almost overwhelming. I 
think that I am also feeling at risk of being overwhelmed and am making an 
intervention to ground myself.  
 
C10: These aren’t normal things and I know teenagers are teenagers, she’s not a 
teenager any more she’s 22 but for the level of the things I’ve seen, an-, are far 
beyond normal, or teenage things. I could accept, I could accept somebody 
having a house party, something like that, maybe a bedroom getting wrecked or 
you know I could accept somebody sm-, banging the family car or something, I 
could accept all normal things, I could accept catching her smoking, I could accept 
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her smoking, I can accept boyfriends and all this, I’ve no problem with that, I 
accept things like that, but when it’s not normal.  
 
CP10: I, I sense that you feel so-, somewhat persecuted by it, almost as if she’s 
doing it to hurt you?  
 
[James breathes out heavily twice] 
 
Is that how it feels? 
 
Comm 10: As Casement (1985) suggests, I am using countertransference to listen 
for James’ unconscious communication and I feel that he is afraid of his daughter. 
He experiences a rigid distinction between normal/not-normal and acceptable/not-
acceptable. I am thinking about how right now for James there are no in-between 
feelings so a person/object is either good or bad but not both (Klein, 1946). James 
is telling me that he experiences his daughter at these times as intentionally 
harmful and therefore dangerous. When I name the feeling for him he breathes 
out hard, as though he has been holding his feelings and is now letting them go.  
 
C11: [Breathes out] I felt, that, that’s what I think um, you’re right, absolutely right, 
the manipulation, it seemed to be wanting to get this reaction and hurt people 
around her, it seemed to be hurting people that she got the kicks from.  
 
CP11: And that, that’s disturbing for you.  
 
Comm 11: He sounds dismayed but less frightened than before. I am listening for 
compliance and a false-self (Winnicott, 1984), trying to maintain the focus on 
James’ process by interpreting feelings caused by the idea that his daughter 
wants to hurt people. I am mindful that James has had fantasies of hurting 
strangers deliberately and I am thinking about the formulation and the fact that in 
the future I may want to make this transference link to him.  
 
C12: That is very disturbing  
 
CP12: The idea that she wants… 
 
C13: To hurt people.  
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CP13: Hurt people. 
 
Comm 12: I feel that it is still too soon to link his feelings about Gemma to himself 
and I resolve to hold on to this interpretation. I decide to continue reflecting 
James’ process so that by subjectively experiencing his feelings about Gemma, 
he will begin to experience more understanding towards her and himself.  
 
C14: And it’s true, that is it, that’s what we’re wanting to get to, she hurts people 
around her and she seems to relish it, she seems to enjoy this fact that she can 
make people unhappy. So I’ve had enough unhappiness really in my life and I 
don’t want to accept any more of that and I don’t care, this well, Anne goes mad, 
“you don’t care, how can you say that about your daughter, you don’t care”, but. 
 
CP14: It feels like you can’t do any more for Gemma.  
 
Comm 13: In the countertransference I feel he wants me to accept his feelings 
and reassure him that he’s not a monster. At this moment Gemma contains the 
destroying object through projective identification. By not caring, he is splitting off 
the feelings and defending himself (Lemma, 2003). I stay with my plan of 
promoting mentalizing (Allen et al., 2008), using my feeling that James helpless 
about Gemma, and describing this to him in order to provide him with an 
experience of subjective understanding.  
 
C15: I really couldn’t, I couldn’t have seen the point when I could have done any 
more myself or, even my wife. I think there’s something between my wife though, I 
think she’s, my ex-wife is slightly, something there, not quite right as well, a bit 
mental, so between everybody it just got to the point, I thought, enough’s enough, 
I need to walk away from all of this, before I go, before I lose my mind, or. 
 
CP15: It made you feel like you would lose your mind if you stayed. [James sighs 
deeply]. 
 
Comm 14: I am reminded of previous sessions in which he spoke with 
bewilderment about his ex-wife’s behaviour. My countertransference feeling is that 
it is safer for him to blame her for Gemma’s behaviour, defending against feelings 
of helplessness. I am thinking about how Mollon (1993) suggests that 
helplessness and rage are narcissistic affects that defend against shame, and 
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how these helpless feelings make him feel as though he will go mad, like 
Winnicott’s (1984) concept of annihilation.  
 
C.12. Discussion  
 
This extract demonstrates how critically important it is to strive to prevent even 
momentary failures of empathy when working with a narcissistically injured client 
because such clients are unconsciously highly sensitised to others’ perceptions of 
them (Mollon, 1993). The clearer formulation helped me to have a better 
understanding of James’ subjective experience although it did not prevent me 
from losing contact with James’ when I experienced a particular counter-
transferential pull to rescue him. I believe that this was because I became overly 
concerned with applying a particular model, in this case, mentalizing theory (Allen 
et al., 2008), which meant that my agenda impacted negatively on the session. I 
have been struck by the compatibility of the concepts of narcissistic injury of Kohut 
(1977) and Mollon (1993), Klein’s (1946) theory of schizoid object-relating and 
Winnicott’s (1984) ideas about a mother’s inability to contain infant omnipotence. 
 
Through supervision, I gained a clearer understanding of the enactment of 
seductive transference within the therapeutic dyad and my role in this. I had a 
clearer sense of a counter-transferential feeling of being seduced and will hold this 
in mind in future sessions. This helped me to reflect on James’ need to keep 
people in relationship, and the anxiety he experiences when he perceives a failure 
to do so. I reflected both in supervision and personal therapy on whether I may 
unconsciously invite a seductive transference from clients, effectively colluding 
with them.  
 
The focus for the remainder of the contract would be on continuing to work with 
process at moments in which James experiences a lack of subjective 
understanding and feared abandonment. My intention was to use the ending to 
explicitly explore ways in which James can tolerate ambivalence and imperfection 
in relationships. Towards the end of the contract, James was able to express the 
anger and disappointment he felt about his father now, and was finally being to 
mourn the loss of this hoped-for yet always disappointing, relationship. He 




He had begun the therapy with no expectation that anyone would be able to 
manage his feelings. However, in the penultimate session, James was able to tell 
me how sad he felt about ending, and that he was dreading the last session and 
was thinking about how he would feel at ten to eight the following week. I offered 
him a follow-up session for three months after ending and his mood brightened 
instantly. It was as if the fact that he would continue to exist for me, although not 
being physically seen, was enough for him to feel that he could survive being left 
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Section D: Empirical Research  
 
Understanding “altruistic” kidney donation – a psychosocial study 
 
 D.1. Abstract 
 
 The aim of this study was to analyse how prospective altruistic kidney donors 
 construct their decision to donate, and to explore meaning-making, subjective 
 experience and practices that are made available to the donor and others 
 through discourse. A genealogical approach to existing literature was taken. 
  
 A multiple-case study design and biographical-narrative, semi-structured 
 interviews aimed to produce text for analysis on two levels. These were; the 
 social implications for subjectivity and practice, and a tentative, 
 psychodynamic theory-driven explanation of the participants’ 
 psychological  investment in the discourses they used. Six prospective 
 altruistic kidney donors were interviewed.  
  
 In-depth discourse analysis integrated Foucauldian, psycho-discursive and 
 psychosocial approaches. Psychodynamic theory was applied to sections of 
 the text in which participants seemed to have particular emotional investment.  
  
 Discourse analysis generated three major discursive themes: other-oriented, 
 rational and self-oriented discourses. Participants used discourses to position 
 themselves as concerned with the needs of the recipient, to resist questioning 
 and criticism, and to demonstrate the rationality of donating. Participants’ own 
 needs were largely rejected. Psychodynamically informed analysis 
 suggested that altruistic donation was experienced by donors as compelling 
 and could be theorized as unconscious communication.  
  
 Results suggested that using the term “altruistic” for living, non-directed organ 
 donation constrains available discourses, severely limiting what can be 
 said, felt, thought and done by donors, clinicians and the public. This study 
 demonstrated the compatibility and usefulness of counselling 
 psychology and psychosocial methodology when it is applied to the 















“While some of the claims made for altruism may be overblown, the 
notion of altruism as underpinning important communal values 
expresses something very significant about the kind of society in 
which we wish to live” (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2011, p132). 
 
Altruistic kidney donation – the transplantation of a living, anonymous donor’s 
kidney to a stranger on the transplant waiting list – poses an ethical dilemma for 
health professionals and regulatory bodies tasked with governing organ donation 
in the UK. Whilst kidneys for transplant are much in demand, there were more 
than six thousand people on the active transplant list in January 2012 (NHS Blood 
and Transplant, 2012). The practice of accepting an organ from one individual to 
improve the health of another forces society to confront a number of important 
issues. These include our understanding and beliefs about the relative integrity 
and inalienability of the body, with far-reaching implications for the increasingly 
technologically driven nature of medicine, the values we place on life and death, 
the way in which we conceptualise the self in relationship to the physical body, 
and importantly for the discipline of Counselling Psychology, the extent to which 
we perceive ourselves as responsible for each other, the ways in which we think 
and feel about ourselves and our relationships to others.  
 
The aim of this study is therefore to explore how altruistic kidney donation is 
constructed in its social and individual contexts in order to try to understand the 
various subjectivities that are brought into play. Martin (2010) argues that 
Counselling Psychology research needs to generate theory that can be applied in 
the various situations in which the discipline is practiced, always with the goal of 
contributing to the therapeutic relationship and outcome. I hope that by addressing 
these issues this research will contribute to the continuing development of a 
distinctive Counselling Psychology ontology, with its emphasis on understanding 
and theorizing subjectivity, inter-subjectivity, and ethical and philosophical 
assumptions about the nature of interaction between the individual and society 
(Martin, 2010).  
 
Although practiced outside the UK since the 1990s, altruistic kidney donation has 
been legal in the UK since September 2006. In 2007-8, ten altruistic donations 
were approved. By 2010–11 this had risen to twenty-five (NHS Blood and 
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Transplant, 2012). The risk to the living kidney donor is statistically low, and is 
given as somewhere between a 1 in 3000 and 1 in 6000 risk of death and a 2 - 
4% chance of major complications from surgery (Human Tissue Authority, Guide 
for Transplant Teams and Independent Assessors, 2011). The Human Tissue Act 
2004 requires all living organ donations in the UK to be approved by the Human 
Tissue Authority (HTA). Consent from the HTA depends on certain conditions 
being met: No reward can be given to the donor; there must be informed consent, 
and an interview with the donor has to take place.  
 
In its guidelines, the HTA instructs health professionals that: “Psychiatric 
assessment is a necessary part of the process to ensure fitness to donate…Early 
psychiatric assessment is recommended to ensure there is no relevant psychiatric 
or psychological illness” (Human Tissue Authority, 2011, 51: p15). The same 
document sets out the legal requirement for the assessor to: “Be satisfied that the 
donor has no evidence of current or past mental illness that affects their ability to 
donate altruistically with full informed consent” (Human Tissue Authority, 2011, 93: 
p.27).  
 
Contemporary medicine aims to operate according to a rational system of ethics 
that incorporates moral intuition or feeling about decisions, as well as reason, and 
is centred, ethically and legally, on the patient’s “best interests” and autonomy 
(Hope, Savulescu & Hendrick, 2008, p34). These rights and principles are applied 
equally to the altruistic kidney donor as to the potential recipient of the kidney. 
The use of the term “altruistic” in non-directed donation derives from the notion 
that the anonymous donor does not receive the direct emotional benefits as say, 
a parent donating to their child.  
 
A recent report on donation for medicine and research defines altruism as an 
“ethical value”, including it in a list of other values considered relevant; autonomy, 
dignity, justice, the maximising of health and welfare, reciprocity and social 
solidarity (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2011). Finally, a poll conducted in the UK 
in 2011 found that 8% of adults said they would consider donating a kidney to a 
stranger (compared with 74% who said that they would consider it for a family 
member) (Channel 4 News, 2011). If 8% of adults actually donated a kidney, 
there would be no waiting list for transplants.  
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This chapter begins with a definition of altruism as it is applied to kidney donation 
and a discussion of the way it is constructed in texts. Next, a review of existing 
research on living donation is presented. This will be followed by a discussion of 
the development of philosophical, psychological and psychoanalytic theories of 
altruism. Discourses of the body and organ donation will be explored, with the aim 
of describing the availability of various social ways of thinking and speaking about 
altruistic donation. Finally, the aims for the study and research questions are 
described. 
 
In line with Parker (2005), the intention in this introduction is therefore to “examine 
how certain kinds of explanation function and how certain limits are set in place by 
those explanations” (p147). I understand these limits to mean the subject 
positions and possibilities for the subjective experience of “altruism” that are made 
available. I aim to draw attention to the way that the label “altruistic” has been 
adopted in the medical and lay literature. Inevitably though, through my adoption 
of the term ‘altruistic’, this research imposes a socially pre-determined framework 
on the participants’ and other texts in this study. Haraway (1991) argues that the 
invocation of a construct as an analytic device is inescapable.  
 
D.2.1 Defining “altruism” 
 
The aim of this study is to explore the social and psychological meanings that are 
constructed and available through language around a very specific form of 
behaviour that has been termed “altruistic kidney donation” (NHS, 2012). Other 
terms for this practice include “non-directed” or “stranger living kidney donation” 
(Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2011). These terms describe instances of when an 
individual anonymously donates a kidney to the general pool of patients in need of 
a transplant. The Human Tissue Authority, the body responsible for meeting the 
legal requirements of the Human Tissue Act 2004, defines altruistic donation in 
the following way:  
 
“Altruistic non-directed donation: A form of living donation whereby 
an organ (usually a kidney)…is donated by a healthy person who 
does not have a relationship with the recipient and is not informed 
who the recipient will be.” (Human Tissue Authority, 2011, p9) 
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Altruistic behaviour and motivation seem to be difficult concepts to grasp. At it’s 
most simple, altruism is defined as the motivation or desire to benefit another 
person (Batson, 2011). Cohen (1978) defines altruism as composed of three 
elements: “…giving or the desire to do so, empathy, and no motives of reward 
from the object of the altruistic behaviour” (p81). All three elements have to be 
present for genuine altruism to exist according to Cohen. For the purpose of the 
current study, this definition is considered to be sufficient and is consistent with 
constructions of living kidney donation in official and lay discourses. 
 
The concept of altruism suggests a view of human nature that is sometimes 
distinctly at odds with the evidence before us, yet at other times seems entirely 
natural and obvious. Monroe (1996) suggests that in so much of contemporary life 
in the west self-interest is the norm. Philosophers, theologians and latterly, 
psychologists, have debated whether or not human individuals can be truly 
altruistic and the properties of ethical behaviour for thousands of years. Thomas 
Nagel (1970), in a detailed philosophical justification of “the possibility of altruism” 
concludes his argument in the following way:  
 
“To say that altruism and morality are possible in virtue of something 
basic to human nature is not to say that men are basically good. Men are 
basically complicated; how good they are depends on whether certain 
conceptions and ways of thinking have achieved dominance, a 
dominance which is precarious in any case” (p146).  
 
I take the position that the concepts of altruism in individuals and giving are 
inextricably bound up with social constructions, obligations and meaning (Mauss, 
1954), and this study is therefore situated in a social constructionist framework, 
which will be discussed fully in the next chapter.  
 
D.2.2 Constructions of “altruism” in text  
 
When applied to kidney donation, the term ‘altruistic’ is used by the regulatory 
bodies in the UK for cases in which the donor does not know the recipient. The 
implication of the use of “altruistic” is that no benefit is experienced by the donor in 
the way that the directed, or related donor, is perceived to benefit emotionally 
through having given a loved one the “gift of life”. I will argue that this absence of 
obvious emotional benefits is paradoxically also the reason that altruistic donors’ 
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motives have been held to be potentially suspicious. In the literature, the principle 
of altruistic donation itself is lauded:  
 
“Altruism receives its highest expression in the absence of personal 
relationships – ie. when there can be no question of even emotional self-
interest. The gift of an organ to a complete stranger, whose identity is 
concealed from the donor and from whom the donor’s identity is 
concealed, seems worthy of the highest respect” (Evans, 1989, p19). 
 
This statement is nevertheless ambivalent in its use of the word “seems”. The 
author is suggesting that there may be something else going on here. The use of 
the word “altruistic” in the social construction of kidney donors sets up the 
potential for confusion in the way in which these donors are positioned. Are they 
to be regarded as the apotheosis of human goodness or with scepticism as to 
their true motives? An alternative, less value-laden description is the “Living 
Anonymous Donor (LAD)”, which is sometimes used in the North American 
literature (eg: Landolt et al., 2001). However, “altruistic” is the term used by the 
official body with legal authority for transplants in the UK and is used in media 
reports and in patient literature. It is therefore used in the current study because it 
is the term that is available to participants when constructing their decision.  
 
Altruistic kidney donation is constructed through discourse as a very specific form 
of ethical or moral behaviour. It seems to provoke a myriad of discursive 
responses from people, ranging from admiration to confusion, criticism, guilt and 
anxiety. In the academic literature, the altruistic donor’s “real” motives are sought. 
In contrast, media accounts construct altruistic donors as heroic, selfless 
individuals saving the lives of otherwise helpless individuals who face either death 
or the prospect of years of painful and intrusive treatment “hooked up” to a dialysis 
machine.  
 
In the most up-to-date consideration of the ethics and social background to organ 
donation available, altruism as an ethical value remains the recommended basis 
for all blood and organ donation in the UK: “…an altruistic basis for donation helps 
underpin a communal, and collective approach to the provision of bodily material 
for others’ needs, where generosity and compassion are valued” (Nuffield Council 
on Bioethics, 2011, p132). The notion of organ donation as a “gift”, as compared 
with a financial arrangement, will be explored below.  
 63 
In this study, I draw on Foucault’s notion of genealogy in discourse analysis in 
terms of knowledge, power and materiality (Hook, 2001). To that end, I will review 
the theoretical literature on altruism and the research literature for living kidney 
donation with the aim of identifying the points at which the idea of altruism as 
psychopathology arises. Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine (2008) say that Foucauldian 
discourse analysis aims to draw on different forms of text so that discourses and 
relationships between them can be studied. This means that theoretical, research 
and official literature is considered to be a type of “expert” text in the current study. 
Discourses found in interviews with donors carried out for the current study, along 
with those in media reports will be compared with “expert” discourses. 
 
D.2.3 Living kidney donor research 
 
2.3.1 Assessment research  
No qualitative research with altruistic kidney donors has been found, although 
there are anecdotal, first- and third-person accounts. Gohh, Morrisey, Madras & 
Monaco (2000) present a case study of a woman who successfully completed an 
altruistic donation in the authors’ clinic, briefly describing the motivation of the 
donor, but this is not qualitative research and makes no claims to an analysis. 
Similarly, Hoyer (2003), a German surgeon, gives an account of his own 
experience of donating a kidney to a stranger and the considerable opposition he 
received from his peers, constructing his decision in terms of Christian tradition.   
 
From a clinical and legal assessor’s point of view, autonomy, informed consent 
and the lack of coercion are the key ethical issues for both directed and non-
directed forms of donation and medico-legal discourses constitute the dominant 
discourses in the academic literature. In light of the paucity of existing empirical 
research on altruistic donation, this literature review will include research on 
directed kidney donation and other types of bodily donation where relevant. This 
approach is supported Adams et al. (2002), who suggest that altruistic donation 
shares many psychosocial features with the decision to donate a kidney to a 
relative or non-related person with whom the donor has a relationship such as a 
partner or friend.  
 
In one of the earliest published papers on living, genetically unrelated kidney 
donors, a retrospective study with eighteen participants who had previously 
donated a kidney to an unrelated recipient, Sadler et al. (1971) suggest that 
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“these donors challenge us to respect human altruism and to consider its nature 
as a further groping toward self-integration” (p86). Altruism was constructed at 
that time as incompatible with the behaviourist theories that dominated 
psychology. However, this statement contains the important suggestion that 
altruistic donation might be thought of as an adaptive mechanism linked to 
psychological change. The authors base this conclusion in the overwhelmingly 
positive retrospective evaluations given by the donors to their experience.  
 
In addition to a finding of positive outcomes for donors, the most striking aspect of 
Sadler et al.’s (1971) paper is to be found in the discourse of profound distrust 
towards non-related donors that was expressed by medical professionals 
surveyed, some of whom are reported as viewing donors as “impulsive, suspect 
and repugnant” (p99). At the time this study was conducted, before the 
development of modern immuno-suppressants, the use of live, unrelated donors 
was still considered to be an experimental, rather than a therapeutic treatment, in 
which many recipients died after transplant. Doctors and surgeons would no 
longer dream of describing their patients as “impulsive, suspect and repugnant”, 
yet to what extent is an attitude of mistrust repressed by the use of these 
prevailing discourses of altruism? Massey et al. (2010) found that people in the 
immediate social environment of altruistic donors are more likely to react with 
scepticism to the donor than those in the general public.  
 
Since altruistic kidney donation is a relatively new clinical procedure and still rare 
in comparison with directed donation, much of the literature consists of 
descriptions of how transplant clinics have developed their assessment 
procedures for altruistic donors. Altruistic donation is problematized in these 
articles, constructed as something like a medical condition itself, to be clinically 
managed and monitored for outcomes. Assessment protocols have generally 
evolved from the procedures used for assessing directed donors. Adams et al. 
(2002) and Jacobs et al. (2004) are examples of this type of article, and describe, 
in varying degrees of detail, psychological assessment and contra-indications to 
altruistic donation. The overall aim of these assessments is to establish capacity, 
obtain informed consent and avoid negative psychosocial outcomes for donors.  
 
Adams et al. (2002) review the findings on assessment of altruistic donors and 
conclude that “socially acceptable” motives for non-directed donation to be found 
in the literature are; altruism, religious beliefs, a desire to reciprocate to society 
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and a desire to honour an individual who died waiting for a transplant. Adams et 
al. (2002) point out that there is no comprehensive understanding yet for the 
psychological and emotional impact and motivation for altruistic donation. 
Rodrigue et al. (2007) support this view and suggest that agreement on the scope 
of assessments of anonymous donors is currently limited because of a lack of 
data on psychosocial outcomes.  
 
In a response to the expansion of the practice of altruistic donation in the US, an 
article by Dew et al. (2007) recommends that guidelines for psychosocial 
evaluation of altruistic donors should be based on clinical consensus and the 
principle that the donor is considered to be a patient with the same status as the 
potential recipient and is owed the same duty of care. The authors suggest that 
the following factors will protect the donor from a poor psychosocial outcome; the 
absence of psychopathology in the present or recent past, no substance 
abuse/dependence, a knowledge of the risks and benefits for donor and recipient, 
little or no ambivalence, realistic expectations about outcome, a history of medical 
altruism, a history of reasonable adaptation to life stressors, and support from the 
family for donation. Jacobs et al. (2004) argue that most contra-indications to 
altruistic donation are the same as for directed donors, including active grief or 
severe depression.  
 
Discourses of the possibility of donor self-interest runs implicitly throughout journal 
articles about living kidney donation but is rarely referred to directly. Lurking 
beneath these discourses of “psychosocial” assessment is the spectre of the 
donor whose motivation for giving is “wrong”, and not genuinely “altruistic” but 
instead may signal the possibility of mental illness or personality disorder. This 
possibility is addressed through the literature’s overwhelming focus on the need 
for clinicians to rule out the possibility of psychological disorders. 
Psychopathology measures are cited and references are made to DSM Axis I and 
II criteria (eg. Jendrisak et al., 2006).  
 
Kranenburg et al. (2008) carried out a careful systematic review of this concise 
clinical literature on altruistic donation and found that although there are 
similarities in approach, with five articles describing an interview and psychometric 
testing, there is no agreement on the best measures or assessment protocols to 
use. In the literature, “altruistic” donors are positioned as something of a 
psychological oddity, suspected as being at risk of psychopathology and needing 
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to be assessed in order to establish their mental health. The functions of these 
discourses are benign in intention and ethical in respect of medicine’s first 
principle not to harm. Authors, who are usually clinicians, want to ensure that the 
donor is protected from the risk of harm, or from implicit coercion by others. 
However, one unintended consequence of these discourses of psychopathology is 
the suppression of discourses of the morality and ethics of organ donation itself, 
about what else may be going on in “altruistic” donation. This task is left to 
medical anthropologists and sociologists and will be reviewed later in this chapter. 
 
2.3.2 Outcome research  
 
A positive outcome in terms of self-esteem is found throughout the directed 
donation literature. This is a particularly strong finding in Fellner & Marshall 
(1968). Although Adams et al. (2002) point out that it is not known whether the 
psychosocial outcomes for directed donors are the same as for non-directed 
donors, there is some evidence for a similar good outcome. Findings are limited 
however; Jendrisak et al. (2006) followed up seven non-directed donors at three 
months after transplant and found that they all had positive psychosocial 
outcomes, “a high degree of self-satisfaction” (p119) although no further follow-up 
was made. Increased self-esteem has also been found in a more recent outcome 
study of 24 altruistic donors in the Netherlands (who had been carefully screened 
before donating for psycho-social risk factors), in which 75% of participants said 
that they had donated because they wanted “to help someone” as their main 
reason (Massey et al., 2010).  
 
Massey et al. (2010) wanted to explore whether there was any justification for the 
assumption of the risk of psychopathology in 24 altruistic donors, interviewed two 
years after donating. They found that donors reported major positive psychological 
effects and only limited negative impact and this was in spite of the fact that nearly 
half of these donors had a history of psychiatric diagnosis before donating. 
Massey et al. (2010) suggest that the less than positive outcomes reported in the 
minority of donors in their study might be linked with their experience of scepticism 
and lack of understanding from people in the altruistic donor’s environment, 
saying; “the attitude of those in the donor’s social environment appears to more 
closely mirror the scepticism toward this type of donor within the transplant 
community [than that found in the general public]” (p1451). This is an important 
finding because the altruistic donor literature, limited though it is, has tended to 
 67 
assume that the mental health and wellbeing of the altruistic donor is more likely 
to be at risk when compared to directed donors, who have access to more 
obvious and socially available emotional gains (Massey et al., 2010).  
 
Dew et al. (2007) suggest a list of characteristics that they consider to be factors 
that are likely to contribute to poor psychosocial outcome following altruistic 
donation. These are; significant psychiatric disorders, either past or on-going, 
substance abuse/dependence, limited ability to understand risks and benefits for 
both donor and recipient, ambivalent or unrealistic expectations, motivation that 
reflects a desire for recognition or a personal relationship of some sort, family 
stressors or obligations, expectation of secondary gain and a poor relationship 
with family or a family that does not support donation.  
 
2.3.3. Donor motivation studies 
 
Studies of directed donors present subtle differences in discourses. In a 
phenomenological study of twelve prospected related donors, Lennerling, 
Forsberg & Nyberg (2003) divided motives for donating into seven categories: A 
‘natural’ desire to help; the expectation of increased self-esteem from doing 
something good; identifying with the recipient; the benefit to the self and quality of 
life through the recipient’s improved health; logic (no reason not to); external 
pressure and a feeling of moral duty that cannot be questioned. These authors 
concluded that the decision was based mainly on emotions and practical 
information from medical professionals contributed little to the process 
(Lennerling et al., 2003).  
 
In contrast, for “altruistic” donation to a stranger, the idea that the donor might be 
motivated purely by emotion is apparently met with some suspicion. Edwards 
(2001) points out that the concept of emotions can be used rhetorically either in 
contradiction with, or in support of cognitive processes. In the studies outlined 
above, the former rhetorical construction, emotion versus cognition, is implicit and 
underlies the analysis of the instantaneous, voluntary decision to donate given by 
Gill & Lowes (2008). The absence of a relationship between the altruistic donor 
and the recipient appears to make it hard to account for within current socio-
cultural discourses (Lamanna, 1997; Roff, 2007). Roff (2007) reviews the altruistic 
donor literature and the ethical implications of regulating altruistic donation, 
concluding that throughout the 20th century, the dominant moral philosophy has 
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positioned altruism as incompatible with rationality. Rationality has been 
constructed in terms of self-interest and moral emotions entirely disregarded, and 
this is the reason that altruistic donors have been traditionally met with suspicion 
(Roff, 2007). Roff (2007) suggests that the answer may lie in a “new moral 
economy” that is able to incorporate altruistic donation and recognise its 
generosity (p441).  
 
Jacobs et al. (2004) include a section on some of the motivating factors of 49 
prospective altruistic donors. These include a utilitarian argument for putting a 
“spare” kidney to use; wanting to help without any expectation of personal gain; a 
way of practicing a Christian faith and as a way of “grieving effectively” after 
someone close to the donor had died (Jacobs et al., 2004, p1112). The authors do 
not provide any details of an analytic strategy or methodological approach to the 
data however so it is not clear how these themes were arrived at.  
 
Henderson et al. (2003) used a prospective, hypothetical design to assess 93 
individuals who autonomously approached the authors’ transplant centre in 
Canada offering to donate to a stranger. They employed a series of mental health 
measures and a clinical interview that they adapted from a validated adult 
attachment interview. Henderson et al. (2003) found that “suitable” donors were 
more likely to express a desire to make a substantial improvement in another 
person’s life with an acceptable level of personal cost, had a consistent spiritual 
belief system and previous experience of transplantation or medicine. They were 
also more likely than a control group to be considered to be altruistic by objective 
standards, so were more likely to have been blood donors, community volunteers 
and/or be registered bone marrow donors. Henderson et al. (2003) suggest that 
contrary to assumptions, altruism expressed through kidney donation can be 
consistent with psychological health. However, the hypothetical design of this 
study means that the individuals who agree that altruistic donation is a good thing 
in principle may not be the same individuals who are prepared to go ahead with 
an altruistic donation.  
  
Landolt et al. (2003) also surveyed peoples’ hypothetical willingness to be 
altruistic donors and found that 29% of 500 people contacted said that they would 
be willing (in principle) to be altruistic donors. Again, there is a limitation with this 
finding as there is no way of assuming that these results would apply to actual 
donors. There is support from Jacobs et al. (2004), in their account of the 
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motivations of 49 actual altruistic donors at their clinic but as discussed above, 
these accounts appear to be largely anecdotal rather than empirically derived.  
 
2.3.4. Qualitative research with directed kidney donors 
 
There is some qualitative research with related or directed kidney donors. Belle-
Brown et al. (2008) employed a phenomenological approach to explore the 
experience of 12 directed donors and found that three key themes emerged in the 
decision making process. These were the experience of a loved one’s illness and 
suffering; intra-personal and social factors, and the powerful emotions associated 
with the opportunity to give someone life (Belle-Brown et al., 2008).  
 
An instantaneous, overwhelmingly positive response by donors when they learn of 
the possibility of donating has been highlighted in the literature since the earliest 
studies. Fellner & Marshall (1968) were struck by the fact that the majority of 
participants in their study with twelve directed donors (mothers and siblings of the 
recipients) reported that they made a decision to go ahead with the donation 
immediately they were asked, before they had had the opportunity to consider the 
implications of what they were agreeing to. Fellner & Marshall (1968) describe this 
mode of decision making as “irrational” (p2703) and not in line with the notion of 
informed consent, which would have been a “rational” decision. Donors in this 
study reported that they were not particularly interested in the information given by 
medical professionals, choosing instead to “trust” the doctor’s expertise and 
benign intentions (Fellner & Marshall, 1968).  
 
Gill & Lowes’ (2008) longitudinal phenomenological study of related donors found 
that donors reported that their decisions to donate were made voluntarily and 
instantaneously, without a period of reflection. This was the case even for those 
relatives who agreed to donate but later said that they had privately hoped that 
they would be found to be immunologically compatible. The speed of decision is 
assumed in the literature to mean that it is based not on cognition, but on 
emotions. Lennerling et al. (2003) also concluded that the twelve perspective 
donors in their phenomenological study based their decision to donate mainly on 
“emotions” and that there was little influence on the decision-making process by 
medical and practical information. Motives to donate were divided into seven 
phenomenological categories; a ‘natural’ desire to help; increased self-esteem 
from doing something ‘good’; identifying with the recipient; benefit to the self and 
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own quality of life through the improved health of a partner/spouse; external 
pressure (from a doctor) and a feeling of ‘moral duty’ that cannot be questioned 
(Lennerling et al., 2003).  
 
In a qualitative study of living liver donors’ decision making process, Papachristou, 
Marc, Frommer, Burghard & Klapp (2010) also report being struck by the initial 
speed with which all twenty-eight donors participating in a qualitative study 
apparently came to a decision, before they had been given sufficient information 
to make it informed, and suggest that this indicates decision-making based on an 
emotional rather than a logical process. The two modes of decision-making, 
logical and rational versus emotional and irrational are therefore implicitly 
positioned in the literature in opposition to each other. Papachristou et al. (2010) 
suggest that four groups of attitudes were to be found the interviews; heroic, 
fatalistic yet optimistic; optimistic yet apprehensive; informed and realistic and 
uncertain/anxious.  
 
Franklin & Crombie (2003) give a qualitative account of parents’ and siblings’ 
decisions to donate a kidney to family members but avoid the imposition of a 
rational versus irrational framework. The instantaneous decision made by donors 
is again highlighted in this study, as well as the donors’ experience of increased 
self-esteem after donating. Interestingly for future research, although beyond the 
scope of the current study, Franklin & Crombie (2003) included interviews with 
recipients of donated organs, highlighting the complex relationships and not 
always positive relationships that can ensue when the recipient experiences a 
sense of obligation to their donor. Combining two studies with different but 
compatible methodological approaches; a psychological study, using content 
analysis in a phenomenological framework, and an ethnographic one, the authors 
argue that living organ donation is best understood in the context of both the 
psychological and the socio-cultural domains (Franklin & Crombie, 2003).  
 
Franklin & Crombie (2003) found that although no donors expressed regret for 
their decision and all described increased self-esteem afterwards, the decision to 
donate was more problematical for siblings than for parents, and harder for fathers 
than mothers, which in some cases led to psychological distress. Some siblings 
expressed regret that the decision had not really been theirs at all, suggesting that 
implicit coercion meant that they were not able to refuse. A particular strength of 
this study was the large number of participants interviewed.  
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D.2.4. Theories of altruism and gift giving 
 
2.4.1. Psychological theories of altruism 
 
In 1970, Darley & Latané noted; “altruism presents a problem for psychology” 
(p83). According to the behaviourist perspective dominant in psychology at that 
time the argument was made that human individuals always act on the basis of 
positive or negative reinforcement. Altruism could only therefore be explained by 
the benefits it afforded the altruistic individual, for instance in terms of a boost to 
self-esteem, or through the reduction of personal distress. Wispé (1978) describes 
the possibility of a sense of moral superiority that an individual feels when they 
exceed “moral norms” (p2), which is consistent with a theory of drive reduction. 
This led to a “hedonistic paradox” being posited in which helping behaviour was 
argued from a psychological perspective to be aimed at self-reward and therefore 
never truly altruistic. Early social psychology studies of altruism and helping 
behaviour included Latané & Darley’s (1970) classic bystander research into the 
situational determinants of helping behaviour, as well as naturalistic reports of self-
sacrifice (eg. London, 1970).  As Monroe (1996) argues, this research was situated 
in “the assumption that self-interest is an intrinsic part of human nature” (p3). 
 
At the same time, biological approaches favoured a genetic explanation of 
altruism. Wilson (1978), an evolutionary biologist, argues that altruism can be 
selected for in a population as long as the beneficiaries of the altruistic behaviour 
also carry some altruistic genes and the benefits enable that beneficiary to 
multiply those genes. Wilson argues that “reciprocal altruism” (Trivers, 1971, cited 
in Wilson, 1978) confers genetic fitness on a society. This approach proposes 
that altruistic or “good Samaritan” behaviour is rewarded by the possibility of 
reciprocal helping in the future, thus increasing both individuals’ chances of 
survival. Biological psychology explains the evolution of systems of morality in 
this way and suggests that successful social living requires that biologically driven 
tendencies for selfish survival are over-ruled.  
 
Campbell (1978) provides an example of how a “social indoctrination” of self-
sacrifice can cause human beings to over-ride their own instinct for survival, citing 
the willingness of individuals to die in a war. It is the reason, Campbell (1978) 
suggests, that all the major world religions emphasise the dangers of sin and 
immorality and in doing so “…represent social evolutionary products directed at 
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inculcating tendencies that are in direct opposition to the ‘temptations’ 
representing for the most part, the dispositional tendencies produced by biological 
evolution” (p52). “Indoctrinability”, or group identification, may therefore provide a 
sufficiently adaptive advantage to outweigh the adverse effects on genetic 
selection for self-sacrificing altruism (Campbell, 1978, p53). 
 
Cohen (1978) also describes how religions stress the value of empathy or 
sympathy as a desirable human quality, and argues that this is a tradition rather 
than a “psychological reality” (p95), arguing instead that empathy, the emotion 
that has been most often used to define altruism is prevalent in many human 
cultures, notably western ones. Although at a group or social level, altruism has a 
clear adaptive function, allowing hunter-gatherer societies to survive by sharing 
resources when necessary, at the individual level it is not at all clear from the 
study of other cultures that altruism is an innate human characteristic argues 
Cohen (1978), who suggests that empathy and individual altruism is in fact 
culturally dependent. Giving is a socio-cultural act, not a psychological fact and as 
a result, tension exists between hedonistic individual drives and socio-cultural 
expectations of helping, in which the notion of overcoming personal drive is 
constructed as a desirable aim, one that is considered to confer a “capacity for 
greatness” on individuals (Cohen, 1978, p97).  In this way, altruism and morality 
can be explained as a product of social, as opposed to biological evolution, and 
the desire to help others is socially inculcated.  
 
The most current social psychological research on altruism posits that it is a 
motivational state and is related to our tendency to nurture our children (Batson, 
2011). In this everyday nurturing, central to the human experience, we can find 
evidence and explanations for altruism and Batson (2011) proposes that altruistic 
motivation is produced by “empathic concern”, which he defines as: “…other-
oriented emotion elicited by and congruent with the perceived welfare of someone 
in need” (p11). This concept of empathic concern incorporates many emotions, 
including “sympathy, compassion, softheartedness, tenderness, sorrow, sadness, 
upset, distress, concern and grief” directed towards another person (Batson, 
2011, p11). According to this definition and understanding of empathic concern, it 
must be “other-oriented” to be linked to altruistic motivation and is defined as a 
“motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing another’s welfare”, which is 
contrasted with egoism, “a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing 
one’s own welfare” (Batson, 2011, p20). Both motives, altruistic, and egoistic, can 
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exist simultaneously in an individual, and there will only be conflict if the 
behaviour to which the two motivations lead are different (Batson, 2011).  
 
Batson (2011) asserts that “a person may be altruistically motivated and not know 
it, may be egoistically motivated and not know it, may believe that his or her 
motivation is altruistic when it is actually egoistic, and vice versa” (p22). According 
to Batson’s approach to motivational stages; “Self reports cannot be trusted to 
reveal a person’s motives, especially such value-laden motives as those for 
benefitting another (2011, p23).” It is not necessary for altruism to involve self-
sacrifice and this concept of altruistic motivation can withstand a “weak form” of the 
problem of “psychological hedonism” because although goal attainment is likely to 
bring pleasure to an individual, this benefit to the self is secondary to the primary 
goal, which is to benefit another person rather than the self (Batson, 2011, p22).  
 
This approach to altruism is supported by attachment researchers Mikulincer et 
al. (2005), who link attachment security to altruistic helping and caregiving, 
suggesting that attachment insecurity interferes with the tendency to empathically 
respond to distress in others. Attachment avoidant individuals are not comfortable 
in the presence of other people’s need because of the closeness and 
interdependence this demands (although avoidant people may view helping 
others as a route to enhancing fragile self-esteem), anxiously attached individuals 
find their own distress in response to the needs of another prevents them from 
being effective caregivers, whereas secure attachment status enables a shift in 
perspective from the needs of the self to the needs of others (Mikulincer et al., 
2005). Mikulincer et al. (2005) claim that their studies also show that secure 
status does not have to be dispositional, but by enhancing an individual’s 
experience of security in attachment, care-giving ability can be enhanced.  
 
2.4.2 Gift exchange theory  
 
The majority of research into motivating factors in kidney donation has focused on 
donors who have a relationship with a prospective recipient, either of kin, marriage 
or friendship, which is known as directed donation. This type of donation has been 
theorised in terms of Mauss’ (1954) gift exchange theory, in which gifts are a way 
of creating and maintaining social networks. Titmuss (1970) applied gift exchange 
theory to the human body in an influential study on blood donation. The powerful 
nature of the “moral enforcement” of any gift exchange in a social group is 
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highlighted by Titmuss (1970), who regards voluntary anonymous donation of 
blood as free from a “situation of power, domination, constraint or compulsion, no 
sense of shame or guilt, no gratitude imperative, no need for penitence…or wish 
for a reward or a return gift” (p89). Titmuss (1970) concludes that an altruistic 
basis to donation is necessary for the benefit of society and that social gifts and 
actions enable the realization of the self because they allow an expression of the 
need to help.  Discourses of organ donation as a gift have been in use ever since 
and this approach to donations involving the human body is still dominant in the 
UK (eg. Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2011).  
 
Schwartz (1967) drawing on psychoanalytic relational ideas, describes the social 
psychology of gift giving and receiving in terms of the imposition of, followed by 
either acceptance or rejection of identity, and argues that it gives insight into “the 
idea which the recipient evokes in the imagination of the giver” (p2). The idea that 
we define ourselves through what we give to others, in other words in relationship 
with others, is consistent with a psychoanalytic understanding of how the ego or 
self forms inter-subjectively, in conscious and unconscious relation to real and 
imagined objects. Schwartz (1967) adds that being able to give gifts leads to 
reward in the form of an image of the self as “a source of gratification to others” 
(p3). The possibility of an association between gift giving with guilt and self-
sacrifice is also suggested (Schwartz, 1967).  
 
Gift exchange theory discourse is therefore useful in a general discussion of organ 
donation because it can function to provide a way to avoid asking difficult 
questions about altruism, providing an alternative theoretical framework for 
understanding. As Lock (2002b) suggests, human organs have a “social life” 
(p315), but theorising the social life of organs in terms of gift theory seems not to 
work as well when living donation to a stranger is considered. Lamanna (1997) 
suggests that this is because a gift needs to be seen by society as appropriate to 
the magnitude of the relationship between two people. The “altruistic”, anonymous 
“gift” of a kidney, involving as it does a “major violation” of the body, can lead to a 
situation in which “a person whose gift is out of line with social obligation has 
called his/her normality and social integrity into suspicion” (Lamanna, 1997, p171). 
In this way, altruism makes people uncomfortable, perhaps because as Lamanna 
(1997) argues; “Suspicions voiced about altruism may represent a concern that if 
altruism is seen to be within the normal human repertoire, social norms will then 
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mandate sacrifices for others deemed inappropriate in our culture…altruism as a 
normal expectation” (p175).  
 
The dark side of gift giving has been applied in the context of organ donation by 
anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes (2007), in a fierce criticism of the use of 
living organ donors whom she describes as compelled to give in an act of 
“sacrificial violence” (p507). She questions the ethical implications of the fact that 
it is frequently women who are compelled to be the donors in families in an 
extension of their ‘caring’ role, and the shift within recent decades in the US of 
donated organs being given by the young to their elderly relatives, which she links 
to the development of a highly individualistic society. That she does this in the 
American Journal of Transplantation can be read as immensely provocative and 
her argument against honouring living donors is one of the few and certainly the 
clearest counter discourses to altruism to be found anywhere in the literature.  
 
2.4.3 Philosophical explanations of altruism 
 
Hedonistic explanations for altruism in psychology reflect a Kantian perspective. In 
the 18th century, Kant argued that emotions, including altruistic emotions, as 
distinct from reason, are irrational and unreliable, therefore not governed by 
morality. Accordingly, emotions are not useful for generating either knowledge or 
moral judgement so altruism is considered to be essentially egoistic in motivation 
(Blum 1980). Morality, according to Kant, must be universalizable, derived from 
rational (un-emotional) process and impartial to the interests of individuals. Any 
process that can be argued to have self-interest as a motivating factor is therefore 
against morality: “To be moral is to respect others as having equal value to oneself, 
and as having an equal right to pursue their own interests” (Blum, 1980, p3). 
Furthermore, the Kantian view of morality contains obligation at its heart, that is, we 
are obligated to perform moral actions (Blum, 1980).  
 
According to Blum (1980), this Kantian moral tradition is deeply ingrained in 
contemporary Anglo-American moral thinking and experience. I agree that a 
Kantian approach is evident in the ethical and legal framework that governs 
medicine and organ donation, ensuring that a system of assessment is in place to 
assess and account for any possible “irrational” motivation that may arise from 
mood or emotion disorders in donors. This is not to say that the emotional 
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component of altruism is not recognised, it is, but it must be contained within the 
contemporary understanding and boundaries of “rationality” or “sanity”.  
 
Against the Kantian, egoistic conceptualisation of altruism, Thomas Nagel sets 
out a detailed justification for the possibility of the existence of rational, genuine, 
“pure” altruism (1970). “Pure altruism” can be proven to exist in individuals, Nagel 
(1970) argues, describing it as “the direct influence of one person’s interest on the 
actions of another, simply because in itself the interest of the former provides the 
latter with a reason to act” (p80). For Nagel (1970), altruism constitutes a rational 
requirement for action because it can be proved to be the expression of 
“objective, rather than subjective values” (p88) (although he does not dispute the 
existence of the subjective experience of the individual, he maintains that it is not 
required for altruism to occur). For objective (rational) values to exist, they require 
simply that there is “full recognition of the reality of other persons” (Nagel, 1970, 
p88). The interest of others alone can motivate an individual to act so Nagel 
(1970) argues that we therefore always have available a rational (ie. not egoistic 
or grounded in emotion) reason to act altruistically.  
 
For Blum (1980) the possibility of pure altruism can coexist with altruistic 
emotions, although he recognises that some feelings, such as guilt for example, if 
they constitute the motivating factor, may mean that helping another person is in 
fact “pseudo-altruism” (p123). Blum (1980) argues that the “crucial moral 
distinction” in assessing whether an act is or is not altruistic is not whether 
emotion or pure reason is the motivating factor but whether it is out of concern for 
the good of the self or concern for the good of another person (p124). Blum’s 
(1980) critique of Kantian morality and consequent support for the moral basis of 
altruistic emotions fits well with the relational ontology of Counselling Psychology 
because it incorporates an “engagement with and reorientation of our emotions, 
and, more generally of our being-towards-others” in a pluralistic view (p7). Blum 
(1980) calls this “ordinary moral consciousness” (p7). Put simply, it is the 
proposition that it is good to care about other human beings.  
 
The idea of “direct altruism” is therefore in conflict with the Kantian view described 
above. It is an understanding of altruism that “draws on an intuition which…has 
played a fundamental role in demarcating the domain of the moral at least since 
the advent of Christianity” (Blum, 1980, p85). This is one way of accounting for the 
tension apparent in a contemporary understanding of altruistic organ donation 
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between the Kantian argument that emotions are irrational and therefore must not 
be incorporated in moral decision-making, and the social and religious principle of 
the fundamental morality of helping people in need.  
 
2.4.4 Psychoanalytic understanding of altruism 
 
A pathological association between altruism and masochism is attributed to Anna 
Freud (1936). Freud’s is a pessimistic view of altruism that is pervasive and 
remains current in some psychoanalytic (and psychiatric) thinking (Seelig & 
Rosof, 2001). Altruistic behaviour in analytic patients is described using this 
discourse in terms of “altruistic surrender”, in which the interests of a proxy are 
energetically promoted because a severe superego is unable to permit the 
gratification of instinctual desires (A. Freud, 1936/1966, p123). The wishes and 
desires of the individual are projected into the proxy and the altruistic individual is 
able to gain satisfaction through identification.  
 
Ekstein (1978) describes how psychoanalysis has traditionally viewed altruism as a 
defensive symptom of intra-psychic conflict that takes the form of a reaction-
formation to greedy or sadistic impulses. Seelig & Rosof (2001) state that in 
psychoanalytic terms; “…altruism has been generally regarded by most analysts as 
predominantly a conflict-laden compromise formation…a subcategory of 
masochism” (p937). Meissner (2003) is dismissive of this approach however, 
saying; “Interpretations reducing altruistic behaviour to egoistic motives – common 
in analysis - are no more than ad hoc hypotheses lacking adequate evidence” 
(p163).  
 
Seelig & Rosof (2001) describe from a clinical psychoanalytic perspective five 
categories of altruism, distinguishing between “normal and pathological altruism” 
whilst acknowledging that there are potential ethical, political, cultural and 
philosophical problems inherent in such a categorisation. Seelig & Rosof (2001) 
suggest that altruistic behaviour is pathological when it is maladaptive for the 
individual, comparing this with “normal” altruism, which increases self-esteem and 
is therefore healthy. Type I, “proto-altruism”, is the species-preserving instinct 
present in animals and humans (p934). Seelig & Rosof (2001) explain its origins in 
terms of a benign projective identification of proto-altruism by the mother to the 
infant. This is consistent with Shapiro & Gabbard (1994), who argue that altruism 
is partly a result of object relations and attachment patterns internalised in infancy 
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and childhood in which early interaction combined with genetic factors will 
determine whether an individual is predominantly narcissistic, altruistic, or a 
combination of both.  
 
Type II, “generative altruism”, develops out of “proto-altruism” and is characterised 
as the adaptive ability in individuals to enjoy the success or pleasure of another 
individual in a conflict-free way as a function of an autonomous ego. This type is 
associated with psychological health and the example of a parent enabling their 
child to achieve its goals is given. This is similar to Erikson’s (1964) idea of 
generativity, which he considered to be a positive goal of mature adulthood in his 
lifespan development theory. Contrary to Erikson (1964) though, Seelig & Rosof 
(2001) consider that pure generative altruism is likely to be rare.  
 
Type III is a conflicted version of altruism, which may have “pathologic elements” 
(p947), such as when a parent experiences the need for a child to achieve the 
parent’s goals and the child is drawn into a type of altruistic behaviour that is 
conflicted because they are concerned with satisfying the parent. It is not entirely 
clear whether the parent, or the child is the conflicted altruist, or perhaps both. 
This type, although defensive in origin, can be adaptive in its effects.  
 
Type IV is described as “pseudo-altruism”, and is held to be a maladaptive 
defence against underlying sadomasochism involving “…efforts to defend against 
profound aggression, envy, and a superego-driven need to suffer and be a victim” 
(Seelig & Rosof, 2001, p934). Its narcissistic pathology restricts the individual’s 
ability to obtain direct gratification, instead compulsively defending against 
aggression and envy by making sacrifices and taking care of other people. There 
is no genuine pleasure in the success of the proxy. Seelig & Rosof (2001) suggest 
that this type of altruism is often associated with depression in clinical patients. 
The final type V is “psychotic altruism” (p934) in which the individual is delusional 
and driven to damage or sacrifice themselves for the welfare of others.  
 
In an argument for a ‘non-defensive’ view of altruism, Shapiro & Gabbard (1994) 
present an argument in favour of the adaptive function of both self-interested and 
other-interested behaviour in humans, drawing on evolutionary theory, ethology, 
infant research, experimental psychology and object relations, and suggest that 
“the optimal balance of both [self-interest and other-interest] underlies mental 
health” (p25). They do not rule out the possibility for self-interest being met whilst 
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acting predominantly in the interests of another; “…a positive emotional reaction 
following a self-sacrificing act is not in itself incompatible with altruistic behaviour” 
(p32). Meissner (2003) too argues that “healthy narcissism and… mature forms of 
object love” will increase the capacity of an individual for altruism (p175). Shapiro 
& Gabbard (1994) conclude their argument by making a case for the central role 
of altruism in the psychotherapeutic relationship, focusing on the therapist’s 
struggle to negotiate a balance between their own narcissistic and altruistic 
tendencies in the service of the client.  
 
D.2.5. Discourses of the body  
 
The Human Tissue Act 2004, which governs organ transplantation in the UK, was 
written to replace previous law after it was revealed that body parts and organs 
from children who had died had been kept by a hospital without the permission or 
knowledge of their parents with much resulting public and private anguish (Hope, 
Saveluscu & Hendrick, 2008). The public reaction to these events suggests that 
as individuals and a society, we have strong and very particular beliefs and 
feelings about the sanctity of the physical body; that to have parts taken away and 
kept without permission, particularly from children, is unacceptable to most 
people. As a result, the Act was written to govern how tissue and organs from 
living and dead patients can be removed, stored and used, with consent as its 
fundamental principle. The belief that our bodies are an intrinsic part of our selves 
does not, it seems, disappear with the death of that body.  
 
2.5.1. Medicine, health and illness  
 
For Foucault, the body is produced by, and exists in discourse. Discourse 
constitutes both the social and the psychological (Parker, 2005; Wetherell, 2008; 
Willig, 2008).  Contemporary discourses in technology and medicine, those that 
apply to death, dying and the interface between bodies and machines, the notion 
of the ‘cyborg’ (Haraway, 1991), the sanctity or otherwise of our physical bodies, 
all these and others contribute to the availability of discourses for the construction 
of altruistic kidney donation. Writing from a feministic perspective on how 
biomedical discourses of the immune system in a post-AIDS world are used to 
construct the body, Haraway (1991) describes how contemporary human bodies 
have become more like “cyborgs” – cybernetic organisms – “compounds of hybrid 
techno-organic embodiment and textuality” (p212). Kidney patients attached to 
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dialysis machines, blood flowing between their body and the machine; surgeons 
transplanting organs from one living body to another; Haraway’s (1991) 
discourses of the cyborg seem relevant to organ donation. The cyborg has wide 
cultural significance in Western imagination, ranging from Shelley’s Frankenstein 
to the “bionic” men and women of the twentieth century, according to Howson 
(2004), who argues that although enhancement of the human body now occurs at 
every level of life in the west, it nevertheless still has the apparent power to 
provoke anxiety, calling into question what we think of as ‘natural’, inducing 
“boundary paranoia” (p90). Such boundary anxieties about the melding of human 
and artificial or alien life are reflected in films such as Alien, Robocop and 
Terminator. Boundary anxieties also surface when new medical technologies in 
reproductive techniques, organ transplantation or biotechnology are considered, 
according to Howson (2004). Biotechnological advances force us to confront what 
we mean when we think about what it means to be human and the limited extent 
to which we seem to be able to tolerate being mixed up with other living things or 
machines.  
 
In a recently written forward to his classic 1970’s essay on medicine’s power to 
change our understanding of health and illness, Illich identifies how modern 
medical techniques have the symbolic power to “shape our basic certainties”, 
promising the possibility of “technologically engineered happiness” that abolishes 
the need for suffering itself (2010, p. ii). According to Illich’s argument, the person 
is transformed by medical discourses of function and feedback into a system, and 
in this process becomes to a certain extent disembodied. At some point in this 
medical revolution, a discursive distinction arose between “suffering”; the notion of 
“bearing with your flesh”, and “coping”, which is about “managing emotions, 
perceptions and states of the self conceived as a system” (Illich, 2010, p. vi). 
Sanner (2001) also argues that the machine metaphor that is prevalent in 
medicine and is so productive in terms of diagnosis and treatment, profoundly 
influences the way that bodies are conceived of.  
 
Psychology has relatively little to say about the symbolic and cultural meanings of 
the body, the self and relationships to whole and parts. For an analysis of the 
discourses around organs and transplant surgery, the disciplines of medical 
anthropology and sociology are more productive. In some non-western cultures, 
Scheper-Hughes & Lock (1987) argue that a holistic, “mindful body” epistemology 
connects the bodies of individuals to the societies in which they live as well as to 
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the physical world. This relationship between the individual and the social entity 
has been largely absent from the discourses of modern western thinking.  There 
have been pathological consequences of this estrangement, according to 
Scheper-Hughes & Lock (1987), with the loss of a sense of wholeness and bodily 
integrity seen in the way that “illness somatization has become a dominant 
metaphor for expressing individual and social complaint”, leading to modern 
psychosocial diseases such as eating disorders and addictions, or symptoms 
such as chronic pain for which no medical explanation can be found (p27). In 
Scheper-Hughes’ (2000) essay; “The Global Traffic in Human Organs”, she 
compares how the “transplant rhetoric of gifts, altruism, scarcities and needs” 
functions as a smokescreen for a much more sinister reality that exists for the 
world’s poor, who supply the organs for the rich (p192). In response, Alter (2000) 
describes how a modern culture of biomedicine has resulted in the “fetishization” 
of the living body as a collection of parts and a re-conceptualising of our 
relationship to illness and death: 
 
“…organ transplantation is the radical instantiation of biomedicine’s 
underlying ontological assumption about the body’s natural state of 
health. On the assumption that an absence of sickness denotes 
natural good health, recovery is imperative and always possible. 
Biomedicine cannot accommodate death, hence the search for ever 
more radical modes of recovery, more technologically sophisticated 
means of extending life indefinitely, and also, I think, the search for 
more radical ways to “harvest” body parts, some of them from the 
same bodies whose life is extended. Although transplant surgery 
literally fragments the body, it is a process of fragmentation that is 
epistemologically linked not just to all surgery but to the fact that 
biomedicine reifies body parts—organs, blood, cells, chromosomes, 
and genes, for example - in its fetishization of life” (p 211). 
 
Since bodies have been medicalized, discourses of the body have changed. Prior 
to the modern practice of anatomy, learned through dissection of cadavers, the 
body’s internal organs were considered to be the possession of the individual, 
whose integrity had to be maintained in death for resurrection (Lock, 2002a). The 
practices of medicine have led to the notion of organs as commodities, no longer 
the inalienable possession of the individual or their family, but as the rightful 
property of society or state. Lock (1995) argues that the ability to transplant 
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organs means that dichotomies that were previously considered to be exist 
between nature and culture, and self and other are now subject to manipulation. 
Death is no longer “natural” but something to be rejected, and self and other can 
be mixed together in a justifiable effort to prevent it (Lock, 1995). Once viewed as 
in-exchangeable, organs are now are constructed as “parts” that can be taken 
from one person and given to another, in order to prolong the life of the latter. 
Transplant surgery relies on the “harvesting” and “procurement” of organs, 
economic discourses that provide constructions of relationships between 
the person and the body, between bodies and their parts, and between people’s 
bodies to each other (Scheper-Hughes, 2000). And yet, as Lock (2002b) 
suggests, there exists a tension between emotional and rational discourses 
around organ donation;  
 
 “…mixed metaphors associated with human organs encourage 
 confusion about their worth. On the one hand, the language of 
 medicine insists that human body parts are material entities, devoid 
 of identity whether located in donors or recipients. However, in the 
 rhetoric promoting donation, organs  are animated with a life force…” 
 (p319).  
 
In these discourses, it is the person who is lost, or perhaps ignored for the sake of 
convenience. In Kazuo Ishiguro’s (2005) novel Never Let Me Go, the grisly fate of 
children who have been cloned for the sole purpose of supplying body organs is 
gradually and chillingly revealed. The lives of these fictional donors are given 
meaning only through their function, which is to save the lives of other, 
presumably more valuable, human beings. For the imagined society in which they 
have been created, they themselves have no intrinsic value beyond what their 
bodies can be used for. This story forces us to confront what it means to be 
human, because Ishiguro’s donor children are positioned as sub-human, their 
minds, souls, selves; whatever it is that we want to call the person, are worthless, 
to be thrown away like husks or shells as soon as their useful body parts are used 







2.5.2. Saving lives 
 
Margaret Lock (2002b), in her book Twice Dead: Organ Transplants and the 
Reinvention of Death describes how a study in a medical journal reports a case of 
a brain-dead pregnant woman “kept alive” by doctors until the foetus is mature 
enough to survive outside its mother’s body. According to Lock (2002b) in this 
account of the technological accomplishment, alternative accounts are 
suppressed by this prevailing discourse:  
 
“The chronic ambiguity created by keeping a living cadaver 
suspended in a hybrid state for over two months is suppressed in 
favor of a discussion about how the feat was accomplished and 
whether it should be routinized because the technology is available” 
(p166).  
 
Following the question that Lock (2002b) asks in response to the case she 
describes, it is interesting to ask whether certain discourses about the social 
repercussions of living organ donation are being avoided or suppressed through 
prevailing discourses of altruistic donation? Scheper-Hughes (2000) argues that 
the concept of what constitutes life and death itself in the western world has been 
changed in the west by transplant surgery’s reliance on the category of “brain 
death”, and that ordinary people are no longer granted the expertise to determine 
what death is. Lock (2002b) explores how in Japanese society, instating a 
medico-legal concept of brain death has been immensely problematical, reflecting 
different cultural beliefs about dying and the body. In Japan, Lock (2002b) argues, 
death is considered to be a gradual process, involving both body and soul or spirit, 
rather than a single definable event at a given point in time. Buddhist ideas about 
reincarnation also reflect alternative notions of what it means to have a body. 
Scheper-Hughes (2000) argues that in the west, death itself has become an 
ambiguous legally and technically constructed discourse. Rejection of death and a 
fear of mortality can be seen in discourses, often from the family of a donor, that 
describe how a donor “lives on” in the recipient(s) of their organs (Lock, 1995).  
 
As part of this, ageing and death itself have been reconceptualised as 
“technological failure” (Scheper-Hughes, 2006, p510). Discourses of “gifts”, 
“donations” and “saving lives” are deliberately employed by authorities to 
encourage greater numbers of people to donate. Yet it has been argued the idea 
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of scarcity of organs is itself a medical discourse and a creation of technology, the 
result of surgical and immunological advances that means that as more 
transplants becomes medically viable, more organs are needed to meet this 
artificially created demand and the “…unprecedented possibility of extending life 
indefinitely with the organs of others” (Scheper-Hughes, 2000, p198).  
 
Since kidney transplants between unrelated individuals have become possible 
due to the development of effective anti-rejection drugs and even more deaths 
from kidney disease can be postponed, the moral rights of a patient to an organ 
from another body has become an uncontested discourse. If the organ comes 
from a deceased person, their bodies are positioned as resources, to be put into 
the pool for the good for society. Refusing to become an organ donor after death 
is implied to be irrational, selfish and above all wasteful. Once this reality has 
been established, it can be argued that the extension of these sentiments to living 
donors is relatively straightforward, since most of us have after all, a “spare” 
kidney, which as long as it remains in our body can be described as being 
“wasted”. Altruistic donor Mark Moorhouse draws on this discourse: “If you carry a 
donor card, there’s no reason why you can’t do this now…you don’t have to be 
dead to give someone else the chance of life” (The Observer, 3.4.11). 
 
A leaflet that can be found in all doctors’ waiting rooms and is routinely sent out 
with NHS mailings asks over the photograph of a smiling mother and her son; 
“Have you joined the Organ Donor Register? On the back of the leaflet, the picture 
has changed; the mother looks desperate, and the young man is wearing a 
hospital gown, seated in a wheelchair, an oxygen tube attached to his deathly 
pale face; over which run the words: “Would you take an organ if you needed 
one?” The principle of Mauss’ (1954) theory of reciprocity in gift giving is clear and 
the message is unambiguous; if you would want a donated organ for your fatally ill 
child, then you ought to be prepared to become a donor after your death. Inside 
the leaflet are the statistics: “96% of us would take an organ if we need one. Yet 
only 29% of us have taken action and joined the NHS Organ Donor Register. If 
you believe in organ donation, prove it” (NHS, 2011). The leaflet goes on to 
explain that three people die each day waiting for an organ transplant.  
 
Increasing the number of organ donors is an on-going concern for the NHS, as 
evidenced by the launch of a national organ donation campaign in 2009. The fact 
that under a third of people are registered organ donors in the UK suggests that in 
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spite of the biomedical discourses of exchangeable body parts, for a significant 
number of people there remains something problematical with the idea of giving 
away organs after death. Medicine’s attempt to procure more organs for transplant 
has to compete with contemporary discourses that relate people’s nightmarish 
fears of the possibility of being “switched off” by doctors while still alive. Media 
reports of the sudden and unexpected recovery of a patient who had been 
diagnosed as irretrievably brain-dead by doctors and suitable therefore for organ 
donation are, if not common, then regular occurrences. Stories abound in film, 
television and urban myth of people having their organs “stolen” from them and 
left in a horrifying state somewhere between death and living. The use of the word 
“procure” in relation to organs itself signals a commodification that is apparently 
difficult for people to reconcile with the notion of their living bodies. Lock (2002) 
describes the “technologically manipulated death” that has to take place for 
organs to be taken from a brain-dead donor (p263). Disturbing questions are 
posed by organ donation about what it is to be alive, the role of consciousness in 
living and the idea of “killing the ‘person’ while preserving the living body” (Lock, 
2002a, p263).   
 
A discourse of obligation ‘moralises’ bodies and body parts and the responsibility 
to examine the ethics of what is happening is “side-stepped through 
objectification” (Lock, 2002a, p72). This is discernable in articles written by 
journalists who need a transplant, or who have had one, and who use their access 
to the media to campaign for greater numbers of donors to come forward, or for a 
market in human organs to be made legal in the UK. In these appeals, moral and 
economic discourses are integrated seamlessly. Writing in The Times in 2010, 
Sally Satel, a grateful recipient of a kidney donated by an acquaintance, argues 
for a radical overhaul in the way in which organ donation is regulated in the UK. 
She advocates moving away from an altruism based system to one in which living 
donors would receive benefits “in kind”, in order to meet “the dire need for 
kidneys”. She goes on: “Living kidney donors would be carefully screened for 
physical and emotional impediments to safe donation and be guaranteed follow-
up medical care for any complications” (The Times, 11/6/10). 
 
Behind Satel’s uncontested intertwining of economic and moral discourses lies 
this assumption: “If I want something, and I have the resources, I must be entitled 
to have it, and be able to purchase it if necessary. And if the thing that I want is 
part of another living person’s body, then society must be re-organised in order for 
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it to become acceptable for me to buy that organ.” Understandably, Satel wants to 
go on living, haemodialysis is miserable, painful and severely limits a patient’s 
quality of life and health. The assumption behind her argument, that we have an 
assumed right to go on living and therefore it is morally right that other people give 
parts of their bodies to make that happen, is however powerful and uncontested in 
the media.  
 
“We live in an unfair world, where health and happiness aren’t evenly distributed, 
and I’ve had more than my fair share. My act was simply to redress the balance a 
little.”  This is how Maggie Harris, an altruistic donor, accounted for her act in a 
newspaper interview (The Guardian, 15.5.10). She asked why she should not 
give her a “surplus organ” to “someone who really needed it”.  
 
“It was the idea of instantly helping to save a life that appealed”, another altruistic 
donor, twenty-five year old Luc Delauzun says, continuing, “I’m not a doctor or a 
soldier…so the likelihood of rescuing someone is relatively low” (The Guardian, 
25.10.11). “Rescuing”, and “saving a life”; these discourses routinely appear in 
the slowly increasing trickle of articles about the real-life experience of altruistic 
donors that is steadily increasing the profile of non-directed “altruistic” donation. 
The Observer calls altruistic donation “close to the ultimate selfless act” and 
something “making the difference between life and death” (3.4.11)” 
 
In other stories, families of deceased organ donors describe gratefully how their 
tragedy has been turned to good fortune for others, and that through organ 
donation they are able to think of their dead child as continuing to live on in 
someone else. Lock (2002) calls this the “fetishism of human organs” and 
suggests that this discourse is deliberately drawn on in order to promote donation 
(p72). Scheper-Hughes (2006) draws attention to the ethically questionable 
imposition of an “obligation” on people to become living organ donors and in 
another paper (2000) criticises the “medical discourse on scarcity” that she claims 
drives the market for traffic in human organs. It is an enormously powerful 
discourse. In response to it, altruistic donors apparently willingly submit 
themselves to the expertise of doctors, surgeons and anaesthetists.  
 
In November 2011 a new charity was launched in the UK; “Give a Kidney – One’s 
Enough”, in which a retired doctor, himself an altruistic donor, along with other 
men and women who have donated a kidney in the same way, appealed for more 
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living donors to come forward and donate to the four thousand patients who are 
currently waiting for a transplant in the UK. The charity has high profile patrons 
and the launch generated considerable national media interest. That it is 
remarkable enough to generate the interest it does however suggests that this 
“selfless act” is nevertheless still regarded as “extraordinary” (Sky News, 2011). It 
seems that the public may be simultaneously fascinated yet also on some level 
disturbed by the concept. The charity’s website is dominated by images of hope 
and health – a child holding balloons, a young man jumping into the sea at sunset, 
a smiling, healthy couple in their sixties. These contrast with the page of stark 
statistics on the thousands of people who are on the waiting list for a kidney and 
how many die each year waiting. It states that the aim of the charity is to “raise 
awareness” and “support people who are considering this type of donation”. 
Altruistic donors give testimony as to the value of what they have accomplished, in 
compelling terms. They say: “I knew immediately that this was something I felt I 
might be able to do” and; “Immediately my heart just told me this was something I 
really wanted to do” (http://www.giveakidney.org/personal-stories/giving.html). 
Monroe (1996), in a study of notably altruistic individuals, argues that this 
immediate recognition occurs because altruistic people have a different sense of 
what is “normal”, describing the spontaneous nature of the decision as “reflexive”, 
(p210).  
 
2.5.3. The psychoanalytic subject and the body 
 
The methodology of this study draws on a psychosocial research paradigm (Frosh 
& Saville Young, 2008) which posits that social and the psychic accounts be 
treated as separate and equally privileged entities (Clarke, 2008). Psychosocial 
researchers work from within a range of qualitative psychology and sociology 
perspectives, with various discursive and narrative approaches, informed by an 
interest in different psychoanalytic theories, including those of Freud, Lacan, Klein 
and the Object Relations theorists. My understanding is that in spite of this wide 
set of theoretical resources, there exists a broadly similar epistemological goal of 
developing a method that is capable of critically exploring the complex interaction 
of social and intra-psychic factors that occurs when an individual engages with the 
discursive tools available to them. Frost & Hoggett (2008) characterise the 
“psychosocial subject” as one “in a world of power relations…with agency, though 
not necessarily in a position to exercise this reflexively” (p440). The 
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epistemological and theoretical bases of the methodology of the current study will 
be discussed at greater length in the next chapter.  
 
Frosh (1999) writes: “The object of psychoanalytic knowledge is subjectivity, the 
flowing, changing, productive and disjointed experience that each of us has of 
ourselves and the world, and the pattern of linkages that this subjectivity has with 
unconscious and with external events” (p9). This focus on subjectivity makes 
psychoanalysis a rich and compelling resource for Counselling Psychology 
research. The psychoanalytic subject, self or mind is understood as being a 
dynamically unconscious one, as well as an embodied one (in which the body 
includes the brain and conscious experience). While the anthropological and 
sociological perspectives on the body reviewed in the previous section are 
interested in the way that bodily manifestations flow in the direction of social to 
individual, from outside to inside, psychoanalysis is interested in the way in which 
physical symptoms are generated in the individual mind, from inside to out. 
 
Freud (1923) described the development of the ego in terms of the body. The 
Freudian psyche interprets and thus is structured by drives and instincts that 
begin in the body (Lemma, 2010). In Freud and Lacan’s theory, the ego, or “I”, is 
created to give a reassuring sense of unity to the body and its conflicting drives. 
But for Lacan, the function of the ego and an “integrated self” is delusional 
because “…each subject knows that it is not really whole, that this seeming-self is 
a bare cover for something disturbing” (Frosh, 1999, p144). The ego protects itself 
from anxiety by repressing or altering feelings that are intolerable through the use 
of defences. The body may play a central role in these defensive mechanisms. 
The experience of anxiety or trauma may be translated bodily into a panic attack 
for instance, with frightening physical symptoms such as an increased heart rate, 
sweating, and the feeling of not being able to breathe. Depression too, manifests 
itself physically, with exhaustion or insomnia.  
 
In psychoanalytic thinking about object relations, the way in which we 
unconsciously relate to our selves and others, the role of phantasy is central. 
From this perspective, our experience of ourselves, other people and being in the 
world is mediated through unconscious fantasy. The psychoanalytic subject is 
constructed through integration of experiences of the real and the fantasised 
(Mitchell, 2000). Benjamin (1990/1999) argues that object relations theory does 
not address directly “…the difference between object and other”, and questions 
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this “unfortunate tendency” to elide the question of what is a ‘real’ other (subject) 
and what is an internal representation (object) (p184). In her theory of inter-
subjectivity, Benjamin (1990) argues that a relational psychoanalysis needs to be 
able to conceptualise how individuals experience the other as both object and 
subject. The developmental shift from complementarity to mutuality leads to the 
dismantling of omnipotence and the end of the constant trading back and forth of 
power in the mother-child relationship, but if mutual recognition is not possible for 
any reason, then intra-psychic experience dominates and relating is to the 
internal object at the expense of a genuine inter-subjectivity (Benjamin, 1990).  
 
Psychoanalysis recognises that physical symptoms and illness may, like 
language, be thought of as a form of unconscious communication that function 
instead of language, their role is to telegraph the individual’s subjective 
experience of mind. Illness symptoms can function as communication in cases 
where language about traumatic feelings is not possible and the feelings cannot 
be symbolised (Meissner, 2006). Winnicott (1964/1989) describes psycho-somatic 
illness from a developmental perspective as a “defensive organisation” and 
emphasises that in such cases, priority should be given to treating the mind over 
the bodily symptoms:  
 
“Illness in psychosomatic disorder is not the clinical state expressed in 
terms of somatic pathology or pathological functioning (colitis, asthma, 
chronic eczema). It is the persistence of a split in the patient’s ego-
organization, or of multiple dissociations, that constitutes the true illness” 
(p103).  
 
Winnicott is suggesting that the ego, or self, in a disintegrated state leads to the 
physical illness. Meissner (2006) describes how a contemporary Kleinian 
approach would think of psychosomatic illness as a splitting off or dissociating 
from the bad part-object in order to separate it from the self, and project it into the 
affected (ill) body system. The dynamic processes that are unconsciously 
expressed in physical symptoms represent subjective experiences that cannot be 
thought about (Meissner, 2006).  
 
In her psychoanalytically informed study of body modifications, Lemma (2010) 
suggests that for some individuals, making changes to the body (in Lemma’s 
study, the surface of the body, but I think that this is also relevant to deliberately 
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changing the internal structure of the body) is a way of defensively maintaining the 
split between mind and body in which the mind is “self” and the body is “other”. 
Lemma (2010) suggests that the way in which we relate to our bodies concretely 
marks the way we feel about ourselves and others and contends that when 
individuals feel compelled to dramatically change their body, something is being 
managed in relation to the individual’s feelings towards another (in Lemma’s 
formulation it is the mother). This may be a way of reclaiming or re-appropriating 
the body from the other, or a way of attacking the other by disfiguring the self, and 
Lemma (2010) suggests that if the individual is not able to enact this phantasy, 
they are unable to hold onto a feeling of integration and the sense of self is 
unbearably fragmented.  
 
D.2.6 Aims of current research  
 
My aims for this qualitative study are twofold.  Firstly, I want to explore how 
prospective altruistic kidney donors discursively construct and position themselves 
when asked about their decision to donate a kidney. Secondly, in the context of 
this socially constructed analytic framework, I want to engage with the intra-
psychic and inter-subjective aspects of participants’ decisions to become altruistic 
kidney donors and to reflexively explore whether it is possible to provide a 
theoretically meaningful, non-pathologising interpretation of participants’ 
subjectivity. 
 
This methodological approach takes a social constructionist approach to language 
and incorporates the following theoretical ideas: A Foucauldian-inspired treatment 
of the discourses that relate to altruistic kidney donation has been presented 
above (Hook, 2007). In the analytic strategy I have also drawn on Wetherell & 
Potter’s (1992), and Wetherell’s (1998) psycho-discursive approach, focusing on 
interpretive repertoires and the subject positions made available. Finally, I have 
included a psycho-dynamically informed analysis of three participants’ emotional 
investment in the discourses and subject positions they take up during the 
research interview (Frosh & Saville Young, 2008; Frosh & Emerson, 2005; Parker, 
2005). These analytic strategies have not been applied in a linear fashion, as this 
proved to be unworkable. Instead I have found that I have needed to move 
backwards and forwards between the two, in a reflection of the epistemological 
tension that exists between the social and intra-psychic perspectives. In applying 
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the different levels of analysis, I have found it useful to consider Britton’s (1988) 
‘third position’ approach to theory as a way of moving between analytic positions.  
 
Broadly, my intention in choosing this integrated approach to methodology has 
been to try to reflexively address the ethical problem of being directly implicated in 
the power relationships that reside in the “institutionalised hierarchies and 
discourses of pathology” (Frosh & Emerson, 2005, p310). This is important 
because although this study is rooted in the non-pathologising, pluralistic practice 
of Counselling Psychology (Rizq, 2010), and I hope to be able to suggest an 
alternative account of altruistic donor motivation to that which currently exists in 
the literature, it must be explicitly acknowledged that it is also unavoidably 
confined by a particular discursive backdrop and that any alternative account has 
unavoidable epistemological limits on it. 
 
Another factor driving the psychosocial approach of this study is the epistemic 
question of whether it is possible to make genuinely bottom-up, psychologically 
meaningful interpretations from talk. I am drawn to Frost & Hoggett’s (2008) 
description of the psychosocial paradigm as one in which the subject is 
conceptualised as “ambivalent and emotionally driven” and defined by, but not 
existing solely, in language (p440). One level of interpretation in this study 
therefore incorporates the use of relational psychoanalytic theory, firmly grounded 
in interview text and reflexive practice. I am mindful that in using psychoanalytic 
ideas in research there is a risk of a deterministic, top-down interpretation (Parker, 
2005; Frosh & Baraitser, 2008), the imposition of a pathologising alternative 
discourse on participants’ own discourses, and for the boundaries between 
research and clinical practice to become blurred (Kvale, 2003). This awareness 












D.2.7. Research questions  
 
The main research questions:  
 
i) How do the participants use discourses or discursive repertoires to 
construct altruistic kidney donation?  
 
ii) What subject positions, practices and possibilities for subjective 
experience do these donor discourses allow? 
 
iii) Why these discourses? Is it possible to explain donors’ emotional 



























D.3. METHODOLOGY CHAPTER - PSYCHOSOCIAL RESEARCH  
 
D.3.1 PART ONE – METHODOLOGY  
 
3.1.1. Reminder of research questions 
 
In this section, I develop an argument for the epistemological stance taken in the 
current study. The research questions to be addressed in this study are:  
 
i) How do the participants use discourses or discursive repertoires to 
construct altruistic kidney donation?  
 
ii) What subject positions, practices and possibilities for subjective 
experience do these donor discourses allow? 
 
iii) Why these discourses? Is it possible to explain donors’ emotional 
investments in their discursive positions using psychoanalytic theory?  
 
3.1.2. The turn to language – social constructionism  
 
This study takes a social constructionist approach. According to Burr (2003), a 
social constructionist research paradigm rejects positivist notions of empirical 
investigation and the existence of an essentialist, fixed external reality that can be 
definitively described or proved. Instead, social constructionism takes a critical 
approach to knowledge and assumes that individuals construct historically and 
culturally specific accounts of the world, representing it in thought and in 
communication with others, using language or other symbols (Burr, 2003). The 
role of language is therefore central. Social constructionist psychology posits that 
language precedes thought, since it is culturally specific concepts and categories 
that provide the building blocks and frameworks of meaning for the way 
individuals think and speak. The widely observable fact that different traditions 
and professional disciplines have different ways of describing the same object 
illustrates this argument, according to social constructionist theorist Kenneth 
Gergen (2009). This means that research from within a social constructionist 
perspective is not concerned with providing a true versus false account but is 
interested in how facts are constructed in society as facts and the consequences 
these particular constructions have for people (Wetherell & Potter, 1992).  
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A focus on language leads to arguments about what, if anything, can be 
definitively known about the internal experience of being human, with highly 
significant implications for the theory and practice of psychology in terms of 
whether it is ever possible to understand in any meaningful way the subjective 
experience of another individual. In contemporary psychoanalytic theory, 
subjectivity is assumed to be the result of the integration of fantasy and reality, 
and as such can also be thought of as constructivist in its understanding of reality 
(Mitchell & Aron, 1999). In strict relativist terms, Gergen (2009) contends that the 
way we think and talk about ourselves and others is determined not by any 
singular material reality, but solely by practice traditions, and it is therefore social 
relationships that determine how we come to know the world. This suggests that 
we make meaning of our internal and external worlds through our relationships, 
and the inter-subjective epistemology of social constructionism can circumvent the 
hermeneutic problem of validity in interpreting language (Gergen, 2009). 
 
 “One’s performances are thus possessions not of the mind but 
 relationship; they are inhabited not only by a history of relationships 
 but as well by the relationships by which they are directed. By 
 making these two theoretical  moves, first treating psychological 
 discourse as performance and then embedding performances within 
 relationships, we are now positioned to see the entire vocabulary  of 
 the mind as constituted by and within relationship. There is no fully 
 private self, as in the traditional accounts. Rather, there is embodied 
 action, and such action has meaning within and because of 
 relationship” (Gergen, 2009, p100). 
 
A relativist approach of the social constructionist perspective has been criticised 
by Cromby & Nightingale (1999), who argue that in psychology, the “turn to 
language” has led to a failure to account for power, materiality and embodiment, 
arguing that it is neither possible nor desirable to reduce all aspects of life to 
discourse. Parker (1992) takes a similar critical realist approach to discourse, 
critiquing “the mistaken idea that discourses create all we know and could 
know…” (p25). Burr (2003) contends that a social constructionist psychology must 
be able to address individual differences in selfhood and embodiment if it is to be 
considered actually psychological and not leave us with “an empty person” (p119). 
In arguing for critical-realist ontology in social constructionist psychology, 
Nightingale & Cromby (1999) cite the problem of experiences for which we have 
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no words, the times when “our lives are more than we can say” (p222). The 
research questions in the current study aim to take account of these criticisms of a 
relativist social constructionist epistemology by attending to subjectivity.  
 
3.1.3 Foucault and discourse - relevance and limitations  
 
In a review of recent research that is grounded in the thinking of Michel Foucault, 
Miller (2008) suggests that Foucault is interested in how discourses, or ways of 
knowing, bring people and various realities into being and the social 
consequences of those ways of being. Foucauldian discourse analysis is therefore 
interested in how discourses are used in the production of subjectivity and 
selfhood and the power relations that are the result of language in relationships 
(Burr, 2003). It incorporates the idea that discourses influence how ideas are 
applied and regulated in practice by experts.  
 
The current study draws on Foucault’s (1980) concept of discourse as a system 
for representing knowledge at particular historical, social and cultural junctures. 
Foucault (1978) contends that different institutions produce a multiplicity of 
discourses and the knowledge represented by discourses is then recruited into 
power relations in institutional settings such as medicine, law and psychology. 
Wetherell & Potter (1992) draw on this notion of discourse or discursive practice 
as actively “constitutive” of social and psychological processes and propose that 
the aim of discursive psychology is to look for the processes by which claims 
become communicated as fact and thereby empowered as “truth” (p62).  
 
Foucault (1978) traces the point at which the human body and living, rather than 
simply death, became subject to power relations, to the seventeenth century in 
Europe; “…it was the taking charge of life, more than the threat of death, that gave 
power its access even to the body” (p143). The result, Foucault (1978) suggests, 
is that: “A normalising society is the historical outcome of a technology of power 
centred on life” (p144). The body is the site of this disciplinary power; the activities 
of individuals are bounded and defined by institutions such as medicine, 
psychiatry and the law, and those who violate the boundaries are punished 
(Coupland & Gwyn, 2003). For Foucault though, power is not necessarily 
repressive, it can also be productive and it is for this reason that people at times 
accept power and willingly seem to participate in taking up a clinical gaze.  
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The “discursive construction” under scrutiny – the practice of altruistic kidney 
donation in the UK – is situated in a particular medical context in which assessment 
of the donor by a psychologist is a largely unquestioned aspect of the process. The 
explicit intention of assessment is to protect the donor from psychological harm as 
a result of their action, yet there are many practices that individuals engage in that 
offer the prospect for psychological harm in which assessment is not required by 
society or the law. In line with Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine’s (2008) description of 
the importance of a genealogical approach to Foucauldian research, I want to draw 
attention to the role that the historical medicalization of the body and the mind 
plays in this assumption, the implications for power relations that exist within this 
medicalization, where one individual is invested with power through “knowledge”.  
 
Psychology as a discipline has contributed to this construction of distinctions 
between “sanity” and “madness” which is inherent in the practice of psychological 
assessment. According to current psychological and practice, this particular 
intention on the part of an individual is taken to suggest the possibility of 
“madness”. Although it is beyond the scope of the current study, one goal of a full 
Foucauldian inquiry would be to interrogate this assumption, charting the history of 
the medicalization of the body, and the historical antecedents of assessment in 
psychology and medicine. In this way, it could be shown how historically specific 
social constructions have led to the assumption that the desire to give away an 
internal organ is a possible indication that the individual is not thinking “normally”. 
 
Before 2006, altruistic non-directed kidney donation was not legal in the UK but 
with a change in the law, official discourses of individual, medical and legal 
capacity were amended in order to permit what had hitherto been a practice 
defined as an unacceptable medical practice. I argue that this is consistent with 
Foucault’s description of a “regime of truth” (1980, p131).  
 
 “Each society…has its general politics of truth: that is the types of 
discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms 
and instances  which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, 
the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures 
accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are 
charged with saying what counts as true” (Foucault, 1980, p131).  
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Following Hall’s (2001) description of the operation of a ‘regime of truth’, if it is 
believed by health professionals, regulatory bodies, the public, that wanting to 
donate a kidney to a stranger is not a “sane” or rational thing to do, then the 
would-be donor needs to be protected from harm. According to Foucault (1980), 
related practices will mean that this becomes true in its effects and the practice is 
made illegal, confirming that anyone wanting to pursue this practice is misguided, 
or may even be “mad”. In this way, Foucault allows us to look at the ways in which 
psychology becomes a “subjectifying form of power-knowledge” (Hook, 2007, p2). 
Hook (2001) argues that Foucauldian discourse analysis in psychology research 
must be genealogical in approach and refer to materiality, without which discourse 
analysis is merely “a decontextualized set of hermeneutic interpretations” (p542). 
 
This relationship between psychological “knowledge” and power has obvious 
implications for the practice of living organ donation, recruiting professionals who 
are tasked with carrying out psychological and medical assessments and risks 
subjectifying donors who come forward wanting to donate a kidney to a stranger. 
In terms of practice, it seems that many health professionals simply do not know 
what or how to think about altruistic donation. It is also interesting that in the 
discourses surrounding altruistic kidney donation, the recipient is generally silent, 
positioned from the start as a victim. This tension that is inherent in the practice of 
altruistic donation is interesting in the context of Hook’s (2007) description of 
Foucault’s approach, in which we are required to “reassess notions of a natural 
universal psychological subjectivity” (p4).  
 
3.1.4. Debates about agency and subjectivity 
 
The concept of psychological subjectivity is a problem for Foucauldian thought. 
Foucault is “anti-hermeneutic”, meaning that he makes no attempt to look for 
actual meaning, and what we understand as “truth” is a representation of 
“powerful knowledge” with which subjects are created (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, 
p81). Foucault (1980) advises getting “rid of the subject itself”, in contrast with a 
phenomenological epistemology and its focus on the subject (p117). Foucault 
(1982) seems to be saying that individuals’ constructions of subjectivity are bound 
by readings of discourses that are determined by others, producing 
subjectification rather than subjectivity. But Burr (2003) suggests that by using 
self-reflection and common sense we can argue with Foucault’s stance and say 
that individuals can and do actively appropriate discourses to their own ends 
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(Burr, 2003). Hall (2001) also questions Foucault’s account of the fixed nature of 
the subject positions that are available to individuals through the use of discourse, 
and argues that accounting for individual agency is problematic in Foucauldian 
discourse analysis. Hollway (1989) suggests that Foucauldian analysis is not able 
to account for individual differences in adopting discourses, while Wetherell (2005) 
calls this problem the “agency/structure debate” in social psychological research 
(p169). Wetherell’s (2005) solution to the dilemma of agency is to suggest that it is 
most usefully thought of as a discursive resource, to be sometimes recruited by 
individuals, in the same way they sometimes construct their behaviour in terms of 
external determinants. 
 
I argue that a similar tension is also of theoretical interest to counselling 
psychology, which can be argued to occupy a similarly uneasy position of striving 
to privilege agency and subjectivity, whilst operating within an existing 
knowledge/power infrastructure of the current psychological and psychiatric 
‘regime of truth’. Miller (2008) suggests that in his later work, Foucault does in fact 
offer what seems to be greater scope for agency with a focus on ethical ways of 
being and morality as a way of self-governance, or relationship to the self. This 
later Foucauldian emphasis on individual ethics and morality – “the technology of 
the self” (Miller, 2008, p19), grants greater freedom to individuals to reflect on how 
they are subjectively positioned in relation to discourses and power, but it is 
nevertheless still “a freedom within limits” (p265). Willig (2005) agrees it is 
possible to take a Foucauldian stance to the way in which individuals are 
“constituted by historically and culturally specific discourses and practices, and at 
the same time acknowledge that this subject experiences him/herself as thinking, 
as feeling, as embodied” (p32). Willig (2005) argues that integrating Foucault’s 
genealogical method with an interest in the subjective experience of individuals in 
this way is valuable because it enables us as practitioners to explore “alternative 
subjectivities” with the people we work with (p33). At this point I am drawn to Frost 
& Hoggett’s (2008) psychosocial concept of the “social subject with agency, 
though not necessarily in a position to exercise this reflexively” (p440).  
 
Parker (1999) argues that a critical realist psychology needs to emphasise 
agency, phenomenology and self-awareness, and suggests that Foucault’s 
constructionist “regime of truth” fails to accomplish this. Yet a purely humanist 
approach to research is also unsatisfactory, according to Parker (1999), as it 
relies too heavily on phenomenology and neglects discussion about the ways in 
 99 
which individuals construct subjectivity. Parker suggests that in order to reconcile 
these epistemological weak spots, psychology researchers need to reflect 
critically on the use of theory and analytic strategies and describes the need for “a 
critical reflexive humanist approach in constructionist psychology” (1999, p24).  
 
3.1.5. Positioning theory and interpretive repertoires 
 
Willig (2008) describes how various theoretical and non-theoretical concepts have 
been applied to discourse in order to provide a more satisfactory account of 
subjectivity in discourse analytic research. Davies & Harré’s (1990) theory of 
positioning is one such approach to discourse analysis that can also be used as a 
way of engaging with the active role the individual plays in choosing discourses: 
“A subject position incorporates both a conceptual repertoire and a location for 
persons within the structure of rights for those that use that repertoire” (p262). 
 
Davies & Harré (1990) contend that individuals are constructed through using a 
multiplicity of sometimes contradictory discursive practices but these are not 
completely constraining, allowing the individual to choose whether to engage or 
not with them depending on the subject positions they can provide: “…the stories 
through which we make sense of our own and others’ lives” (p263). Burr (2003) 
suggests that positioning theory allows us to think about the subjective experience 
of discourses and therefore ourselves, describing how when individuals use 
discourses in social situations, others are also positioned, intentionally or 
otherwise. We may resist the positions we are placed in and negotiation may be 
required until both parties are satisfied with the positions available to them (Burr, 
2003).  
 
Positioning theory can therefore be argued to offer a partial solution to the ‘agency 
problem’ in Foucault’s thinking and will be used in the current study to explore the 
ways that individuals actively negotiate and construct their subjective experience 
(Burr, 2003). This notion of positioning in discourse analysis is supported by 
Parker (1999), who suggests that when accounting for individuals’ use of 
discourses, it is necessary to consider how available discourses lead to the 
creation of “spaces” for certain things to be said and positions taken, and 




Wetherell (1998) however, questions whether discourse is in fact the ‘active agent’ 
in positioning, suggesting that it is participants’ accountability and the 
conversational activity that emerges from it that drives positioning; “…what a 
subject position comes to be is only partly the consequence of which discourse it 
can be assigned to” (p401). In place of the Foucauldian notion of discourse, 
Wetherell (1998) uses the more situated concept of ‘interpretive repertoires’ – “a 
culturally familiar and habitual line of argument comprised from recognisable 
themes” (p401), arguing for the analytic focus in discourse analysis to be on 
actual social interaction. 
 
Wetherell (1998) and Potter & Wetherell (1987) argue for a synthesis of discursive 
and Foucauldian-inspired influences to create a more useful analytic approach to 
discourse. Wetherell (1998) suggests a stance in which Foucault’s post-
structuralist theory of discourse and a focus on talk-in-interaction derived from 
conversation analysis can be read in terms of the other. This leads to the 
understanding that in any interaction between people, many subject positions are 
available to be taken and that discursive practices constitute subjectivity, including 
psychological states and identities, in a genealogical context (Wetherell, 1998). 
Thus in addition to Foucauldian theory, Wetherell’s (2005) “psycho-discursive” 
practices provide a useful analytic approach for the current study (p80).  
 
3.1.6. The turn to the relational – the psychosocial research paradigm  
 
Psychosocial methodology offers a third approach to reconciling the conceptual 
gap between social constructionist epistemology and critical-realist ontology, and 
is capable of theorising subjectivity. Frosh (2003) describes how psychosocial 
research aims to account for what happens to a person from both social and 
psychological perspectives and of how they make meaning from it:  
 
“Both bound and free, more than what forms them yet only existing 
as a consequence of the constructing processes of sociality – this is 
the painful state from which human subjects have to use agency and 
imagination to make something of themselves” (p1553).  
 
Frosh, Phoenix & Pattman (2003) describe how psychosocial methodology 
integrates psychoanalytic theory on inter-subjectivity and the co-constructed 
nature of relationships with a Foucauldian approach to constraining discourses, 
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and the way that identity positions and power relationships are enacted through 
them. In this way, Frosh, et al. (2003) suggest that it is possible to provide an 
account of the discourses with which participants position themselves (the social) 
and to tentatively suggest reasons for that individual having chosen those 
discourses (the psychic) that is grounded and observable in the text and the 
research relationship. The psychoanalytic subject is formed through language. In 
psychoanalysis too, there is a focus on the subjective experience of the individual, 
and the role of language in this, rather than an attempt to discern what is ‘true’, 
meaning that social constructionism and psychoanalysis, from this perspective, 
whilst not exactly complementary are at least capable of co-existing. 
 
This integrated methodology can therefore to be argued to address the failure of a 
purely social constructionist discourse analytic approach to give an account of 
people’s subjective experience and events (Parker, 1999, Burr, 2003; Frosh et al., 
2003) and offers the possibility of an ontological stance capable of explaining 
phenomena relating to the self and agency in psychology. Rather than doing away 
with the subject, as Foucault (1982) would have us, psychosocial research is 
interested in “conceptualising…a type of subject that is both social and 
psychological, which is constituted in and through its social formations, yet is still 
granted agency and internality” (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008, p349).  
 
In an example of this type of study, Hollway’s (2008) research into women’s 
identity as first-time mothers uses a psychoanalytic approach to objectivity and 
subjectivity, combining this with positioning theory, to argue that the relativism-
realism debate outlined above can be avoided. Hollway & Jefferson (2005) 
describe how psychosocial research takes account of the specific situation of the 
subject, arguing that Foucauldian power relations are mediated by the individual’s 
unique biographies, in line with positioning theory (Davies & Harré, 1990). 
Wetherell’s (2005) exposition of a critical discursive methodology, while not called 
psychosocial, seems to have strikingly similar methodological aims to the 
psychosocial approach of Frosh & Saville Young (2008).  
 
Wetherell (1998) argues that good discourse analytic research aims to attend to 
“the formation and negotiation of psychological states, identities and interactional 
and inter-subjective events” (p405). Wetherell (2005) also argues that individuals 
are reflexively embedded in social practices that are relational and inter-
subjectively constructed, at the same time as being capable of actively “mobilizing 
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and reworking” these practices (p170). In line with this, psychosocial research 
engages with the idea that subjectivity is constructed socially, including 
importantly, in the research setting (Frosh, 2003). Frosh et al. (2003) propose that 
when individuals describe their lived experience, both social discourses and the 
individual’s particular struggle for agency can be observed as they locate 
themselves in relation to discourses, and the psychoanalytic concept of the 
unconscious plays a part in this struggle, asking “…what structures discourse at 
the level of the personal?” (p42).  
 
3.1.7. The role of psychoanalytic theory in the psychosocial paradigm 
 
Clarke (2008) describes psychosocial research as having its roots in Habermas’ 
(1971) description of psychoanalysis as a depth hermeneutic tool, addressing 
both conscious and unconscious forces, based in self-reflection. There is a 
tension in trying to integrate the hermeneutic approach of psychoanalysis used in 
this way, with the anti-hermeneutic approach of Foucault. One way to reconcile a 
Foucauldian approach to discourse with psychoanalytic interpretation is to use 
Lacan’s theory. Frosh (2006) describes how Lacan’s mirror stage is a description 
of the way an individual’s developing self inevitably incorporates “the meanings of 
the other” (p185) and that this happens because for Lacan, in the real self, 
cohesion is not actually attainable. Notions of “identity” and integration are 
therefore, according to Lacan, a fantasy, a way to artificially cohere the 
fragmented internal self. The mirror stage is fatally interrupted by the symbolism of 
language as it “interferes” with the individual’s understanding of their own 
emotional experience (Frosh, 2006, p185). Language, from this perspective, 
disrupts subjectivity.  
 
Billig (1997) argues that there is a conceptual mismatch between the discursive 
assumption of the external (social) availability of language with the internal, 
unconscious and therefore unavailable processes that are of interest to 
psychoanalysis. However, Frosh (2006) proposes that psychoanalysis is useful for 
understanding how people act and how they make meaning from the social world 
through its attention to fantasy and because it aims to “make sense of the 
subjective determinants or impact of a set of phenomena: the ‘meaning’ of an 
event for people, its resonance and its threat” (p170). Psychoanalysis therefore 
offers answers to “questions of motive, interest, investment and desire…”(Frosh & 
Emerson, 2005, p322).  
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In an early psychosocial study, Hollway & Jefferson (2000) developed a 
methodology that focused on the idea of the “defended” research participant: “The 
idea of the defended subject shows how subjects invest in discourses when these 
offer positions which provide protections against anxiety and therefore supports to 
identity” (p23). However, in a move that is now considered ethically problematical, 
Hollway & Jefferson (2000) used a Kleinian concept of researcher counter-
transference to provide them with information about participants’ unconscious 
subjectivity. This approach has been criticised by Parker (2005) because of the 
way in which it imposes the authors’ own meanings, describing psychoanalysis as 
“a master narrative that demands absolute obedience once it has been allowed in” 
(p108).  
 
Walkerdine, Lucey & Melody (2001) also draw on psychoanalysis in research and 
argue that the discourses with which people construct their identity and 
experiences “work in and through desires, anxieties, defences” (p83). They ask 
how an individual’s subjectivity constructed through discourses is used as a 
defensive mechanism, and try to think about what is being defended against. 
Walkerdine et al. (2001) describe an interpretive process that is similar to way a 
psychodynamic therapist aims to use counter-transference thoughts and feelings 
in order to understand the unconscious communication of their client. The use of 
counter-transference in research is ethically problematic for Frosh & Baraitser 
(2008), who argue that there are important differences between the research 
situation and the therapeutic relationship, citing the fact that in research, the 
participant has not come to the researcher asking for help with intra-psychic 
conflict. Instead, it is the researcher who has sought out the participant and inter-
subjectivity in this context should not therefore be considered to be the same as 
the transference-countertransference in the therapeutic relationship. 
 
Frosh & Emerson (2005) caution that the notion of the defended subject is a top-
down use of theory that does not emerge from the text and as such should be 
avoided if possible. Frosh & Baraitser (2008) warn that psychoanalysis ought not 
to be used as a way of better understanding the subject in qualitative research. 
Wetherell (2005) too, is critical and suggests that it is important to think about the 
discursive context of the interview and the “attributional demands” this places on 
participants, questioning the placing of people in storylines not of their choosing 
for both ethical and epistemological reasons (p171). In arguing for the importance 
of attending to notions both of identity and subjectivity in discursive research, 
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Wetherell (2008) warns that Hollway & Jefferson (2005) over-emphasise 
subjectivity, and thereby neglect the social: “We are left with a person out of 
context, pulling meaning from mind, from out of the psychological depths” (p79).  
 
In response to problems outlined here, Frosh & Saville Young (2008) describe a 
psychosocial methodology that theorises the internal dynamics of subjectivity as 
permeated by the social. This is the particular approach to psychosocial 
methodology that I have chosen to use in the current study and therefore 
emphasises avoiding the deterministic imposition of theoretical concepts on 
participants’ experience (Frosh & Saville Young (2008).  
 
I have endeavoured to hold in mind Parker’s (1992) warning against simply using 
an alternative discourse to interpret the experience of research participants. Frosh 
& Baraitser (2008) question whether applying psychoanalytic theory to the 
interpretation of participants’ life stories, with its deterministic emphasis on 
development, is appropriate, suggesting that it leads to “predictable motivational 
accounts and interpretive strategies” (p353). This is consistent with what Burr 
(2003) says about social constructionist research: “The subject’s own account of 
their experiences can no longer be given an alternative interpretation by the 
researcher who then offers their reading as the truth” (p155).  
 
Frosh & Emerson (2005) highlight the dangers of over-interpretation and offer a 
reflexive critique of the psychosocial paradigm by presenting parallel analyses of 
an interview, one psychoanalytically informed and one discursive. They stress that 
the danger of applying psychoanalytic assumptions to the text is that alternative 
constructions may be prevented and that this is incompatible with a methodology 
that aims to give equal attention to the agency of the subject. In their paper, a 
psychoanalytic framework is employed extremely tentatively, and instead of 
suggesting structural explanations for the content of the participant’s story, instead 
uses carefully-worded interpretations of the possible here-and-now investment 
that the participant makes in choosing discursive positions for “negotiating 
psychological conflicts, with their associated anxieties and desires” (Frosh & 
Emerson, 2005, p313). In the current study, the use of more than one level of 
analysis is intended to provide a way to limit the imposition of a psychoanalytic 




3.1.8. The use of psychoanalysis in this research 
 
The current study draws on relational psychoanalytic theory, which Layton 
(2008a) describes as being is interested in making explicit the “nature of mutual 
enactments and how we get ourselves out of them”. I am interested in the idea 
that altruistic kidney donation may be theorised in this way. A relational approach 
to psychoanalysis places subjectivity at the heart of its ontology, arguing that an 
individual’s subjective experience is constructed from external, social factors as 
well as unconscious (internal) fantasies, meaning that we are “always internally 
and externally imbricated with others” (Layton, 2008b, p66). It can therefore be 
described as being part of an object relations tradition, and draws on Kleinian 
ideas of object relating in fantasy and projection as a form of communication. 
Wetherell (2008) describes relational psychoanalysis as a theoretical approach to 
describing how individuals construct meaning. 
 
A relational ontology links the psychoanalytic theory I will be using with critical 
realist social constructionist epistemology. Stopford (2004) makes an argument for 
using relational psychoanalysis in psychosocial research because of the equal 
emphasis this perspective gives to inter-subjective and intra-psychic phenomena. 
Hollway (2008) suggests that the relational turn in psychoanalysis and the notion 
of identification can provide an ethical means of interpreting socially situated 
subjectivity in the research participant. She outlines a relational ontology that 
draws on the idea of everyday unconscious communication in which individuals 
are capable of discerning or identifying with the emotions, experiences and 
meanings of another human being (Hollway, 2008). The relational psychoanalytic 
paradigm is a two-person psychology that departs from the traditional drive theory 
of Freud by emphasising how inter-personal experiences and constructions 
underlie development and unconscious phenomena (Layton, 2008a). 
Interpretation in relationships, including both therapeutic and research 
relationships is therefore constructed between people and is not available for the 
therapist or researcher to interpret in the traditional sense of being able to 
“diagnose” the psychological structures of an individual. This form of 
psychoanalytic theory is essentially hermeneutic in its epistemology (Frosh, 2006) 
and I argue here and elsewhere in this portfolio that it is consistent with the 




3.1.9. The decision to use multiple levels of analysis 
 
At the start of this piece of research, I was interested by Foucault’s idea of 
assessment as a disciplinary method of control (Hook, 2007; Miller, 2008), and 
wanted to use it to explore the power relations that reside in conflicting 
constructions of donors’ motivations. Power relations are in effect when an 
individual applies to become an altruistic kidney donor and ‘experts’ such as 
physicians and psychologists are required by law to make an assessment of their 
mental health and motivation for altruism. Psychological assessment is used to 
determine whether the donor will be allowed to go ahead with the procedure. 
Psychologists, along with other health professionals can therefore be thought of 
as operating as “moral gatekeepers”, deciding whether an individual is “healthy” 
enough to take the risk involved in an operation (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001, 
p49).  
 
In the case of altruistic donation however, the power relations that are played out 
in the categorisation of “normal” versus “non-normal” feelings and behaviour defy 
a straightforward definition. The relationship between the donor and the 
psychologists and medical doctors can be argued to constitute part of the “psy-
complex” that Rose (1985) describes. However any process in which 
psychologists and doctors are required to decide whether to enable an individual, 
who wants to put themselves in a potentially harmful position in the name of 
helping another is ethically complex and ought not to be reduced to a discussion 
of power in one direction. The donor also retains considerable power in this 
relationship, and it is worth asking if what the medical professionals are being 
asked to do might be conceptualised, possibly, as an abuse of their own 
professional ethic. By positioning altruistic donors as victims of power relations, 
there is a risk of advocating a practice in which anybody who wants to give away 
bits of themselves must be helped to do so. As such, I am interested in the points 
at which an individual’s desire to donate a kidney to a stranger meet resistance 
both socially and from individuals, and what this might imply for the way we 
understand and apply the discourses surrounding altruist donation; the subject 
positions and subjectivity they allow. A psychosocial approach to analysis focuses 
on both the social and the personal (intra-psychic and inter-subjective) levels.  
 
In addition to this psychosocial framework, I have also been guided by Wetherell’s 
(1998) “eclectic” approach to psycho-discursive discourse analysis, in which she 
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advocates focusing on the ways in which psychological states, inter-subjective 
events and identities are formed and negotiated through situated discourse in a 
genealogical context. Within this epistemological framework, Wetherell & Potter 
(1992) draw attention to the importance of questioning the status of discourses 
that are used by the researcher. To that end, they recommend that my discourses 
must be given equal status as an object of inquiry as those of the participants. 
Everything that I say is “equally a discursive construction” (p66). Consistent with 
this, Frosh (2003) describes how psychosocial research engages with the idea 
that subjectivity is constructed socially, including in the research setting.  
This means that psychoanalytic concepts ought to be used reflexively rather than 
as an interpretive lens (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008). They suggest that the most 
defensible and useful role for psychoanalytic theory in research is as an approach 
to reflexivity that scrutinises and emphasises inter-subjectivity in the research 
relationship. Parker (2005) concurs, suggesting that we “treat psychoanalysis 
dialectically, as part of the problem and part of the solution; it is our way in and out 
of the contradictory shape of contemporary subjectivity and social relationships” 
(p108).  
 
3.1.10. Reflection on methodological changes over the course of the study 
 
According to Frosh & Baraitser (2008), reflexivity in qualitative psychosocial 
research means thinking about how the participant uses the research situation 
and the presence of the researcher to actively construct their conscious 
experience, describing how “…what the subject “knows” shifts as a result of the 
interview, as it is co-constructed in and through the interchange with the 
researcher” (p358). This suggests that in a research relationship, the participant 
constructs discourses specifically for the researcher at that moment, and as such 
must be interpreted through a constant reflexive cycle. It means that I must 
engage with, and reflect on the ways in which I am implicated in the participant’s 
construction of subjectivity.  
 
Frosh & Baraitser (2008) suggest that reflexivity in psychosocial research requires 
scrutiny of the text produced not just by the participant but also through the 
research relationship. Reflexive practice has to be incorporated into the procedure 
at every stage of the research; including the interview set-up, communication with 
participants, differences between researcher and participant and what effect these 
might have, and the ways the researcher may influence the participants meaning-
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making through her responses in the interview for example. In practice, this 
means giving my questions equal emphasis in the analysis and places the current 
research within a social constructionist reflexive tradition. Burr (2003) argues that 
a social constructionist paradigm requires the researcher to reflect on how theory 
may be used to re-order participants’ subjectivity and the status of their accounts.  
 
Frosh & Saville Young (2008) point to the risk of circularity in the application of 
psychoanalytic ideas to discourse analysis because of the way that 
psychoanalysis and biomedical discourses have become embedded in the 
dominant cultural discourses available to individuals when they construct 
themselves. Parker (2005) also draws attention to the way in which 
psychoanalytic discourse positions individuals and how the reader is thereby 
invited to read the material in a certain way and is thereby inevitably also 
positioned by it. This requires the researcher to continuously think about how 
people are positioned by the theoretical structures that both participant and 
researcher draw on (Frosh & Saville Young, 2008). I have questioned whether it is 
appropriate for me to use a psychoanalytic framework to inform my research. 
Parker (2005) advocates treating it more like a resource than a theoretical 
framework.  
 
Reflexivity in psychosocial research requires the researcher to examine and utilise 
the self in much the same way that the counselling psychologist is urged to make 
use of, and be able to critically appraise the self in the therapeutic relationship. 
This means being aware of how interventions may encourage some responses 
and inhibit others. I have had to address the ways in which I may have 
suppressed discourses through my use of language and para-linguistic practices 
(Yardley, 2008). In line with this, Clarke (2008) advocates “a critical examination 
of the relationship between researcher and researched” (p119). This view is 
echoed by Frosh & Saville Young (2008) who argue that reflexive practice means 
explicitly acknowledging how the researcher might have elicited a particular 
response or narrative from the participant.  
 
From a psychoanalytic perspective, this requires awareness of the fact that there 
may be unconscious material that is unavailable to reflexive practice and to 
include this awareness of not knowing in the process. As a way of addressing this 
problem, Frosh & Saville Young (2008) describe how a process similar to clinical 
supervision may help, with the aim of making clear the researcher’s investment in 
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the research involving “the possibility of interpretation of the researcher’s activity 
and checking out the impact of this interpretation on her or his understanding and 
future conduct” (p113). In the current study this has been addressed by a process 
of detailed exploration of my interpretations of the interview text with my academic 
supervisor.  
 
Hollway (2008) describes the reflexivity required in this methodology saying that 
“…the objective use of subjectivity is a challenge involving knowing the difference 
between myself and the person or situation I am trying to understand”, adding that 
this is unlikely to be ever completely achieved (p151). In line with the arguments 
outlined above, I feel that it is important to acknowledge that from the inception of 
this research, beginning with the decision to make them the subject of the study, I 
have inevitably positioned altruistic donors as somehow “other”, or different to me 
and to the majority of individuals who do not choose to altruistically donate a 
kidney. Reflexive practice has also led me to identify a feeling of anxiety that the 
idea of altruistic donation elicits in me which will be explored in the analysis. 
 
One possible explanation for this response to altruistic donors is the positioning of 
the donor as “good” and therefore, everyone else, including me, as “not as good”. 
The question must therefore be asked; is my interest in participants’ possible 
motives an enactment of my own anxiety and defended-against feelings? I have 
considered whether this anxiety may also be reflected at an institutional level in 
the medico-legal assessment process. This reminds me of the risk in the current 
study of pathologising the donor’s decision, in much the same way as the medical 
and psychological literature seems to. As Hollway (2008) suggests, I am unlikely 
to be able to satisfactorily answer these questions, but keeping them in mind is 
nevertheless important when I am carrying out interviews and analysing text.  
 
Finally, the inter-subjectivity described by Frosh & Saville Young (2008) has been 
an important influence for me. A focus on inter-subjectivity requires me to reflect 
on how the participant and I co-construct reality throughout the entire research 
relationship and to incorporate this reflexivity in the textual analysis. In this 
respect, I argue that psychosocial methodology is consistent with pluralism and 
focus on inter-subjectivity in counselling psychology practice, and it is from within 
the perspective, discourses and social constructions associated with being a 
trainee practitioner-researcher that I have chosen this methodology. 
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D.3.2. PART TWO - METHODS 
 
3.2.1. Design   
 
This research utilises a multiple case-study design (Rosenwald, 1988). 
Biographical-narrative semi-structured interviews with a small, purposive sample 
of six would-be altruistic donors provided the text for analysis. This design was 
intended to elicit discourses to be analysed from multiple perspectives that have 
been described above. To recap, these are a Foucauldian approach to discourse, 
a more situated psycho-discursive approach, and a psychoanalytic understanding 
of the possible psychological meaning of these discourses for participants. The 
aim was to consider both the implications of discourse for subjectivity and 
practice, and to suggest a tentative, theoretically driven explanation for 




The research proposal for the study is included as an appendix (Appendix D1). 
The original proposal included interviews with health professionals but after 
completing the altruistic donor’s interviews I felt that additional interviews would 
generate an unwieldy amount of text for a study of this length. Ethical approval 
was granted by a City University Ethics Committee (Appendix D2). After receiving 
ethical approval from the university, ethical approval was sought from the NHS 
using the Integrated Research Application System (IRAS). An online submission 
was made at https://www.myresearchproject.org.uk. After appearing before the 
committee, I was asked to supply two additional participant documents and a 
clarification of the recruitment process. On provision of these amendments, ethical 
approval was given (See appendices D3, D4 & D5). The research was also 
approved by the hospital’s Research & Development office and the trust agreed 
that the hospital would act as a Participant Identification Centre (PIC)  
(Appendix D6).  
  
The participant recruitment procedure developed largely out of ethical 
considerations in the planning stages of the research. As reviewed in the previous 
chapter, prevailing discourses available in the academic literature tend to focus on 
the risks of altruistic donation with respect to psychopathology and bio-medical 
ethics. This is to safeguard the individual and to protect the hospital trust from 
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legal action. Inevitably, these “official” discourses impacted on the way I 
approached the recruitment of participants and this illustrates the extent to which 
the study is inevitably positioned within contemporary discourses of altruistic 
donation.  
 
My main concern was the possibility of a situation of risk arising in which I would 
need to break participant confidentiality. I was thinking here of the possible 
disclosure of information that I considered might have a bearing on a participants’ 
psychological wellbeing after donation, in other words, the same risk issues that 
are considered in counselling psychology practice. Initially, after consultation with 
my academic and clinical supervisors, I decided that I would share any concerns 
that arose with the hospital’s head of renal psychology and that this would have to 
be made explicit to the participant before consent was asked for. Subsequently 
however, I was given the opportunity to sit in and observe the psychologist carry 
out a clinical assessment interview with a prospective altruistic donor. Two things 
became clear from this experience. Firstly, the assessment was so thorough that 
on reflection it seemed to me extremely unlikely that anything new pertaining to 
risk or future harm to the participant would arise in a research interview. Secondly, 
the donor whose assessment I attended was highly sensitive to issues of privacy 
and confidentiality, and I believe that had this donor been one of my participants 
and I had explained that material might be shared with an assessing psychologist, 
she and possibly others, would likely refuse to take part in the research or the 
interview would be distorted, resulting in impoverished data.  
 
As a result, I changed two aspects of recruitment. I stated in the participant 
information sheet that I would not share material from the research interview with 
anyone else. Secondly, the inclusion criterion was changed to include only 
prospective donors who had been assessed by the Clinical Psychologist and been 
given the go-ahead, that is, they were considered by the assessing psychologist 
to be at low risk of adverse psychological effects from donating. This did not mean 
that all participants would be going on to donate, since medical and personal 
issues could still intervene, but it meant that I could be reasonably certain that 
research participants would not be at greater than normal risk of psychological 
distress as a result of the research interview.  
 
Had I not had this experience, I might not have felt as confident in the 
department’s internal processes and been reluctant to take such a definite line on 
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confidentiality. It served as a useful early lesson in the advantages and 
disadvantages of being a practitioner-researcher. It meant however that those 
prospective donors who were considered by the hospital psychologist to be 
unsuitable have been excluded from this piece of research, which has ethical 
implications of its own, and limits the availability of discursive repertoires for 
analysis. It is also an interesting example of the way in which discourses in the 
clinical and academic literature, which construct altruistic donation as a potential 
indicator of psychopathology, have impacted on the current study, providing an 
example of Foucault’s notion of the way in which discourses constitute knowledge 
and power.  
 
3.2.3. Participant recruitment procedure and data collection 
 
Despite increasing year on year, the number of altruistic kidney donors in the UK 
remains very small. Altruistic donation is not publicised other than through media 
stories about donors and recipients, although information can be found on NHS 
websites. All participants in the current study had heard about altruistic donation 
through media reports and had approached the hospital directly or through their 
GP. The hospital is a regional specialist centre for kidney transplants. 
 
I endeavoured to ensure that I was as distanced from the hospital as possible. All 
documents for participants had to be formatted in accordance with NHS guidelines 
found on the IRAS website and submitted for ethical approval. The approved 
recruitment procedure was as follows:  After completing his own assessment of 
prospective donors, the consultant clinical psychologist asked them in person 
whether they would be willing to be contacted to take part in research being 
conducted by a trainee in the department. It was made clear that this would have 
no influence whatsoever on the individual’s application to become a donor. If they 
agreed to be contacted, I sent a letter of invitation (Appendix D7) and participant 
information sheet (Appendix D8). I explicitly stated that I would not share any 
information with the hospital team and I put in place a framework for support in the 
event that the participant felt emotionally distressed after the interview in a 
debriefing document (Appendix D9).  
 
Between July 2010 and July 2011, seven individuals who had approached the 
hospital with a request to become an altruistic donor and had been approved for 
donation by the assessing psychologist were written to with an invitation to take 
 113 
part in the research. One person responded by telephone to decline participation, 
giving the reason that donation had been a private matter. Six responded either by 
telephone or email agreeing to take part. All participants were British, five were 
white and one Asian. There were five males and one female. Participants ranged 
in age from 41 to 63 years.  
 
3.2.4. Pilot interviews 
 
After City University ethics had been granted, two pilot interviews were conducted 
with prospective altruistic donors found through non-NHS sources. The intention 
in conducting pilot interviews was to refine both interview technique and the semi-
structured interview schedule. The first pilot participant was identified through an 
Internet search using the term “altruistic kidney donation”. Results from this 
search yielded an anonymous donor’s blog, being written while the donor was in 
the process of being assessed for donation. A description of the current research 
and request for a pilot interview was sent and responded to by email. Informed 
consent was given and the interview took place at the participant’s home, lasting 
approximately one hour. A semi-structured interview schedule was used. After her 
interview, the participant suggested and emailed on my behalf another 
prospective female donor with whom she had been in contact, who was also 
taking part in an assessment process in another part of the country. The second 
hour-long pilot interview was also conducted at the participant’s home.   
 
Pilot interviews were recorded on a digital audio recorder. I wrote field notes 
immediately after the interviews, recording my thoughts, feelings and initial ideas. 
I transcribed the interviews myself in order to become familiar with the text, and 
made further notes while I was while transcribing. Transcribed interviews were 
read and re-read several times. The interview text was interrogated for the effects 
it produced in me, including all thoughts, feelings and ideas. The interview text 
was then thematically coded to identify discourses that were considered relevant 
to the research questions and labelled on the transcript, following Willig’s (2008) 
first and second stages of Foucauldian discourse analysis.  
 
3.2.5. Reflection on pilot work and changes to method 
 
As outlined above, I was initially planning to use a form of Foucauldian discourse 
analysis for the analytic strategy in this study (eg. Parker, 1992; Willig, 2008). 
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However, on listening to and reading the first pilot interview, I became concerned 
that the semi-structured interview schedule that I had developed by drawing on 
the altruistic donor literature neglected emotional content in the interview. I was 
aware of the need to maintain a balance between finding a focus for the interview 
so that it did not become an unmanageable amount of text to analyse, and 
ensuring that the participant felt able to speak freely and productively but was 
unhappy that I seemed to be getting a largely factual account. I believed that I was 
getting the ‘official’ story, probably much as had been told to the psychologist 
involved in the assessment process.  
 
I also found that at times during the pilot interviews, I wanted to interpret 
something of what participants may have been feeling. I reflected that this may 
have been a defensive protection of my own identity; that I may have been 
unconsciously feeling deskilled, which was leading me to try to demonstrate to the 
participant what a “good” researcher (and therapist) I was, but I also considered 
the possibility of whether in addition to this, the urge to interpret and ask the 
participant for an emotional interpretation of their accounts may have been telling 
me something about participants’ defensive structures, as Walkerdine et al. (2001) 
suggest. I also considered whether the participants were talking to me from a 
particular discursive position, established in the process of assessment that they 
had already engaged with, that of proving themselves “sane” and rational. I 
wanted to know how we, the participant and I, could name and describe 
sensations, feelings, emotions, that they felt they had no words for. This is 
illustrated in this exchange with pilot participant Di (who has asked for her real 
name to be used) at the end of the interview:  
  
   Extract  
JC:  Is there anything I’ve asked you about that you felt wasn’t   
  relevant?  
 
Di:  I don’t think so, no, it’s just sometimes hard to explain why you  
  think something, because if it’s emotional based it’s hard to  
  explain, because you don’t know where those emotions have  
  come from.  
 
JC:  And it’s hard to find the words to describe it.  
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Di:  Yes, yeah, whereas if it’s, I don’t know, factual based, and I  
  can’t think of anything but, you can say well I did this because,  
  you know.  
 
JC:  So it’s almost as if having, I’m asking you to describe something  
  that you have no words for, it’s just something you know?  
 
Di:  Yes, it’s just something I know.   
 
       (P001: Lines 1305-1318) 
 
I decided that I did not know enough about the participant’s biography, the 
trajectory of her life that had led to this point (Hollway & Jefferson, 2005). I wanted 
to think about the decision to donate a kidney to a stranger in terms of the donor’s 
experience of subjectivity and their object relations. Importantly, the pilot work was 
taking place at the same time that I was beginning to specialise in a 
psychodynamic model of counselling psychology in my training, and illustrates the 
extent to which practice has informed this research. The conflict I was 
experiencing mirrored the tension I experienced in counselling practice, 
attempting to privilege the subjective experience of the participant whilst giving a 
theoretically informed reading of that experience.  
 
Through Hollway & Jefferson’s (2000) Free Association Narrative Interview 
method, I became interested in whether it was possible to interpret unconscious, 
possibly defensive aspects of the desire to donate from the text of an interview. 
However, this had ethical implications, as a social constructionist epistemological 
approach requires me to support the validity of participants’ own accounts, not 
undermine them by imposing my own, theoretically-derived reading of them (Burr, 
2003). I perceived a limit to the extent to which it was ethically acceptable to try to 
work with the theoretical idea of defensive motivations in research. Parker (2005) 
argues that attending to defence mechanisms is acceptable in critical psychology 
research only as a first step on the way to describing the social conditions that 
have elicited them in the individual.  
 
Increasingly however, I was becoming concerned that in using Foucauldian 
Discourse Analysis alone, I risked neglecting a significant and interesting aspect 
of the decision, namely, the emotional aspects. Following the pilot interviews, I 
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was able to think more specifically about what I wanted to know. I wanted to 
explore whether it is possible to interpret possibly unconscious thoughts, feelings 
and behaviour that have somehow to be incorporated into institutional practices, 
with immediate implications for power relations. In this way, the study’s 
methodology emerged out of a reflexive treatment of the pilot interview texts.   
 
3.2.6. Ethics of interviewing and interview procedure 
 
University premises were used for four of the six interviews. One was conducted 
at the participants’ home (with measures put in place first to ensure my own 
safety) and the other at the participant’s place of work in a private conference 
room. Interviews with participants lasted between 45 minutes and 75 minutes 
each. Confidentiality was explained and participants signed a consent form 
(Appendix D10). Interviews were recorded on a digital audio recorder.  
 
In the ethical conduct of interviews, I have drawn on my experience as a 
counselling psychologist trainee whilst striving to remain mindful that research 
participants have not entered into a therapeutic relationship (Kvale, 2003). My 
intention has been to privilege the participants’ account of their subjective 
experience, as Frosh & Saville-Young (2008) suggest. Kvale (2003) highlights the 
ethical differences between a therapeutic analytic interview and a research 
analytic interview, arguing that it is not appropriate to make interpretations 
intended to produce change in the participant. Nicholls (2009) describes a 
dilemma in interpretation from her own psychosocial study, concluding that when 
she did tentatively interpret to participants with the aim of clarifying understanding, 
it was generally useful and led to richer text.  
 
The interview procedure was guided by the following aims: Frosh et al. (2003) 
suggest the interview produces an “illustrative narrative account” (p43). Hollway & 
Jefferson (2000) describe a biographical-narrative approach, and their “Free 
Association Narrative Interview” aims to explore the participant’s relationship to 
the topic under scrutiny through focusing on the emotional content of the interview 
as a way of understanding an individual’s meaning-making. They suggest four 
techniques of interviewing, borrowed from clinical interviewing, that are intended 
to allow the participant to produce “meaning-frames” (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000, 
p53). These are to use open questions; encourage stories; avoid asking “why” 
questions; follow participants’ order of talking and use their phrases. 
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Walkerdine et al. (2001) also suggest a lightly structured interview that is aimed at 
eliciting a narrative that draws on both conscious and unconscious themes. Links 
are made by the participant through emotional means and interpreted by the 
researcher. This focus on emotionality in the interview is also advised by Frosh & 
Saville Young (2008) to enable access to subjectivity and meaning-making. 
 
I used a semi-structured schedule as a guide (Appendix D11), departing from it in 
order to follow the participant’s direction, picking up in a conversational manner on 
biographical aspects of their talk. Interview questions were drawn from my 
experience in the pilot interviews and reflected my interest in both social and 
psychological themes. This is in line with Frosh & Emerson (2005) who argue that 
personal biographical material and the participants’ in-depth account of their own 
experience should be privileged for a psychosocial reading of an interview. 
Hollway (2008) also advocates that the participant’s account should be “as 
unimpeded as possible” (p140).  
 
I was informed by Kvale’s (2003) “psychoanalytically-inspired academic interview” 
(p25). Questions included:  Would you tell me something about your family? What 
was life like for you when you were growing up?  Kvale (2003) argues that 
psychoanalytic relational thinking makes it a research method that is consistent 
with a social constructionist epistemology. Both are concerned with subjectivity, 
rather than the objective knowledge privileged by a positivist methodology. 
Participants’ comments were clarified by asking about their own interpretation of 
their experience. 
 
My first question was intended to orient the participant to the subject matter of the 
interview, their decision to try to become an altruistic donor. By using the phrase, 
“I’m interested in your decision to become an altruistic kidney donor, please tell 
me about it”, I left the question open to interpretation by the participant, who was 
able to answer with whatever they felt to be most relevant. However, it should be 
recognised that even by using the word “altruistic” in my question, I was using a 
“pre-set theoretical concept” (Frosh & Emerson, 2005, p309). I took the 
description “altruistic kidney donation” from NHS literature. Frosh (2006) suggests 
that as we construct the stories about ourselves in order to make meaning of our 
experience, we are inevitably influenced by explanations of human nature that 
exist “out there”, and this is one such instance of that.  
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Following Hollway & Jefferson (2000), I made brief notes during the participant’s 
initial narration and tried to follow up these themes in their narrated order, taking 
care to use the same phrases and terminology. This interview technique highlights 
the inter-subjective nature of the approach and illustrates how the method 
inevitably leads to an explicitly co-constructed version of events. Stopford (2004) 
argues that participants should be given the opportunity to respond to the 
interpretive process. After this, I asked for biographical narratives, again in an 
open way.  
 
The biographical focus of the interviews reflects Mitchell’s (1988) description of 
the theory in relational psychoanalytic theory that intra-psychic phenomena are 
essentially developmental, resulting from childhood relational experiences. Some 
participants asked why I was interested in so much background information and I 
explained that I wanted to understand how their life experience and relationships 
might have contributed to their decision to donate. This response seemed to make 
sense to participants, who talked freely and generously. At the end of the 
interview participants were given debriefing information in which I gave my phone 
number and email address, as well as guidance about whom to contact in the 
event that the interview elicited distressing feelings that were felt to be un-
manageable, including the participant’s GP, Mind, and the Samaritans. 
Furthermore, as participants remained under the hospital’s care while undergoing 
assessment for donation, they were able to contact their transplant coordinator, 
and/or the renal psychology department of the hospital should they need to. After 
the interview I emailed participants to thank them for their time and contribution to 
the research, again giving them an opportunity to comment on the process. None 
of the participants requested any support after the interview. All offered 
spontaneously to give follow-up interviews if it was required.  
 
3.2.7. The ethics of a second interview  
 
At certain points in the interviews, I noticed in myself a reluctance to ask the 
question: “What do you think is happening here?” I have used these moments in 
the second stage of the analysis, reflecting on what this might mean and drawing 
on the field notes that I wrote immediately after the interviews. Field notes focused 
on how I had experienced the participant and my thoughts and feelings about how 
they had experienced me at certain points in the interview. I reflected how at 
times, I felt uncomfortable asking questions that I imagined might be experienced 
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as difficult or intrusive by the participants. A clear example of this occurred in the 
first interview with the participant I have given the pseudonym “Richard”, when he 
described irreparable damage to the relationship with his mother earlier in his life. 
I chose at the time not to explore this at all and asked another question, effectively 
changing the subject. Afterwards I was puzzled and somewhat frustrated at my 
response. Frosh & Saville Young (2008) give a possible explanation of this, 
arguing that there are unconscious processes “likely” to be interacting in research 
work (p113).  
 
A cautious approach to interpretation is considered ethical (Kvale, 2003), and I 
wanted to know whether a second interview might provide me with an ethical way 
to ask the difficult questions I was interested in. I reasoned that a second interview 
might enable me to explore and validate my interpretations of the emotional 
content of the interviews (Emerson & Frosh, 2004, 2009). However, I was aware 
of the ethical implications of a second interview and mindful that I had to take care 
to ensure that the relationship with participants did not shift from research to 
therapy. With this in mind, and after discussion with my supervisor, I decided that 
going back to participants would indeed risk shifting the relationship from that of 
research to therapy as well as suggesting that I did not “believe” what my 
participants had told me and wanted something more from them. In the 
information for participants I had included the possibility of a second interview, so I 
wrote via email to each participant explaining that I did not feel as though I needed 
to meet with them a second time and to give them the opportunity to they disagree 
with this and request a second meeting. All participants wrote back and were 
satisfied with having done one interview.   
 
3.2.8 Field notes, transcription strategy and data handling 
 
I wrote field notes as soon as possible after the interview, before transcribing. I 
borrowed from my counselling psychology practice in this reflexive exercise to 
note all feelings, thoughts and experience of the participant that the interview had 
elicited in me, with the aim of enriching my reading of the text through an 
awareness of my own contribution to the jointly constructed understanding of the 
topic. This effectively became the first analytic framework that I drew on, and drew 
on the same practice as reflexive work in therapeutic practice.  
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The transcription strategy was informed by social constructionist perspectives that 
emphasise co-construction in interviews (Emerson & Frosh, 2004/2009). Frosh & 
Emerson (2005) argue that transcription decisions both reveal theoretical 
assumptions and produce particular readings of the text. Transcripts were made 
anonymous and some identifying details were changed. As I transcribed and later 
listened to the interviews I made further field notes when struck by moments of 
potential emotionality. I drew on transcription conventions described by Atkinson & 
Heritage (1984) but omitted the more detailed techniques for transcription from 
Conversation Analysis. Transcription therefore included my questions and 
responses, false starts, pauses, laughs or evidence of sadness or distress (Frosh 
& Saville Young, 2008). Line numbers were added to transcripts of interviews. A 
number in square brackets in the text indicates a pause of a certain length. Eg: [4] 
indicates a 4 second pause.  
 
Copies of transcripts and recordings were saved to CD-R disks and stored 
securely in a locked filing cabinet. A second copy of all the transcripts and 
recordings was stored securely at another location. 
 
3.2.9.  Coding of interviews and analytic strategy 
 
Yardley (2008) suggests that in the pursuit of validity in qualitative research, it is 
necessary to provide a detailed description of how data was coded and how or 
whether codes were modified. Interviews were labelled with P and a number. 
P001 and P002 refer to pilot interviews. P003 through P008 are interviews that 
have been analysed. Pseudonyms were assigned to participants.  
 
In this study I aimed to integrate several levels of analysis; a discourse analytic 
reading of the constructive nature of discourses together with a consideration of 
the emotional, biographically informed and situated investment that an individual 
has in these discourses. The aim of the discursive analysis was to identify how 
participants use discourses in the research interview to construct altruistic kidney 
donation and consequently the subject positions that are afforded to them and 
others by these discourses. Arribas-Ayllon and Walkerdine (2008) describe how 
Foucauldian discourses form relations between things, making objects “thinkable 
and governable” and importantly, how discourses can be resisted (p105). 
Interviews were first listened to and read in transcript form as Hollway (2008) 
suggests, and thematic notes were made on the right hand side of the transcripts. 
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For transparency, a section of an annotated interview transcript is included as an 
appendix (D12). 
 
A Foucauldian approach to discourse analysis was carried out following Willig’s 
(2008) six stages. Willig’s (2008) method does not constitute a full discourse 
analysis but was considered to be sufficient for the aims of the current study with 
its focus on subjectivity. I was also informed by Parker’s (1992) guide to discourse 
analysis, and Potter & Wetherell’s (1987) discursive psychology approach. 
  
Stage 1: All references to altruistic donation in the transcript were identified by 
physically highlighting the sections that contained any reference, even obliquely, 
to it (Willig, 2008). Wetherell (2005) refers to these “units of analysis” in the text as 
“psycho-discursive practices”, arguing that individuals formulate and constitute 
notions of self, identity, emotions, motives, intentions and beliefs through them 
(p80).  
 
Next, I made hand-written thematic notes on the right hand side of these 
highlighted sections of the transcript. These notes later aided grouping of 
discourses into themes. I extracted from the interview texts all references to 
altruistic donation and noted the interview line numbers. The following example 
shows my descriptions of discursive constructions of altruistic donation in 
Richard’s interview (P004) as I made them:  
 
 Reference to discursive construction    Line number 
A positive thing       5 
A worthwhile thing to do      29 
If I can do it, why not do it      30 
Something that will make a huge difference to somebody 31 
Something it would be “churlish” not to do   33 
An obvious, natural thing to do     50 
Part of being caring and considerate    640 
Nothing special       642 
Not something to make a big deal about    664 
No reason not to do it      666 
A very small risk       671 
As something full of anticipation     707 
Body as vehicle        768 
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Kidney may as well be used while it’s still good   770 
As something that will hopefully make a difference to  
somebody’s life       772 
Not about recognition      774 
No loss to me       776 
Maybe an unusual thing to do     784 
Not particularly significant      785 
 
Stage 2: I named the different discourses that were being used in the construction 
of altruistic donation (Willig, 2008) and then wrote descriptions of discourses that 
aimed to exhaustively incorporate all examples of discursive constructions for 
each participant, only stopping when all references to altruistic donation made by 
a participant could be described by a discourse. Examples of these included: 
helping discourses; biomedical discourses, risk discourses and self discourses. 
This process was cyclical, if a reference did not fit within an existing discourse, I 
created a new one to describe it (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Through doing this, 
three overarching groups of discourses began to emerge. I found that by putting 
the discourses into groups in this way, I was able to begin the next stage of 
analysis. 
 
Stage 3: For this stage I examined the “action orientation” of the discourse in the 
context of the research interview (Willig, 2008, p116). I asked what the participant 
was achieving by using this discourse at this point. Here it was necessary for me 
to interrogate how my interview questions led the participants to answer in 
particular ways. Wetherell (1998) advises that it is necessary to ask what 
discursive activities my questions key into. I also thought about how the function 
of the different discourses meant that they related to other discursive 
constructions in the text (Parker, 1992). For example, a medical discourse might 
be drawn on to demonstrate to the interviewer that the participant is 
knowledgeable and to shore up a less “rational” discourse that is emotional in 
content.  
 
Stage 4: Thinking about the functions of discourses and their inter-relationships 
(Parker, 1992) enabled the suggestion of possible subject positions (Davies & 
Harré, 1990) afforded by the discourses to the donors and other individuals. Willig 
(2008) describes how “discourses make available ways-of-seeing and ways-of-
being” (p113). For example, a medical discourse positions the donor as rational 
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and therefore in accord with the health professionals who control access to 
altruistic donation. This position therefore has important implications for power in 
the relationship between donors and health professionals. It makes it more likely 
that they will be allowed to donate. This demonstrates how the fourth stage links 
into the fifth stage of discourse analysis.  
 
Stage 5: Next I considered how the discourses and associated subject positions 
related to practice; “…what can be said and done” (Willig, 2008, p117). Using the 
above example, if a donor chooses not to draw on a medical discourse and take 
up the position it affords, the donor is to a large extent positioning themselves as 
outside of the existing power structure and probably reduces the likelihood that 
they will be allowed to go ahead with donation. I found that this stage overlapped 
considerably with the final stage, possibly because what can be said and done 
depends to a large extent on an individual’s subjective experience. 
 
Stage 6: Willig (2008) suggests that this is the most “speculative” stage of analysis 
(p122), and I found this to be the case. The aim was to explore what the 
discourses used by the participants might have implied for their subjective 
experience: “…what can be felt, thought and experienced from within various 
subject positions” (Willig, 2008, p117, italics in original).   
 
The six stages were repeated for each of the six participants. After analysing 
individual interviews, I looked for unifying and differing themes between them. 
Rosenwald (1988) argues that in attempting this synthesis, homogeneity of 
participants is not important and heterogeneity may be more productive. 
 
3.2.10. Analysing participants’ emotional investment in discourses and subject 
positions 
 
Participants’ personal investment in discourses were analysed, drawing on a 
psychosocial approach. Care was taken to ground the interpretations in what 
could be observed in the text (Frosh & Saville Young, 2008). This stage of the 
analysis was concerned with suggesting possible psychological explanations for 
the emotional investment that participants made in the discourses they have 
chosen to use. It was foremost a reflexive process, in which I drew on the 
biographical information available in the text, my own responses towards the 
participant during the interview and towards the recordings and the text. This level 
 124 
of analysis was therefore informed by an interpretive strategy that attends to what 
Hollway (2008) describes as the “whole narrative” (p140), to include the meanings 
that are co-constructed between researcher and participant, links in the 
participant’s account, conflict, tension and what is not being said, as well as what 
is. Psychoanalytic theory and biographical detail contained in the interview was 
drawn on to provide a tentative interpretation of participants’ personal investment 
in the discourses they use, in line with Frosh & Saville Young (2008).  
 
The intention was to provide as “bottom-up” as possible a reading of the text 
(Frosh & Emerson, 2005) while explicitly acknowledging what Burr (2003) 
describes as “the illusion of democratisation” in the research relationship (p156). 
Clarke (2008) recommends aiming for a subjective reading in the interpretation of 
text, attending to the parts where researcher and participant co-construct data. 
Frosh & Emerson (2005) advise a process of analysis “in which interpretations 
might be tested within the text itself, treating them as discursive constructions the 
effects of which can be examined and discussed” (p322).  
 
I endeavoured to hold in mind the following questions: What are altruistic donors 
communicating about themselves at given points in the interview? How was 
meaning being constructed jointly by the participant and me in the interview? 
Particular samples of text to be subjected to a more detailed psychoanalytic 
reading were selected according to Gough’s (2004) description of emotionally-
laden text “…where there seems to be a lot at stake, as signalled in talk by 
hesitations, exaggerations, evasions and emotive interjections” and times when 
talk is “…infused with anxiety and/or desire, where speakers passionately 
construct ‘others’ as threatening” (p247).  
 
To summarise the analytic process, the two stages of analysis did not always 
proceed in the order described, but formed a cycle (Frosh & Saville Young, 2008). 
This began with my felt responses to the participant in the interview, which I 
recorded in my field notes, noting how the participant and their talk made me feel 
in the interview and immediately afterwards. After this, the focus of analysis 
moved to the text and recordings, and I continued to try to reflect on what was 
being evoked in me at the same time as thinking about what was being 
accomplished discursively. It was necessary to move flexibly between the different 
analytic frameworks, thinking about the wider social meaning of discourse, a 
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situated approach to discursive repertories, and the feelings and thoughts that 
were being evoked in me by the text and the recordings.  
 
3.2.11. Validity and reliability  
 
Yardley (2008) suggests the following principles for demonstrating validity in 
qualitative research:  
 
i) It should be sensitive to context, including the relevant theoretical and 
empirical literature, the socio-cultural setting, ethical issues, the empirical 
data and the participants’ perspectives. The analysis must not impose 
meanings on the data but allow them to emerge and be open to alternative 
interpretations. 
 
ii) There needs to be methodological competence and rigour in terms of data 
collection and analysis ought to be a rigorous and in-depth engagement 
with the topic.  
 
iii) The study needs to be coherent and demonstrate clarity and power in its 
argument. It ought to demonstrate a good fit between theory and method. 
Methods and data presentation must be transparent and subject to a 
process of reflexivity. 
 
iv) Consideration needs to be given to the impact and importance of the 
research in practical or applied, theoretical and socio-cultural terms.  
 
 
Frosh & Baraitser (2008) suggest that using reflexivity to interpret inter-subjectivity 
in psychosocial research inevitably challenges traditional ideas of validity and 
reliability in research, and that from this perspective all knowledge necessarily has 
to be thought of as interpersonally and temporally determined. A discussion of 
validity in psychosocial research entails considering the constraints that are 
placed on interpretation by the methods employed. Habermas’ (1971) 
hermeneutic approach means that in research, just as in psychoanalysis, only the 
participant can give validity to the researcher’s account by their willingness to 
internalise interpretations as new knowledge about her or himself. This means 
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that interpretations made in research do not have the same status as those made 
in a therapeutic setting. 
 
The psychoanalytic approach that I draw on both in my counselling psychology 
practice and this research does not attempt to interpret a description of a 
psychological structural reality in patients, clients or participants (Layton, 2008a). 
Instead it acknowledges and works with the idea that reality is continually 
reconstructed between subjects as it is enacted in relationships (eg. Safran, 
2002). This is consistent with social constructionist and psychosocial research 
paradigms, which argue that the participant actively constructs meaning in the 
interview in relationship with the researcher (Frosh, 2006).  
 
In psychosocial research, Frosh & Saville Young (2008) argue that a similar way 
to assessing a clinical interpretation, in terms of its capacity to produce a deeper 
emotional response in the client, may also be drawn on in this analytic approach 
to a text, to ask “what way of understanding generates most material, what 
pushes thinking on, what “thickens” the story that can be told about how 
psychological phenomena might work?” (p117). Although validity is necessarily 
limited in this approach to research, it can be increased through adopting a 
tentative stance towards the text and cautiously checking the interpretation with 
the “emotional tone” of the participants talk and the reactions of the researcher 
(Frosh & Saville Young, p117). Ultimately however, all that can be validly claimed 
is the intention to give an account of a “possible reality” (Frosh, 2006 p38).  
 
3.2.12. Summary  
 
In this chapter I have set out my understanding of a post-positivist, constructionist 
approach to the generation of knowledge from interpretation of other people’s 
subjective experience. I have described how the methodology of this study has 
been informed by social constructionist, Foucauldian, psycho-discursive and 
psychosocial research perspectives, and situated this in the discipline and ethics 
of Counselling Psychology as a pluralistic practice. The methods for text collection 
and analysis have been described and the ethical and reflexive aspects of the 





D.4. ANALYSIS and DISCUSSION 
 
4.1. Introduction and reminder of methodology 
 
This chapter contains an analysis and discussion of the way in which discursive 
themes are used by participants in the research interview to construct altruistic 
kidney donation and position themselves and others, and explores the possible 
practice and subjective experiences that these discursive positions make available 
(Willig, 2008). The analysed text comes from semi-structured biographical 
narrative interviews with six individuals who volunteered to become “altruistic non-
directed kidney donors” at a UK hospital during one twelve month period in 
2010/11. I have drawn on the six-stage analytic strategy proposed by Willig 
(2008), together with the psycho-discursive approach to discourse analysis 
recommended by Wetherell & Potter (1992), Wetherell (1998) and Edley & 
Wetherell (2001). The study of a situated flow of discourse aims to engage with 
the “formation and negotiation of psychological states, identities and interactional 
and intersubjective events” (Wetherell, 1998, p405). The discursive object for the 
purpose of this analysis is “altruistic kidney donation” (Willig, 2008).  
 
At the end of each section there is a psychoanalytically informed analysis of 
subject positions for one participant, three in total. The aim here is to use 
psychoanalytic interpretive strategies to broaden my thinking about the intra-
psychic and inter-subjective aspects of altruistic donation as a way to theorise the 
“unconscious dimension of subjectivity” (Frost & Hoggett, 2008, p440).  
 
Wetherell (2003) suggests putting socially constructed and intra-psychic theories 
“side by side in engagement with each other to see what we might learn” (p100), 
and that by applying a psychodynamic analysis alongside a discursive one, the 
person is treated as an additional site of meaning-making. In the previous chapter 
I outlined concerns about the “diagnostic” nature of some psychoanalytic thinking 
and its assumption of a psychic structure underpinning an individual’s reality 
(Frosh & Baraitser, 2008; Parker, 2005; Wetherell, 2003). One way to integrate 
epistemological differences between psychoanalysis and social constructionism is 
to draw on the relational aspects of psychoanalytic thinking. This approach 
characterizes the individual’s subjective experience as always co-constructed in 
relation to the subjectivity of another (Layton, 2008). 
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4.2. Overview of discursive themes 
 
I have chosen to present the discursive themes in this analysis in three broad 
sections. These themes have been selected because they offer a coherent way of 
interpreting the discourses used by all six participants. Wetherell & Potter (1992) 
suggest that coherence is one way of assessing the usefulness of an analysis. 
Separating the discourses into themes in this way has aided a clearer approach to 
the possible function of particular discourses, the subject positions that they make 
available to participants and others (including myself) and the implications of 
these for practice (Willig, 2008).   
 
Imposing a structure such as this on the text is inevitably artificial. With my 
analysis, I am not suggesting that there are no alternatives and there is nothing 
inevitable or fixed about the meanings I have attributed to particular discourses, 
they are simply possible constructions amongst the many that are available. In 
choosing to present the analysis in a certain way, I have necessarily had to 
neglect possible alternative meanings. This is reflected by Davies & Harré’s 
(1990) notion of positioning in discourse that emphasises the dynamic notion of 
linguistic encounters and by Wetherell (1998), who argues that there is always 
plurality in the subject positions available to individuals through discourse.  
 
The groups of discursive themes are not discrete; there is overlap between them 
with discourses from different groups being used by participants to position 
themselves in similar ways. All participants draw extensively on at least one of the 
discursive themes and some made use of all three. Altruistic donation is 
constructed throughout the interviews in contrasting and at times conflicting ways, 
reflecting what Gergen (2001) suggests about discourses being “open to 
continuous alteration as interaction progresses” (p249). Wetherell & Potter (1992) 
also suggest that in addition to coherence, discourse analysis ought to look for 
variability in interpretive repertoires, that is, the different ways of constructing 
events, people and processes. Whilst attempting to hold this in mind, I have felt 
that within the limited scope of this study, it has been important to try to avoid 
becoming lost in the multiplicity of meanings available for each discourse; “the 
infinite regress of possible interpretations” (Wetherell, 1998, p388).  
 
The first group of discourses contains participants’ ideas about altruism, emotions, 
ethics and morality, particularly the way that participants relate their subjective 
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experience of emotions to altruistic donation. An important distinction to make is 
that these discourses are other-oriented and fit well with Batson’s (2011) 
description of altruistically oriented emotions that he includes under the umbrella 
term of “empathic concern” for other people (p11). These other-oriented 
discourses are the “way in” to altruistic donation for all the participants in this 
study. For example, they often describe an instantaneous feeling of being drawn 
to it in response to learning about the possibility of altruistic donation from a 
television, radio or newspaper item: “I just sat there going, that’s incredible, that’s 
absolutely amazing!” (James; Lines 17 – 18); “…and I don’t know what it was but 
it just hit me that…it’s such an interesting idea” (Peter; Lines 10 – 12); “[it] 
sounded like a positive thing and I thought, why not?” (Richard; Lines 5 – 7). 
 
There is also a rescuing discourse that suggests omnipotence; “I could stop 
somebody being on a machine, I could give them their life back” (James; lines 38 
– 40). Participants construct altruistic donation as morally right and selfless, for 
the benefit of another person and as something that will change the life of that 
person for the better, even prevent them from dying. The implications for power 
that reside in this discourse are unavoidable: “…a kidney can make a huge 
difference to a person’s life” (Richard: Lines 31 -32); “I could make a difference to 
somebody else’s life” (James; Lines 33- 34); “…[the kidney] could make such a 
big difference to someone else that desperately needs it so it’s as simple as that 
really.” (Liz; Lines 17 - 19). Making “a difference” is a common theme, suggesting 
one possible interpretation that the desire to donate may reflect an experience of 
having an unmet need in the donors themselves. 
 
These discourses also incorporate the notion of personal sacrifice that can be 
found in religious and socio-cultural traditions that encourage helping others. “I 
suppose it’s quite deeply ingrained isn’t it, the thing that you should try and help 
other people to erm, have a better quality of life if you can” (Liz; lines 113 – 115). 
They also sometimes evoke the idea of a higher order; community, fatedness, 
destiny and submitting to a force outside the individual’s control, something like a 
calling; “…the Gods were saying you should do this” (James; lines 683 – 4), 
possibly thereby absolving the individual of some of the responsibility for taking 
the decision.  
 
Importantly, these other-oriented discourses were drawn on by participants to 
describe ideas that they themselves found “obvious”, as though the feelings, 
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thoughts or beliefs that they incorporated needed no explanation: “the right thing 
to do” (James, lines 784), “the right reasons” (Will; lines 355 - 6); “an obvious, 
natural thing to do” (Richard; Lines 50 -1). Using the word “right” suggests that 
there is no need to question the naturalness of these feelings, instantly setting the 
participants up in resistance to those who might suggest doubt. These discourses 
of certainty and obviousness foreclose on the possibility of ambivalence.  
 
When it was suggested to participants during interviews that their instantaneous 
response to the idea of altruistic donation seems to have been driven by feelings, 
they tended to turn to rational discourses. It was as though they heard the 
question as suggesting that emotions were not a sufficiently well thought out 
argument, or perhaps were insufficiently rational. They were perhaps wary of 
sounding “mad”. Setting up emotions in opposition to rational thought reflects a 
Kantian view of morality and supports Blum’s (1980) argument that the Kantian 
approach is deeply ingrained in western moral thinking. I suggest that by using 
both emotional and rational discursive themes, participants are able to position 
themselves as both ethical and responsible when they perceive that their 
motivation is being questioned.  
 
The second group therefore contains these rational, logical discourses about risk. 
It was the easiest discursive category to identify and code in the transcripts and 
includes discourses of risk, science, medicine, utility, engineering and the body. 
All participants used them extensively. Physical risks and discomfort are de-
emphasised; “I’ve been a blood donor and regularly, and to me it actually doesn’t 
seem terribly different to that,” (Liz, lines 12 -14); “…nothing really to worry about” 
(Will; line 225); “If I don’t, I’ve let someone die for no reason” (George; line 117). 
These discourses allow the construction of a pragmatic, positivist stance. They 
serve to position the participants as rational, responsible individuals and crucially, 
enable them to resist accusations of psychopathology from experts and of ‘being 
crazy’ from medical professionals, friends, relatives and researchers.  
 
However, an alternative way to think about these altruistic discourses of the body 
becomes possible with a focus on the way participants use them to emphasise the 
separateness of the physical self from the psychological self, a form of Cartesian 
dualism, dismissing the significance of the body, even possibly disowning it: “…it  
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seemed to me a waste to put it in the ground, if it can be used” (Richard; lines 49 - 
50); “…re-use the bits if you can” (Will; lines 25 – 26). This way of talking 
disavows corporeality. There is no sense of a wish to keep the body intact and the 
donation of organs after death (“in the ground”) appears to be given equal status 
to donation while alive. I argue that this says something about the speaker’s 
feelings about their own aliveness. Perhaps this construction of altruistic donation 
allows for the possibility of the avoidance of mortality and loss. In saving the life of 
another person, the participants are in some way able to rhetorically defy their 
own embodiment and therefore eventual physical demise.   
 
Lastly, I present and discuss a third discursive theme that is clearly evident in two 
participants’ accounts and only tentatively present in the others. This finding 
supports the value of negative case analysis in qualitative research (Henwood & 
Pidgeon, 1992). It is a psychological discourse of the self in which altruistic 
donation is constructed as something that can benefit the donor in emotional 
terms. Donation is “something really significant…something you could hang your 
hat on” (James; lines 179 – 182) implying an expected increase in self-esteem. In 
contrast with the first discursive theme, these discourses are self-oriented and as 
such they question definitions of altruism that assume no benefit to the donor: “…if 
it works, it will make such a difference to someone who’s really struggling, and…it 
does give me great pleasure, yeah (Liz: lines 107 -110); “So you feel good in 
yourself of having done something like this, which is probably why I’m doing it” 
(Peter; lines 134 – 145). 
 
D.4.3. Other-oriented discourses – Emotions, empathy and self-sacrifice 
 
4.3.1. Resisting questions  
 
As might have been expected, all participants drew on moral, ethical and 
emotional discourses when they were asked to talk about donation. In using these 
discourses participants construct altruistic donation as an act through which they 
are putting another’s interests before their own. The rhetorical effect of doing this 
in conversation is to draw attention to the speaker’s moral or ethical position in a 
way that emphasises their empathic understanding of other people’s needs. 
Making the needs of others important in this way is consistent with contemporary 
psychological discourses of altruism, such as Batson’s (2011) empathy-altruism 
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hypothesis. Participants tended to use these discourses to construct altruistic 
donation as obvious and unremarkable. 
 
     Extract 1 
JC: So can you tell me a bit more about that moment that you heard 
about it on the radio and you had the feeling that you would be 
interested in doing that, can you just give me a bit more detail about 
possibly went through your mind then?  
 
Richard: Erm, I know, it, it…itʼs a thing that worthwhile doing and its er, 
erm, you know, I can do, why not do, you know if Iʼve got two kidneys 
and a kidney I know can make a huge difference to a personʼs life, er, 
why not, it, it seemed, seemed er, churlish not to, you know, why hold 
on to it if I donʼt need it, just you know it sparked a thought I mean, er, 
ma-, maybe, itʼs part of my erm, personality that I, I, I, I, used to 
always donate blood since I was a teenager I guess… and Iʼve also 
signed er documentation that my body should be used for, for, erm, 
science, or, student er, er, cutting up or whatever you know because 
again it seemed to me a waste to put it in the ground, if it can be used 
and so it just seemed an obvious natural thing to do when I, when I 
heard it was possible.      (Lines 25 – 51) 
 
Richard’s own needs are dramatically minimised through his altruistic discourses. 
He is suggesting that wanting to keep both of his kidneys when someone else is in 
need of just one of them would be positively selfish, even rude; ‘churlish’ as he 
says. On the other hand, the fact that he is referring to one of his internal organs 
generates in me, the listener, a sense of unformed anxiety. Why is Richard not 
entitled to “hold on to” his own body? He also seems to be suggesting that 
everybody who chooses not to give away a kidney is being “churlish”. Yet there is 
ambivalence in his answer, “why not do it?” It is as though Richard experiences a 
sense of obligation to effectively sacrifice a part of himself to a sick stranger. This 
is a sense of responsibility that goes far beyond what the majority of individuals 
presumably feel. 
 
A discourse of obligation such as this is difficult to contest. It positions the speaker 
on an ethical “high ground”, in effect silencing argument. Discourses that draw on 
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the “obviousness” of the morality of helping another person in need reduces the 
listener to little more than an admiring observer, without recourse to argument or 
challenge such is the ethical weight of these discourses in philosophical and 
religious traditions. How does one argue with such goodness?  
 
In his interview Richard described how he had experienced in his life a great many 
events over which he had had no control but which had had a powerful emotional 
impact on him, such as his parents’ and later his own divorce. This led me to ask 
whether he made any link between the idea of difficult things happening to him 
and his desire to help other people. I was thinking here about the idea of agency 
and finding compensation for a non-agentic life in compassion for others. 
However, this represents an intrusion of psychoanalytic discourse, because it 
reflects the idea that altruism is a defensive reaction-formation. Although I was 
attempting not to phrase the question in a way that Richard might have 
experienced as prescriptive, it is perhaps inevitable that he would have heard me 
making this link.  
  
     Extract 2 
JC: Iʼm wondering if you have any theories about how your experience 
throughout life has made you think about other people and made you 
want to, you talked about being very compassionate towards your 
familyʼs maid, and you talked about finding the apartheid system very, 
very disturbing and I wonder if thereʼs something about how you see 
other people, how you think about other people?  
 
Richard: I, I, I, donʼt know why my attitude is the way it is, it seems to 
me just normal and natural to be caring and considerate of others, in, 
in small things and in big things, er, er, I ca-, donʼt know that thereʼs 
anything special about it, you know, giving blood it seems like erm 
obvious thing, you know youʼre producing it all the time, you, you, you 
give a pint of blood itʼs made up again in no time, it was in America 
that I started giving blood, erm, but what brought me to it I donʼt know 
but it was convenient, I, I worked er, from where I worked in new york 
a few blocks away there was a place where you did it and er it seemed 
silly not to, you know [laughing slightly]. 
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JC: And is the kidney then just a continuation of that thought process?  
 
Richard: I think so and also, the bone marrow is, is, I turned [inaudible] 
I was surprised when I found out, its apparently similar to giving well, 
blood, they just draw it out with big syringes, itʼs not, not, itʼs a bit more 
of a deal than giving blood but you know [intake of breath] again, you, 
you make it up a, again, I, I was, when I found out then I, as I say, I 
tried to do that too, the kidney, you know she [woman on radio talking 
about living kidney donation] made it sound easy and natural and not 
a problem and…       
       (Lines 632 – 659) 
 
Richard argues that it’s “silly” not to give something if you are able and suggests 
that he does not believe that the way he feels is “special”, again taking up a 
position of resistance against my questions. By focusing on blood and then bone 
marrow donation and the “obviousness” of these, he resists talking about the links 
with his life that I have asked him about. He suggests that living kidney donation is 
more or less the same as blood and bone marrow donation. His laughter 
underscores his bemusement that it could be thought of otherwise. In all of this, 
he resolutely ignores my question about whether or not he thinks that his giving is 
rooted in some form of reparation, resisting this interpretation, describing it instead 
in terms of a discourse of pragmatism and utilitarianism. 
 
He wonders whether helping people is part of his “personality”. This psychological 
discourse describes his experience of wanting to help another person as 
something fixed and internal. All the participants felt as though being a helpful 
person is intrinsic to them as individuals, and it is also useful to consider that the 
principle of helping others is a common cultural ideal enshrined in all the major 
religions (Blum, 1980) and therefore constitutes a powerful social norm. That 
participants choose to respond to this culturally prescribed standard through living 
organ donation is nevertheless interesting, particularly when there are so many 
other opportunities to help which are arguably more effective in terms of the 
numbers of people who can be “saved”.     
 
I suggest that there is a potential for conflict for some participants (although not 
all) when discourses of being a “helping” person are compared with their feelings 
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(or lack of them) of valuing themselves. Richard dismisses the idea that his own 
life holds any intrinsic value such as when he says, “…you know, you just happen” 
(Line 56). The moral philosopher Thomas Nagel (1979) remarks that a utilitarian 
ethical position such as Richard’s, with its insistence on personal pursuit of the 
common good is demanding because the individual is not allowed to take up any 
“special position” (p203). One effect of utilitarianism is to deny a person’s 
subjectivity through privileging the objective in any situation (Nagel, 1979). To 
deny one’s own subjective importance is in practice a position of self-sacrifice. 
Through this discursive repertoire Richard seems to be saying: “I have no greater 
importance to myself than a stranger does to me”. To his friends and family, it is 
possible that this attitude may be disturbing. As a discourse, it is quite aggressive 
in its rejection of being valued.  
 
4.3.2. Positioning other people in opposition 
 
All the participants spoke of how close friends and family were often opposed to 
them donating. It is possible that the other-oriented discourses the participants 
draw on have the effect of enraging or frightening the people who are closest to 
them, resulting not in an experience of admiration and praise, but criticism and 
persecution. James was bewildered by his parents’ response, having already 
fantasised that he would gain their approval: James: “I thought they’d be ‘ah, isn’t 
that a great thing to do, wow, we must have brought him up correctly’, mm, well 
they didn’t.” (Lines 130 – 132) 
 
In response to strong criticism from his sister, constructed by her in terms of 
protecting their parents from distress, in his interview, James gives an account of 
himself as an emotional yet still rational individual who is motivated to become an 
altruistic donor in order to “give something back” for the many privileges he says 
that he has experienced in his life. This enables him to take up the ethical position 
and identity of a “good person” (versus his sister, who is necessarily positioned as 
“bad”). In extract 3 below, he accomplishes this position discursively with 
contrasting positions; by downplaying the effort that it requires on his part whilst 
describing it at the same time as a “massive thing to do” that he thought about 
“every breathing moment”. James draws on these two contrasting constructions of 
altruistic donation when he relates the story of having to withdraw because his 
parents were worried about him.  
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 Extract 3 
JC: Tell me, so what your, what was your perception of how they felt 
about it? 
 
James: Erm, they, from what my sister said, they said that it was the 
chance that I could die, it was nothing to do with the other person who’d 
be getting it, it was the chance that why would I put myself through 
something that could kill me, and I didn’t get that. I said, “Don’t you think 
I’ve been through this with the doctors, over and over again, where 
they’ve ad nauseum told me these are the risks, these are the risks”, and 
my sister said, “Oh they’re lying, they’re lying, it’s much worse than that, 
I’ve looked on the internet”; [sighs] “You know I’d rather not look on the 
Internet and I have looked on the Internet anyway and it agreed with what 
they [the doctors] said, so I’m not sure what you’re looking at”. But she’s 
probably fed them [their parents] with all this stuff, of, “he hasn’t thought 
of this and he hasn’t thought of that”, when every breathing moment from 
the time that I saw that news story, to the moment I ended up having to 
say I couldn’t do it, was, I was just thinking about it the whole time. It was 
such a massive thing and I honestly think I had thought of everything, 
and I knew the risks, and they seemed not, minimal, but worth it, worth it.  
        (Lines 134 – 154)  
 
In extract 3, James answers my question about what he perceived his parents 
believed by reporting a conversation with his sister. He seems to be angry at the 
suggestion that his parents may value him more than they do a stranger, drawing 
on both altruistic and risk discourses to strengthen his argument. They ought to be 
thinking about the recipient, he is saying, and in any case, the risk of harm coming 
to him is low. Then, as if this discounting of the facts was not insulting enough, he 
says that his sister will probably have undermined his reputation for being able to 
make a rational decision. Disembodied speech communicates his feelings of 
bewilderment and indignation at having to defend himself from the accusation of 
irresponsibility from his sister, suggesting that he has heard my question as 
asking for him to account for himself. He condemns his sister using her own 
words. His feelings come very close to the surface and I am faced with his 
considerable anger and hurt feelings. His emphasis functions to convince me, his 
questioner, of his deeply heartfelt commitment to donation, to ensure that in spite 
of his having had to pull out, I understand unequivocally that he did not do it out of 
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choice. By using an emotional discourse in this way James takes the subject 
position of an ethical person who wants to show that he cannot comprehend why 
his sister might criticize him for his actions, which through their very nature ought 
to be regarded as selfless.  
 
James thereby positions himself as resistant to criticism – in response to the 
criticism that he has experienced from his sister. This may also be the way that he 
experienced me in the interview. His talk positions him as “good”, and his sister as 
“bad” for preventing him from going through with the donation. Importantly, it may 
also function to prevent me from questioning him further, as if the morality of 
donation is so obvious there is really no need for us to examine it more closely. In 
this way James accounts for wanting to be an altruistic donor by using emotional 
discourses to underscore and provide additional evidence of his (already 
established) rational, intellectually sound commitment to the process (Edwards, 
2001). I, on the other hand, am positioned by this discourse as another possible 
doubter (and therefore less moral) because I, like his sister, have questioned his 
motives.   
 
Finally, in spite of his earlier rational discourse surrounding risk assessment, 
James can also be heard to construct the absence of evidence against altruistic 
donation as something that makes it in some way fated for him, or pre-ordained: 
“The gods were saying ‘you should do this or we would have thrown up a reason 
why you can’t do it’” (Lines 683 – 686).  The function of this dramatic discourse 
may be to absolve him, perhaps in relation to his sister’s accusation of 
selfishness. It places him in a position where responsibility for the decision to 
donate is now out of his hands and with it the pain that he has, albeit 
unintentionally, caused his parents (and himself). This might help him to avoid 
experiencing the difficult emotions that are associated with this particular chapter 
of his life, to put an end to both internal and external debates. If he has no need to 
question it further himself, the implication is that others, myself included, need not 
do so either.  
 
There is talk in all of the interviews describing how it is other people in the donors’ 
lives that have problematized the morality of altruistic donation. In light of this, it’s 
possible that participants experienced me as also problematizing their decision 
through the fact of doing this research. One way to think about this is to consider 
the ways in which other people might experience participants’ discourses of 
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empathy and physical sacrifice as discomforting, leading them to oppose the 
altruistic donation. The discomfort is presented in the socially acceptable terms of 
caring for the donor’s wellbeing, of not wanting them to put themselves at risk for 
a stranger, a “reason” that is often rejected by the participants. 
   
     Extract 4  
 JC: What’s your interpretation of that, why do you think they were so        
negative? 
George: I would like to think that they were looking out for me, but I 
think that would be, I don’t think that would be the case in most 
instances. I think they were just, they thought it was a silly thing to do. 
(Lines 106 – 111)  
 
All of the participants described incidents in which they had been criticised fiercely 
by friends or family, of how they had been urged to reconsider the donation, and 
how surprised they had felt. The attempt by other people to prevent the donor 
from going ahead places them in the confusing and uncomfortable position of 
having to defend something that they had constructed for themselves as obviously 
moral and logical.  
 
Extract 5 
JC: So it was this, I guess like you say, why not, this kind of, it seems very 
logical to you… 
 
Liz: Yeah, mm, it does. 
 
JC: Because you can do it, erm, but it’s not, that’s not the response that 
everyone having that, reading that article [about altruistic donation] would 
have had.  
 
Liz: No, absolutely, and what’s been quite surprising to me, the most 
surprising thing about the whole thing is that, is the reaction of people 
when I tell them. Now at first I sort of thought, no, I’m not going to mention 
it to anyone, I’ll keep it quiet until I’m definitely going to do it. Then I started 
telling friends and I would say 80% of friends say that I’m mad, erm, and 
er, some of them are quite vocal about it and think it’s completely the 
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wrong thing to do, and you’re messing with nature, and if, you wouldn’t 
have two kidneys if you didn’t need two kidneys, and what if your children 
need them, and what if you fall off your scooter and you need one, and, 
and, I, it’s definitely about 80/20 against, from the people that I talk to…  
 (Lines 31 – 48) 
 
George described how he encountered a similar reaction and also, like Liz, how 
“surprised” he had been at the reaction.  
  
 Extract 6  
 JC: Tell me about that, what that was like and what sort of reactions you      
got? 
 
 George: I was incredibly surprised, everyone, every time I saw them 
raised it and sort of stated their, erm, dislike for that. 
JC: They were against you doing it? 
 George: Absolutely. I mean not just ‘oh that’s really stupid, you 
shouldn’t do that’, [but] ‘You’re mad’, they would make a very big point 
of it…      
 (Lines 82 – 90) 
The uncomprehending and confrontational stance from friends and family reflects 
discourses in the academic literature, which frequently takes as its starting point 
the possibility of psychopathology in the altruistic donor. James believed that his 
sister had “stoked the fire” with their parents because “…she didn’t like the idea 
that I was going and doing something that she would never be able to do” (lines 
288 – 292), constructing donation as sibling rivalry. I am suggesting that there is 
something about this particular altruistic act that generates anxiety in other people 
that is then turned against the donor. It is possible that altruistic donation induces 
uncomfortable feelings in those close to the donor. Social pressure to conform to 
behavioural norms thereby reduces the chances of a person behaving in an 
altruistic way by creating conflict in the donor, as happened to James.  
 
This seems to be what Judith Butler (2005) is saying, when she describes how 
Foucault argues that relating to the self is always a social action and is therefore 
regulated by social norms. Butler (2005) suggests that if it is indeed the case that 
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“socially enforced modes of individualism” force us to be “narcissistic”, preventing 
“self-acceptance or forgiveness” (pp135-6), then it is important for us to engage 
with Foucault’s idea of there being a price to be paid for social constructions of the 
self, or making meaning for the self through social constructions. It may be that in 
the case of the altruistic donors, they pay that price through the internal conflict 
that is generated by the disparity between the way they have chosen to construct 
themselves as a helping person, and the way society, in the form of their friends, 
family, doctors and psychologists, attempt to enforce individualism upon them. In 
conducting the research interview, I too have put participants in the position of 
having to defend their actions, to justify what they feel should be “obvious” and 
that what they are doing is an unquestionably “good” thing. Donors discursively 
seek to solve this dilemma that they find themselves in by positioning their family 
and friends as “selfish” in comparison. This can be seen in Liz’s interview. This 
extract continues from her earlier statement of surprise at the negative reactions 
of others, given above.  
 
 Extract 7 
Liz: “…I’m not, I don’t mean to be judgmental at all, but I bet they don’t 
give blood either, you know they will, they will take it, when they need it 
after an operation or an accident but I guess there’s a kind of person 
that does those things, and doesn’t really think twice about it and, and I 
guess I’m one of those people. But I’m quite surprised by how 
vociferous people have been. (Lines 49 – 55)  
 
Like Richard earlier, Liz appears to be taking the position that we are all morally 
obliged to help people in need if we are able; it is the ‘default’ position, what you 
do if you are a good, thinking person, she seems to be saying. But again this has 
difficult implications for anyone who does not choose to act this way, because the 
only subject position this automatically affords others (including me) is a selfish 
one. George was clear and damning of his friends’ response: “I think they’re 
selfish and greedy” (line 133).  
 
Another way that donors respond to perceived criticism is by keeping their 
decision secret. This has the added benefit of being consistent with a discourse of 
altruism, in that it is constructed as for the sole benefit of another person. It makes 
discursive sense for the donors to be seen to avoid attention of any kind. This is 
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likely to impact on their feelings about the research interview, making them feel 
uncomfortable and even more likely to refute the possibility of personal gain.  
 
 Extract 8 
JC: Um, did she, did you tell her [Will’s mother] about your altruistic 
donation? 
Will: Yes I did. 
JC: What did she think?  
Will: She was a little bit non-committal and um, er, I didn’t tell anybody 
else, I, I kept it quite a closely guarded secret so I wanted to do it for 
the right reasons, if you start telling people it’s like, you know, I’m 
being a hero, I’m going to donate a kidney, la-di-da-di-da, but I didn’t 
want to give that impression at all, do it for the right reasons and um, 
just don’t tell anybody, but I told my mum.”                                           
(Lines 351 – 359)  
 
Will uses the fact that he kept his plan secret from everyone other than his mother 
as evidence of the rightness of his intentions, offering it to me as proof that his 
altruistic motivation is genuine. Modesty is a discursive resource that allows him to 
construct donation as being genuinely about another person and not himself. This 
enables him to protect himself from perceived attack by potential critics. If donors 
don’t tell anybody about what they are planning to do, they cannot be criticised or 
forced into reflection on what they are doing or why they want to be altruistic 
donors, and through not seeking attention or reward for their action, they are able 
to remain entirely within a “pure” altruistic discursive construction. Thus the 
avoidance of attention, conveniently consistent with dominant socio-cultural 
expectations of altruistic behaviour can also be a way of avoiding external and/or 
internal criticism in the context both of the research interview and in life outside. 
This external pressure on the altruistic donor to conform to social norms through 
an enforced consideration of their own and the needs of those closest to them is 
consistent with Layton’s (2009) critique of the neo-liberal discourse that she 
argues is dominant both in our society and in the psychological therapy room. The 
effect of this discourse, argues Layton (2009), is that we are all encouraged to 
separate psychic and social influences to the extent that we believe that as 
individuals we are responsible only for the happiness and wellbeing of ourselves 
 142 
and of those closest to us, not the individuals who make up society at large. 
Altruistic donors do not fit this model, which may explain why they seem to 
generate feelings of anxiety and resistance in other people.  
 
From Layton’s (2009) perspective, in acknowledging the suffering of a stranger 
through their actions and choosing to involve themselves in it, altruistic donors are 
making themselves vulnerable to another’s situation in a way that does not fit with 
a neo-liberal discourse that discounts empathy and altruistic discourses in favour 
of more hedonistic theories of motivation. In making themselves vulnerable, 
donors encounter resistance from close family and experts who might be argued 
to be drawing on a more mainstream neo-liberal discourse. At this point, altruistic 
discourses become a circular argument, enabling donors to position themselves at 
the summit of a moral hierarchy. The donor is able to refute the criticism of others, 
making themselves in some sense inviolable. I tentatively argue that they may 
then go a step further, and link what they are doing to their own identity and 
constructions of self, absolving themselves from having to reflexively question 
their decision.  
 
 Extract 9 
 Liz: I guess there’s a kind of person who does those things and 
 doesn’t really think twice about it and I guess I’m one of those people.  
        (Lines 52 – 3)  
 
Liz compares herself favourably to her critical friends, who are not like her; “I bet 
they don’t give blood either” (line 50). By making her altruistic donation central to 
her identity in the context of the research interview, Liz is able to ignore her 
friends’ protests and go ahead with her plan to become a donor. In this way, 
helping discourses that at first seem to privilege the other also give Liz and the 
other donors the opportunity to demonstrate agency and control in their own lives. 
 
4.3.3. Constructing relationships and positioning the recipients  
 
Despite the emotional tone of the discourses used by donors, altruistic donation is 
notable for the absence of actual emotional ties with the recipients. Donors have 
chosen to participate in a method of helping in which anonymity is assumed. A 
discourse of altruism thereby enables the donor to position themselves as good 
and ethical whilst, somewhat paradoxically, remaining outside any emotional 
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attachment with the person they are helping. In this distal relationship, participants 
actively empathised with the recipients to a varying extent. A discourse of 
empathy was most evident from the only female donor in the study, Liz. The 
separation from the person being helped is highlighted by the contrast implied in 
Liz’s referral to the people with whom she has had the closest emotional 
relationship with, her two adult daughters, when she explains why she has chosen 
this point in her life to become an altruistic donor. The anonymity of altruistic 
donation seems to present a stark contrast with the her twenty years of parenting:  
  
Extract 10 
JC: OK, and so why this point in your life, do you think? 
 
Liz: My two daughters…they’re big enough to look after me if I need 
them, er, but I guess, I’ve been a single parent for twenty years, and I 
guess I kind of feel that they’re now old enough to erm, er, certainly to 
look after themselves if I’m incapacitated for a while, er and I guess it’s 
kind of yeah, it’s kind of my time really, I think.    
        (Lines 85 -94) 
 
Being a parent, and perhaps especially a “single parent”, as Liz describes herself, 
is likely to be an intensely emotional role. It suggests a relationship in which 
feelings of responsibility are magnified due to the absence of a second person 
with whom to share the emotional and practical work (and the rewards) of 
parenting. Now that Liz’s children have grown up, instead of relinquishing a caring 
role, she has chosen to help somebody with whom she has no connection 
whatsoever. Altruistic donation appears to be constructed by Liz here as a reward 
to herself, something that she has earned through twenty years of parenting. 
 
Altruistic donation is a solitary act, enabling her to ignore the protestations of her 
friends and help a silent, presumably grateful and largely invisible second party. 
From this perspective, altruistic donation offers the donor a strikingly different type 
of relationship from the intense, messy, complicated reality of being somebody’s 
parent, son, daughter, husband or wife. For Liz, her construction of altruistic 
donation may be a way of actively distancing herself from those closest to her, 
and in this sense it might be said to free her, cutting the family ties that have 
bound her and giving her a form of independence after years of caring.  
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All of the potential that social relationships have for infiltrating and affecting the 
psychological and the personal, the way that we are unavoidably affected by the 
people we are in relationships with, can it seems, be avoided in altruistic donation. 
The recipient can remain an abstract, not a real person. It might even be 
suggested that the donor holds all the power in this particular relationship. As 
James said, “I could stop somebody being on a machine, I could give them their 
life back” (lines 39 - 40). It is paradoxical that by doing something so morally 
“right” and also so physically intimate, the donor is able to avoid being in a 
reciprocal relationship. Will particularly did not want to think about the participants 
at all when he was asked about them. He gave a very clear reason for this; to 
avoid being hurt in the event that the recipient was not grateful.  
 
Extract 11 
JC: Do you think about that person it might help? 
 
Will: Erm, no I try not to, I, um, in case they don’t say thank you. 
JC: What would that be like if they didn’t? 
Will: If they knew and they just um, they just um, it’s like doing a favour 
for somebody and then, like my sister, you know, I’ve seen her in plays, 
she’s never come to see me doing anything and um I don’t want to 
experience that. “There’s the kidney, I hope it goes well for you”, that’s 
all. 
JC: So if you think about them and try and sort of imagine them in 
anyway then they don’t thank you, you would experience that as quite 
hurtful? 
Will: Well I’d be very hurt and it’s um, a bit of a big thing isn’t it? 
JC: Yes, it’s a very big thing. 
Will: And er, if I knew who they were and they knew who I was and they 
didn’t say “thank you mate”, or just ignored it or just, I don’t want to go 
[there], I don’t want to experience that. They can have the kidney but I 
don’t want to know who they are, job done and I’ll never know.  
 
JC: And then you won’t have to be disappointed? 
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Will: And I don’t get the opportunity of being disappointed, there you go. 
       (Lines 605 – 621) 
Will risks making himself vulnerable to what feels like despair through donation; “I 
don’t want to go [there]…I don’t want to experience that”. He imagines that if he is 
not thanked for donating his kidney, being ignored and “disappointed” will be more 
painful that he can bear. It is therefore much safer for him emotionally to avoid 
thinking about the recipient at all. He links this feeling to the way he experiences 
his sister as uninterested in him. He feels ignored in their relationship, despite 
believing that he is engaging with her. Will seems to long for the love and 
admiration that he feels is absent in his relationships yet has chosen a way of 
relating that involves a stranger and the option of remaining anonymous. This 
extract, and Will’s investment in it will be considered in greater detail below 
(p165). 
 
Throughout the interviews, potential recipients are positioned by participants’ 
discourses as sometimes central to the decision, but at times as secondary to it. 
Recipients are however unavoidably the subject of this action and are positioned 
in these discourses as helpless, disempowered through disease and dependent 
on the donor for their health, maybe even their life. This subject position is an 
inevitable consequence of discourses that construct the donor as ‘saviour’.  
 
James, who had to pull out of donating a week before his scheduled operation 
after his sister told him that his parents were concerned for his safety, was deeply 
distressed by thoughts of the recipient and said that he tried not to think about the 
person. The competing discourses of altruism that he and his sister were using 
placed James in a highly confusing, possibly even unbearable position. His sister 
has accused him of being selfish, irresponsible and stupid using the very act that 
he constructed as entirely selfless, and now he is being asked in the interview to 
experience anew the painful feelings. James appeared to be upset and angry at 
this stage of the conversation, understandably so.  
 
  Extract 12 
JC: Is it a lo-, is it that it brings up feelings of loss for you about not 
having been able to do it?  
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James: Loss, and anger with my sister when I think you know she’s my 
only sibling and when my mum and dad go she’ll be the only one left and 
I can’t believe that she would do something like that, that I thought was 
selfish, she was calling me selfish and I couldn’t believe that she was 
doing that. How can I be being selfish here, I’m not doing this for me, I’m 
doing it for somebody else, I will get this lovely feeling, I’ve been told that, 
but, and she honestly thought I was doing it for myself. ‘You really don’t 
know me very well do you?’     (Lines 565 – 576) 
 
It feels as though his anger is directed at me in this response, as though I am the 
one who has misunderstood and misrepresented him; “You really don’t know me 
very well do you?” is a direct form of speech. James has taken the opportunity of 
the research interview to construct his decision to pull out of donating in a way 
that allows him to make sense of his conflicting emotions. One way to avoid his 
sister’s accusation of selfishness is to position her as less ethical than he is; “she 
would never dream of doing anything like this” (line 287). This enables him to 
maintain his own positive identity even though he has had to withdraw from 
donating. In contrast with a risk discourse, with which he downplays his 
investment, here he again constructs donation as a significant emotional event to 
such a degree that being asked by me to think about the fact that he has had to 
withdraw makes him feel uncomfortable. The uncaring position he is placed in 
through this discourse, and the discomfort he experiences in recounting this 
experience to me is difficult for us both and the reason for this becomes clearer 
when he describes how he has resisted thinking about it until now.   
 
     Extract 13 
JC: … What it’s like talk-, I mean I know it’s uncomfortable talking about 
the conversation with your sister, is there any other, are there any other 
feelings around this whole thing for you that we haven’t talked about?  
 
James: I don’t like to think about the guy who was getting it. That’s 
something I managed to completely blank out I think. God there was 
somebody who was told we’ve found a match, he was given a date and 
his family were all round him there, wow, next Tuesday, whoa, here we 
go, so that’s something I don’t like to think about. [5] No, I, I know it’s 
weird, but that is what I’ve done now, I have managed to just blank it out 
because there didn’t seem any, didn’t see any point, there’s no 
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advantage to going over it and over it and getting annoyed, so I just 
haven’t really thought about it. There was a series on TV not long 
afterwards, specifically about donors and everything, and they were 
showing people going through the operation and everything, and it was 
just, I couldn’t really watch it, excuse me [coughs], I couldn’t really watch 
it because it was just too, oh no, I could have been that person and that 
person…who was getting it, he could have been that person, yuk.  
 
J: It felt yuk, it felt horrible to think that you could have been the person 
doing that.  
 
P: Yeah.  
 
J: It seems like you really identified, you’d already really identified 
strongly in some way, you’d already sort of thought ahead and put 
yourself in the position of what it would be like to have done it.  
 
P: Yes, I think going through all the tests and everything and speaking to 
the doctors and, you have to do I can’t remember, is it one or two 
psychological evaluations, so they ask you, they make you think about 
this sort of thing. [coughs] so yeah, so it was the biggest thing in my life 
and I thought about it all day, every day.                    (Lines 662 – 696) 
 
My question about his having “identified” with being a donor was intended to 
reflect my sense that he had internalised a particular idea of himself, and to try to 
convey my understanding of how difficult it must have been for him to have had to 
let go of this identity. The two subject positions that his discourses make available, 
one as a good, ethical person, providing the opportunity for a positive subjective 
experience, and the other offering failure, pain and guilt, add up to the likelihood of 
him feeling highly ambivalent about the research interview.  
 
In contrast, the absence of a clear image of the prospective recipients in 
participants’ discourses, and the absence of curiosity expressed by some is 
striking, positioning the recipients not just as invisible, but not even permitted to be 
thought about other than in the most general sense. It is possible that the recipient 
and their suffering can be avoided to some extent in this way. 
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     Extract 14 
   JC: You mentioned about the person whose life you could have saved a little 
while ago and what are your sort of thoughts and feelings and ideas about the 
person, whoever they are, that might get it? 
George: I assumed that I would never know who they were. 
JC: No. Do you have any particular ideas about people with kidney 
disease, dialysis; is there anything around kidneys specifically that you 
[inaudible]? 
George: No because I was asking about what else I can give, [laughs] 
sorry I was. I was saying you could have a bit of my liver if you want, you 
can have bits of this or that. I don’t have, I’ve never known anyone on 
dialysis or anything to my knowledge, erm, I do know people that only 
have one kidney through motor accidents or whatever, not many but I 
know a couple and they’ve had no problem, erm, No, I mean, it was just 
to help someone out. I don’t know, maybe I’m sitting at home by myself 
too much, you see these things and think well at least I’m getting out of 
the house for a bit, I don’t know [coughs].  (Lines 166 – 184) 
 
George says that he is prepared to give away any bit of himself and says that he 
is not interested in who will get them. Although his discourse is verging on the 
sacrificial he makes light of this, laughing, wondering whether it is because he is 
“sitting at home by myself too much”. He uses humour to minimise the emotional 
significance of what he’s doing, undermining his own importance in the process; “it 
was just to help someone out” feels like something of a deliberate understatement 
in this context. Perhaps in reaction to my question about the person whose life 
might be “saved”, it is possible that George’s outwardly unconcerned attitude is 
due to modesty or even embarrassment, that my question feels grandiose to him. 
Yet it seems unlikely that an individual who does not want attention would 
volunteer to have an operation in the course of which they will receive the 
attention of a great many people. It is not just the recipient who is strikingly absent 
from this discourse, George himself is also missing, in the sense of an ‘I’. It is 
possible that he experiences what he is proposing to do as something that he 
feels cannot be explained, at least in any way that is consciously available to him.  
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D.4.4. Emotional Investment in Discourses - Richard 
 
The story of Richard’s childhood and later, his own marriage, can be read as one 
of parental omnipotence and Richard’s own powerlessness in the face of it. In his 
account, his childhood was dominated by things happening to him – major events 
brought about by his parents – over which he had no influence, yet which would 
have had a profound effect on his own experience. His parents divorced when he 
was a young boy, and as Richard says in the interview, there was “nothing he 
could do about it”, and he “admired” (perhaps idealized) his mother for bringing up 
the children alone. When Richard and his twin sister were seven, their mother 
wanted to take them out of the country but their father refused to let them leave, 
so Richard, his sister and an older brother went to live in a children’s home for a 
year. They saw their father twice a week, a situation that Richard said was “ok”, 
and how his father remained “devoted” to them.  
 
On his mother’s return she married again and the children went to live with her 
and their new stepfather. For reasons that were unclear, Richard’s stepfather 
objected to them continuing to see their own father and a plan was concocted in 
which Richard and his sister, at the age of “nine or ten”, were instructed to tell 
their father, in the presence of a lawyer, that they did not want to see him any 
more. At the last minute, Richard says that he refused to go through with the act 
and later continued to see his father in secret. His twin sister did meet her father 
as she had been instructed and bore the brunt of this dreadful experience, 
according to Richard, becoming unable to walk for several months with a 
medically un-diagnosable condition that Richard told me he now assumes was 
“psychological”.  
 
JC: So Iʼm trying in my mind to get a picture together of this life which 
has been eventful, your life has been full of change and relationships 
ending and beginning and, adaptability, a huge amount of adaptability 
on your part, having to adapt to new situations.  
 
Richard: “Someone pointed out to me once that er, there’d been erm, 
a, a, few erm serious points in my life where it changed dramatically 
without me having any control over it, erm, I hadn’t thought about it 
until that was mentioned, and maybe that’s one of the reasons why I 
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feel fatalistic about life I don’t know and I also feel, I, I, I’m not a person 
of power or of aggression or of self-assertion, erm, but you know first of 
all my, my parents divorced when I was small and I remember th-, how, 
that there was nothing I could do about it, but it was a great pain, then 
my erm mother married my stepfather without, before she even came 
to say hello I’m back from the united states, you know she married my 
stepfather with whom we didn’t have a good relationship even before, I, 
we knew him as a teacher before, erm, [pause] and er then my wife, er, 
erm, er getting involved with somebody else er, without me knowing 
anything about it, I of course, again couldn’t do anything about it, erm, 
[pause] but er, anyway.”     (Lines 599 – 621) 
  
One of the most striking aspects of the interview with Richard and his discourses 
about altruistic donation was his absolute determination to refuse to give himself 
any special status above that of the stranger who would have his kidney. He drew 
on ethical and biomedical discourses of morality and risk but resolutely rejected 
discourses of the self and would not accept that what he was proposing to do was 
in any way remarkable, as if making himself special in any way was unthinkable. 
To decide to give someone the “gift of life”, yet argue that this is not something 
remarkable, seems at times to be perverse. It is as though he is unable to 
experience himself as special or deserving of praise in any way.  
   
In extract 1, above, Richard says that once he found out about the possibility of 
altruistic donation, it seemed “churlish” not to do this “obvious, natural thing”, 
comparing it to giving blood, which most would not consider it equivalent to, in 
either medical, personal or ethical terms. Understanding the compulsive quality of 
this is where the psychoanalytic notion of the unconscious may be useful. With his 
use of “churlish”, he seems to be saying that because he can save a life, he must 
do so. His determination and compulsion on learning of the possibility of altruistic 
donation is marked, as when he described how he “immediately made an inquiry” 
and “eventually” managed to get information after “multiple attempts”.  It is as 
though he is compelled to make a sacrifice of himself through his foreclosing on 
his own value. Altruistic donation is something he does for no personal gain; in the 
interview, he refuses to allow himself to take any pleasure from his giving. It 
seems that donation is not a loving act, but rather one that repeats his experience 
of deprivation.  
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Richard’s emotional investment in the discourses he uses suggests that he does 
not care what happens to himself, such as when he asks; “why not?” become an 
altruistic donor. He is ambivalent, but in a negative way, as though he is not able 
to care one way or the other what happens to him. In his interview, I experienced 
Richard as reluctant to talk much about being altruistic. He insisted that donating 
was merely a function of his “fatalistic view of life” (line 56). Through his 
construction of altruistic donation as something that ought not to confer a special 
self-status, he denied the possibility of any related personal loss, needs, 
importance or intrinsic value, saying; “…if I were to die on the operating table it 
wouldn’t make any difference to me” (lines 678 – 679). By giving a part of himself 
away and not being concerned about the possibility of any negative outcome for 
himself, he splits himself from his physical body. It seems from this as though 
Richard feels that for him, living and dying are equivalent.  
 
Richard’s lack of ability to care for himself can be seen in the discourses he uses 
to think about whose life is valued more, in which he positions the prospective 
recipient of his kidney as worthy of being saved while his own life is relatively 
unimportant. It can be argued that Richard has made an emotional investment in 
this discursive categorization of self and other (Wetherell, 2003). In the interview, 
Richard avoids a claim for personal significance through altruistic donation, 
although he recognizes that at certain times in his life things have happened to 
him over which he has had no control, he chooses not to see his altruism in light 
of this. 
 
Richard’s discourses of altruism in the interview can therefore be interpreted in 
several ways; as full of humility and concern for the other, or as an aggressive 
rejection of the self and others. He resists a discourse of reparation as he 
describes himself as “…in some ways a bit of a waste of space” (line 756), and 
“…one of the many…not one of the few” (line 781). His feels that his parts are 
inter-changeable with others, that he is not special or unique. He has no intrinsic 
value. Being with Richard felt sad, unsurprisingly.  
 
Richard’s strict ethical position allows him to continue to experience his own lack 
of specialness and his account of not wanting children is consistent with this 
refusal to even consider his own needs:  
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“I regard having children as a supremely selfish act, that you don’t give 
children [life]… that, that life isn’t a gift, that life is a sentence, that for 
one’s own, er need to have something to love or need to erm, to, er, erm, 
live eternally, you have a child to, who does that for you, but it’s, it’s for 
your gratification that you have a child and er, you know, the child has to 
suffer life, to satisfy that need in the parent”.  (Lines 511 – 518) 
 
Richard seems to be saying that his own unhappy experience of childhood felt 
like “a sentence”. With a psychoanalytic reading, it is possible to suggest that 
Richard’s subjective experience of wanting to be an altruistic donor symbolises 
unconscious feelings about himself as an object and his experience of being 
powerless in his own life. Altruistic donation may therefore offer him a way to 
manage the sadness that he feels about his failure to make something more of 


















D.4.5. Rational Discourses 
 
4.5.1. Responding to criticism 
In the previous section, a discussion of ethical, altruistic and emotional discourses 
was presented in which the participants constructed altruistic donation as 
‘obvious’. All participants said that donating altruistically was not something they 
considered themselves extraordinary for wanting to do. Using this discursive 
resource, they seem to be suggesting that there is little or no need for further 
examination of their decision. However, when they were asked to account for their 
decision in the research interview there was a tendency for participants to draw on 
alternative rational and actuarial discourses. With these discourses, participants 
reported factual information and hard data, consistent with the medico-legal notion 
of informed consent that is found in official literature for altruistic donors. 
Participants also describe the physical costs of donation as relatively insignificant. 
By downplaying the physical risks and by making this argument, they are able to 
position themselves as rational, logical individuals.  
In a Kantian approach to morality, the question of how to live a good life, or living 
ethically through putting others before the self is an act of humanity, but it must be 
a rational as opposed to an emotionally driven process (Blum, 1980). This is 
consistent with the way clinical judgments about organ donation are made, 
founded on the principle of the unacceptability of harm to the donor (“first do no 
harm”) balanced with the prospective gains for the recipient (Beauchamp & 
Childress, 2001).  
 
These contrasting discursive resources, one “emotional” and one “rational” appear 
to be in conflict. Parker (1992) describes how contrasting discourses can overlap 
to construct the same object in different ways. The fight between these competing 
discourses can be seen in this extract from James’s interview in his response to a 
question about the role of emotions in his decision:  
 Extract 15 
JC: It seems as though it was almost like an emotional response rather 
than a, actually kind of reasoned response.  
 
James: Mm, bit of both. 
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JC: You were sort of feeling… 
 
James: I couldn’t think of a good reason why not, you know, I was quite 
happy if somebody had then turned round and said ‘you haven’t thought 
of this James’, but they didn’t…   (Lines 44 – 50)  
 
Having spoken previously in the interview using emotion discourses, at this point 
James switches to a risk discourse in response to my question about feelings. 
This allows him to resist my interpretation. He replies to my second question, “you 
were sort of feeling…” with; “I couldn’t think of a good reason…” He is resisting my 
agenda, which is to get him to talk more about the feelings that he described 
earlier, and his resistance takes the form of his rational discourse and positioning. 
Perhaps he hears my question about feelings as a suggestion that he has not 
properly thought about what he is doing, just as his sister did, and so he provides 
what he considers to be a more intellectually rigorous account of himself. He 
cannot think of “a reason not to do it” (line 31), there can be “no excuses” for 
someone in his position (line 169 -170), a person with no partner or children who 
depend on him. These are all very cognitive responses, and from this discursive 
position he attempts to reduce the emotional significance of donating, describing 
the operation as just “a bit of discomfort, and a bit of time out of your life” (lines 40 
– 41) and it’s “nothing” (line 40). 
 
Through this pragmatic discourse, James constructs altruistic donation as a low-
risk activity and in doing so positions himself as a mature, sensible individual who 
demonstrates competence at assessing risk and uses the same language as 
clinicians. With this discursive repertoire he may be warning me not to go on trying 
to position him as emotional and therefore by extension “irrational”. He describes 
having sought out and examined the evidence as an autonomous individual who 
is capable of finding and evaluating evidence using a methodical, scientific 
approach. Unfortunately for James, this approach was ultimately not successful in 
his attempts to convince his family of what he wanted to do.  
 
An actuarial or risk discourse can be argued to provide participants with a 
response to perceived questioning or criticism of their action by others, positioning 
the donor as “sane” and “rational” as opposed to emotional and “irrational”. What 
is more, it is difficult to dispute and can be readily backed up with references to 
medical and organ transplant regulatory literature, and can be used either to 
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augment, or in place of, the emotional and moral discourses discussed above. In 
contrast, detractors are positioned as “irrational”, and in George’s case, he 
delivers a further rhetorical blow by arguing that this also makes his critics “selfish 
and greedy”.  
  
Extract 16 
JC: You feel selfish and greedy for your friends who want you not to do it? 
 
George: I think they’re selfish and greedy, I don’t think that, I mean, I 
don’t know, maybe my perception of life is very different and weird, I just 
think well I’m fifty, if I gave a kidney away tomorrow and in twelve months 
time I had problems with the one that I had left which ended up resulting 
in me dying, I know this sounds probably a little bit depressing but I did 
what I could with the information that I had at the time. I don’t think I’m 
particularly, erm, scared of death, I don’t want it to be painful or anything 
but I don’t want to die either, but I don’t know, maybe I’m just a little bit 
too pragmatic for my own good, I don’t know.  
 
JC: Yeah, I was thinking about, as you were talking then, how, I wonder 
how much you value your own physical body, yourself? 
George: It does sound like that. When I went and saw the psychiatrist at 
the hospital and I was saying I want to do this and do that and he was 
sort of looking at me, yes, I know it sounds stupid, everyone’s told me it 
sounds stupid, and he went down the same [inaudible], and I said “No, I 
want to live until I’m 180 I think, I mean there’s things I want to do, places 
I want to go, there is just no time left, yes I want to do things but 
everyone’s got to die, there’s no point in, I don’t know, when it happens it 
happens. I don’t want to bring on my own death but, walking across the 
road could do that, I’ve got better, actually I’ve got a better chance of 
giving a kidney away than technically walking across the road and getting 
hit by the number 10 bus”, so yeah.   (Lines 131 – 162) 
 
In this extract, George appears to be suggesting that for him, dying as a result of 
donating would be an acceptable outcome. Talk about death is frequent in this 
extract and throughout George’s interview mortality discourses recur. He suggests 
that he is simply “pragmatic” about death and dying, but like his earlier talk about 
 156 
altruistic donation being “just to help someone out” (line 182), the repeated use of 
“I don’t know” suggests the presence of doubt. He seems to be taking a logic 
discourse to its extreme and it is not clear what the function of this discourse 
might be for him in terms of his subjective experience. It is true that in medical 
terms, the risk of permanent harm being caused to a kidney donor is considered 
to be low. But arguing that the chance of harm from donation is “acceptably” low is 
surely not the same as arguing that death would be an acceptable outcome, which 
is what George appears to be saying in this extract.  
 
This apparently uncaring attitude to his own life or death, in order to improve the 
health of a stranger, is what prompted my question about whether he valued 
himself. In his response, he recounts what he had already told the assessing 
psychologist at the hospital, using a fatalistic discourse “everybody’s got to die”, 
and the enigmatic “there is just no time left”, as well as a more “rational” risk 
discourse that constructs altruistic donation in terms of probability. If, as George 
argues, death “happens when it happens” for him, why the attempt to stop it 
happening to somebody else?  
 
Liz also chose to “rationalise out” her decision and used risk discourses in her 
response to those of her friends who told her she was “crazy” for wanting to 
donate.  
 
    Extract 17 
Liz: …everything that they [her friends] talked about, er, you know 
whether it was the er, erm, the fact that you, do you need both kidneys, 
what happens if your children need them, what happens, you know all of 
these things I can rationalise out myself and still think, I’m gonna do it, 
you know, there’s a good reason to do it, the chances of that happening 
are so small, that erm, it’s not a good enough reason not to do it, in my 
mind.                                                                             (Lines 72 – 79) 
 
Discourses of utility, that position the donor as possessing a useful commodity 
than can be put to use for the greater social good, are also commonly drawn on to 
fulfill the same function. To the listener, this discourse can feel cold and clinical, 
which is disconcerting and evokes anxiety. This was certainly my experience. 
Something of a similar feeling of anxiety is provoked by Richard’s admittedly 
rational yet nonetheless disquieting discourse in which he creates for himself a 
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subject position of being indifferent to his own continuing existence, similar to that 
evoked by George in the extract above. 
 
Extract 18 
JC: The risk doesnʼt bother you? I know itʼs a very small risk in statistical 
terms. 
 
Richard: Yeah, it, it, itʼs a very small risk and er it doesnʼt bother me. If it 
bothered my children it would be an issue and thatʼs why Iʼve discussed it 
with them and Iʼve tried to make clear to them what the risk is, er, and 
theyʼre both intelligent sensitive people and theyʼre [inaudible], they, they 
seemed, they, they are quite happy with it, Iʼve kept them abreast of all 
the checks that Iʼve had and so forth and theyʼve not expressed any 
reservations at all, and thatʼs what matters, if, if erm, if I were to die on 
the operating table it wouldnʼt make any difference to me, it might make a 
difference to them, you know, it er, so, yeah, no, Iʼm not, [intake of 
breath] Iʼm not concerned about the risk.    (Lines 669 – 
681) 
 
Richardʼs apparently cavalier attitude to his own mortality, “if I were to die on the 
operating table”, is, like Georgeʼs, somewhat shocking, especially in the context of 
saving lives. The idea that death “wouldnʼt make any difference” to him suggests 
that he does not value his own life as much as he values the life of the prospective 
recipient of the kidney. It seems, if not suicidal, then indifferent to life. From a 
clinical perspective, this does not fit with official discourses of altruistic kidney 
donation, which strongly emphasise that the donor should not be put at risk of 
significant levels of harm in order to donate to a stranger.  
 
Richard and George seem to be almost embarrassed by the attention of the 
research interview. This leaves me feeling somewhat nonplussed as the listener, it 
is disorientating to experience and I donʼt know where to go next. Both construct 
altruistic donation as not heroic, and not emotionally important. George explicitly 
dismisses any emotional investment on his part in donation, using a discourse of 
logic in its place 
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     Extract 19 
George: I’m no bloody hero, I don’t know, it’s just a logical decision. 
JC: Logical? 
George: Well for me yes, I think so, it is a logical decision, it’s not, I 
think I probably made it logically, maybe I never made the decision 
emotionally I don’t know. I’ve never really attached any emotion to 
the decision. Again, maybe if I had have given away a kidney, maybe 
after the event the emotion would have hit me, I don’t know, but I’ve 
never really attached any great emotion to it. I’ve got two healthy 
ones, you can have one, the chances of anything happening to me 
that are bad are remote so.   (Lines 723 - 734) 
 
When George is pressed to think about what altruistic donation is, rather than only 
what it is not; the constructions that he chooses are those afforded by logical and 
risk discourses. I have wondered whether after facing so much criticism from his 
friends, might he be expecting criticism from me as well?  
 
From the perspective of the participants’ subjective experience, in addition to the 
positioning of themselves as “sane”, the use of discourses associated with 
rationalism might also enable them to avoid, or get rid of some their own 
potentially uncomfortable feelings about what they doing, preventing (or 
‘defending against’) the experience of distressing emotions and anxiety. Peter 
acknowledges the paradox of not being on the donor register and explicitly refers 
to the possibility of his own avoidance in the interview when he questions his use 
of these discourses, wondering whether he has underestimated the potential for 
harm involved in kidney donation or whether; “…is it that you actually don’t care?” 
He moves between using the first and third person pronouns, splitting himself into 
interviewer and interviewee potentially pre-empting questions that may be difficult 
to hear.  
 
     Extract 20 
JC: Have you done other medical altruistic, do you give blood for 
instance? 
 159 
Peter: No, no, you’d think you’d start off and you’d think that you have 
some involvement with kidney patients through some connection with 
that side, but I have no, there’s nothing like that. It’s not that I, I haven’t 
even filled out a donor card, you know, you’d think there’s a progressive 
step and this is the sort of ultimate sort of thing, it hasn’t followed that so 
even when I, in talking to you now, I think you know why is this 
happening and why are you doing it and if you stopped and thought 
about it and you just, is it that you actually don’t care? You know, if 
something happens to you, oh so what. 
JC: Is that what it feels like? 
 Peter: Well I’m just thinking that there might be some element of that but 
I do care, you know, and if God forbid something happened to me, you 
know, how would that impact on my children and those that are close to 
me, would there be an unnecessary thing to risk your life for, you know, 
do I not care enough about them to expose myself to the risk? I’ve 
thought about that absolutely. I probably perceive the risk to be possibly 
less than it is, I’m not, it doesn’t concern me.      (Lines: 83 – 103) 
 
Peter asks himself whether his apparent lack of emotional investment is evidence 
of the fact that he doesn’t care about himself and by extension, and more 
disturbingly for him, his children. He dismisses this idea almost immediately when 
he examines the feelings more closely and realises that he cares very much that 
his children do not lose their father. It might be that Peter experiences caring 
about his children as more acceptable than caring about his own welfare. In 
response to my question asking him to clarify his feelings, “Is that what it feels 
like?” he draws on a risk discourse that enables him to extract himself from the 
uncomfortable position of not caring about what happens to him. As with Richard, 
by constructing altruistic donation in such a way as to suggest that he does not 
care if he is harmed in the process, Peter’s discourse conflicts with the medical 
principle of the donor not coming to harm, and it is possible that he realises this in 
the course of the interview and alters his position to fit with a more “acceptable” 
discourse of altruistic donation. Later, he revises his position by referring to his 
attitude towards medical procedures, this time constructing it as an operation that 
carries with it an acceptable level of risk, reinforcing the idea that he is in no real 
danger of coming to harm or of his children losing their father. He chooses 
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however not to respond to my question about the significance of giving away a 
part of himself, turning again to a medical discourse with which he can distance 
himself from the personal aspect of donating. 
 
 Extract 21 
JC: We’ve talked about a little, we’ve talked a bit about the idea that it doesn’t 
feel like a very big deal to you but I just wanted to quickly pick up on that idea, 
that your body and how you feel about the fact that you’re giving away a bit of 
your body, does that have resonance for you? 
Peter: It really doesn’t impact on me in terms of, you know, there’s going 
to be an operation, some element of risk in it, I know that I’ll still be able 
to function quite normally afterwards, people do it every day. I don’t have 
a fear of medical things so it’s not, it really isn’t a big deal.  
(Lines 492 – 501) 
Compared with the other participants, Peter makes greater use of the research 
interview to reflexively explore the idea that altruistic donation might be a symbolic 
action. He is able to observe himself from a third position (Britton, 1988). In the 
interview, he can be heard to be actively constructing and deconstructing donation 
and at times seems to contradict himself. An example of this occurs when at first 
he describes his reasons for wanting to donate in order to feel good about himself, 
to prove that he has value, and later in the interview when he says that he’s doing 
it to be helpful to another person. I experienced these contradictions as confusing 
and at times difficult to follow. In contrast, the other participants appear to be more 
certain of their views, more concrete in their thinking, and the detailed risk 
discourses they use to construct altruistic donation may function to provide them 
with a socially acceptable subjective experience of altruistic donation.  
 
I have argued that rational discourses might be used in interviews because they 
allow participants a socially acceptable way to account for the complex emotions 
that accompany the decision to become an altruistic donor, and which are 
possibly not available for them to put into words. This construction of donation as 
low risk is intended to allay anxiety not just in themselves but also in other people. 





Peter: I’m not sure whether it’s because of my desire to do this deed is 
overpowering and somehow diminishing the “what if”, I might be too 
dismissive of that because my desire to let’s say, well to put it bluntly, 
make myself feel better for what I’m doing is so overpowering that I may 
be too dismissive of the dangers, but I’ve tried to be objective about that.
        (Lines 515 – 521) 
 
4.5.2. Engineering discourses - managing feelings about death and dying 
Richard situates his decision to donate in a pragmatic, bodily discourse. His body 
is a constructed as a commodity to be used efficiently, not “wasted” in death. The 
implication is that if the body is no more than the sum of its parts, subjectively for 
Richard there is no need for him to have any feelings about what he is proposing 
to do. He effectively resists questions about motives in this way.  
 
Extract 23 
Richard: Iʼve also signed documentation that my body should be used 
for, for, erm, science, or, student er, er, cutting up or whatever you 
know because again it seemed to me a waste to put it in the ground, if 
it can be used and so it just seemed an obvious natural thing to do 
when I, when I heard it was possible. (Lines 46 – 51) 
 
Will’s interview is particularly notable for the way in which he constructs altruistic 
donation by integrating engineering metaphors as a “solution” to emotion 
problems. In response to my first interview question, he described how he had 
been going through a “bad patch”: 
 
Extract 24 
Will: …and I thought about taking my own life and um, I thought, well, I’m going 
to make sure, you know, I can be broken for spares. You know, being a good 
engineer, you know, you reuse the bits if you can.   (Lines 23 – 26)       
Will’s phrases; “broken for spares” and “re-use the bits” are starkly mechanical 
discourses in the context of mental distress. On discovering however that suicide 
would mean that his organs would be unsuitable for transplant, he made a bargain 
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with his GP, in return for an appointment with a psychologist to find out “what’s 
wrong with me” (line 28), he offered to donate a kidney to a stranger.  
Extract 25 
JC: So you’d made this promise, erm, still it was, it’s quite a big thing to    
go through with, I’m just really wondering what that, why the commitment 
to this particular way of helping people? 
Will: Um, well, as I say, if I had have killed myself um, it would have been 
a shocking waste of some good bits and I’ve been healthy all my life, and 
I mistakenly thought you could have the lot.                   (Lines 95 – 100)  
 … 
JC: But that came out of a rather dark period of time where you felt that 
you probably didn’t want to go on living anymore, is that right? 
Will: That’s true, yes, although the realisation it was a shocking waste of, 
a shocking waste of um, you know, body parts was when I read about 
those suicides, I thought you know, why not, you know, didn’t you carry 
an organ donor card or something like that. Little did I realise it didn’t 
matter because, you know, you’ve done it, you know, they can’t get the 
parts, I didn’t realise that at the time but years later when, you know, I did 
think about taking my own life, but then I thought well, you know, have a 
live, be a live donor.     (Lines 586 – 593) 
 
Will as a ‘self’ or an ‘I’ seems not to exist in this extract. There is no suggestion 
that it would be a shame or sad for him that his life had come to an end, merely 
the problem of the waste of “bits” and “parts”. The reduction of himself to “parts” is 
a discourse of bodies as commodities, foregrounding the physical, embodied 
person and positioning the symbolic aspects of self, the things that make us who 
we are psychologically, not just as unimportant but non-existent. “I am nothing 
more than my body”, he seems to be suggesting. It may be significant that Will 
made his decision to become an altruistic donor when he was experiencing 
psychological distress. One possible subjective experience of this focusing on the 
physical, material aspects of his existence is that his mind and the pain it causes 
can be neutralised. I suggest that the function of these engineering discourses 
might be to enable Will to think and speak about his experience of psychological 
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distress, along with the potentially disturbing subjects of death and dying, in a way 
that he can tolerate. He also may assume that his listener will be better able to 
tolerate this way of thinking. It is a way of approaching what may be a very 
frightening idea in a manageable way, promising an escape both from continued, 
painful existence, as well as from annihilation, through a form of recycling, a way 
of going on living after death.  
Will also drew on logistical discourses and these seemed to serve a similar 
function as the engineering repertoires. In response to a question about his 
feelings around the assessment process at the hospital, he constructs altruistic 
donation as a logistical problem to be solved, thereby again affording himself a 
position that is largely free of possibly troubling emotions.     
Extract 26 
JC: And as you were going through that [the assessments], can you 
remember what your feelings were about it? Did you start to get a sense of 
anticipation about what you were doing, or can you describe for me how you 
were feeling as you went through this, as it would have appeared to be 
getting closer? 
Will: Um, [8] I think just sort of, that erm, kind of just want to get it over and 
done with, you know, it’s [4] yeah, it’s just go up and, for the assessment and 
um, er, you’re just like let’s get it over and done with but I suppose the other 
thing is like where can I fit this in? You know, it’s a fairly big thing I’d better 
be out of work for about a month, um, probably two weeks off, maybe part 
time thereafter for a couple of weeks, you know, your body takes a bit of a 
knock and Christmas is the best time and then, yeah, that’s sort of it really, 
it’s kind of like planning, like planning when it’s going to happen. 
JC: Mm, so it was a logistical exercise to some extent? 
Will: Yes. 
JC: And in terms of thinking about how you would feel about yourself 
afterwards, did you have any, was there anything there? 
Will: Er, not really, no.     (Lines 198 – 215) 
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Although my question to Will was about the feelings that were evoked by being 
assessed, his answer is punctuated by two long pauses and he is not prepared to 
enter into an emotional dialogue with me here. He is resolute in his matter-of-
factness, constructing altruistic donation as a chore that has to be planned, or a 
task that he wants to “get over and done with”. He is not willing to consider the 
possibilities for feelings about the aftermath of donation here, refusing to be 
drawn, but sounding far from convinced. 
4.5.3. Medical discourses – absolving responsibility.  
Participants also use medical discourses to allow them to feel safe and secure in 
the expertise of doctors and the NHS. These experts are positioned as 
knowledgeable and competent to make clinical decisions, they are handed power 
willingly in this situation. Will describes how he put himself in the hands of the 
medical profession without doing any extra research.  
Extract 27 
JC: It seems as though it was quite a straightforward decision for you 
then, it didn’t hold much emotional or anything particularly difficult, any 
difficult feelings for you or any particularly strong feelings for you, would 
that be right to say? 
Will: No, no worry as such, you know, I’m fairly confident in the health 
service, I’ve seen people on the TV, you know they, and I met, as I say 
I’ve met these two recipients and they’re fine and the people who’ve 
donated a kidney they’re fine as well, so nothing really to worry about 
there. Erm [4] erm [3] yes, no real medical worry, no, but it’s a little bit of 
anticipation or a little bit of, you know, it is quite something there, you 
know, the er, and a little bit of worry about there’s a small risk that you 
might die. I think it’s one in er, they told me, one in er three thousand, but 
I think life’s risky and um, so I thought, right I’ll make a will…” 
(Lines 218 – 230) 
Will’s talk is much more hesitant here than the transcript suggests. There are 
pauses of four and three seconds respectively, and frequent use of “er”, 
suggesting that Will’s subjective experience may extend beyond what he is overtly 
expressing. It is possible that he is using medical discourses to convince himself 
and others of the low risk. If there is no significant risk, he need not think much 
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more about it. And if he does think about it, then the response is once again 
strikingly practical and logical; “…right I’ll make a will”.  
James describes a similar seemingly blind trust in medical expertise when his 
sister suggests that the doctors “just want your kidney”, saying; “I really do trust 
the doctors, they’re not going to do something that’s wrong.” (Lines 62 – 64) 
Liz is also very clear that she expects the operation to be medically 
straightforward and cites this as being central to her decision. However, she 
seems the most prepared to think about the realities of the operation itself, in 
addition to which she has had the opportunity to link the expectation of the pain 
involved to the type she experienced when giving birth, which she constructs as a 
positive type of pain, different from being ill or injured, and which she draws on 
here: 
Extract 28 
Liz: …if it was a really long drawn out painful er recovery, I may not do it, 
you know, I love the fact that that we’re probably looking at something 
now that has been quite well perfected, that is a good technique, that is 
less invasive, that it makes the recovery period so much shorter and I 
think that’s something that I can cope with you know, I have quite a good 
attitude to pain, erm, and I don’t think it will be too much of a problem, 
particularly because you know where the pain’s coming from, it’s a bit like 
childbirth, you know, because I’m, I’m not ill.               (Lines 322 – 332) 
In summary, all the participants constructed altruistic donation as a low-risk, 
rational decision, drawing on medical, engineering and utility discourses in which 
they positioned their bodies as commodities that ought not to be wasted. This 
includes those participants who had also talked about it in emotional terms. I have 
argued that the effect of these discourses is that participants foreground their 
physical selves at the expense of their psychological selves. These discourses 
may therefore function to provide a response to critics who suggest that donors 
are “crazy” to want to give away a kidney to a stranger, by displaying evidence of 
rationality and knowledge. I am also suggesting that these discourses may 
provide participants with a manageable way to subjectively experience thoughts 
and feelings relating to the anxiety-provoking experience of psychological distress, 
physical pain and mortality.  
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Additionally, it is important to note that the discourses in this group represent not 
just the views or feelings of the donors. Of all the discourses drawn on by 
participants, this group corresponds most closely with discourses used by experts 
and in the official literature and so are most likely to receive approval from the 
expert position. By positioning doctors and medical professionals as benevolent, 
objective and scientific, the use of a medical discourse enables donors to align 
































D.4.6. Emotional Investment in Discourses: Will  
 
The interview with Will was notable for his determined use of engineering and 
mechanical discourses. Unlike the other participants, who tended to turn to 
these types of discourse after they had described the emotional draw of helping 
someone in need, Will was unique for the fact that these discourses were all 
that he used.  
 
In extract 24, he describes how as he was considering suicide, he was thinking 
about how his body might be most effectively put to use, thereby rhetorically 
avoiding the emotional implications of the end of his life as himself. There is a 
feeling of donation offering him something like a resurrection; the ‘good’ bits, 
which are his physical body are kept and recycled, while the ‘bad’ bits, his 
mind, can be killed off.   
 
For Will, in extract 25, the waste of a person’s body when they commit suicide 
is “shocking” – the sadness or otherwise that a person has chosen to end their 
life is not remarked on other than in these terms. Perhaps with these 
discourses, he is letting me know that he experiences his own life as something 
of a ‘waste’, that his ‘good things” have not been properly used. In extract 26, 
he focuses on the practicalities of “getting [the operation] over and done with”. 
He claims not to have any thoughts about what he may feel after having 
donated. He seems unable, or perhaps unwilling, to allow himself to feel 
anything about donating other than in terms of getting the job done. 
 
In Will’s narrative of his life, there is little evidence of any good relationships 
other than with his father, an engineer, who died suddenly when Will was 
seven, and with whom he said he was “good friends” (line 299). Will describes 
how he thinks his mother probably had not wanted another child after his two 
older siblings and how his childhood was not a happy one after the death of his 
father. His older brother is admired, a success in contrast with Will’s failures, 
but the younger brother’s love for the older is unrequited, and he feels that his 
sister is critical of him and selfish, unappreciative and refusing to recognize the 
interest he feels that he has dutifully shown her. His experience of his family 
has therefore overwhelmingly been one in which he is rejected, not seen for 
who he is. The romantic relationships in his life have been “total disasters” (line 
461) with women “who have either been desperate or stupid” (line 466) as 
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though they are the only women that would be able to tolerate him. He says: 
“I’ve only got myself to blame most of the time” (line 569).  
 
Seen from this context, in which every relationship he has had since his father 
died seems to have been a disappointment to Will, it makes more sense that 
Will would defend himself against the recipient of his kidney similarly 
disappointing him by avoiding becoming emotionally involved. The idea that the 
recipient might not be grateful to him, in the way that he experiences his sister 
as ungrateful when he is brotherly towards her, is almost too painful for Will to 
contemplate as can be seen in the following extract: 
 JC: Do you think about that person it might help? 
 Will: Erm, no I try not to, I, um, in case they don’t say thank you. 
 JC: What would that be like if they didn’t? 
Will: If they knew and they just um, they just um, it’s like doing a 
  favour for somebody and then, like my sister, you know, I’ve 
  seen her in plays, she’s never come to see me doing anything 
  and um I don’t want to experience that. There’s the  kidney, I 
  hope it goes well for you, that’s all. 
JC: So if you think about them and try and sort of imagine them 
  in anyway then they don’t thank you, you would experience that 
  as quite hurtful? 
Will: Well I’d be very hurt and it’s um, a bit of a big thing isn’t it? 
JC:  Yes, it’s a very big thing. 
Will: And er, if I knew who they were and they knew who I was  and 
  they didn’t thank you mate, or just ignored it or just, I don’t  want 
  to go, I don’t want to experience that. They can have the kidney 
  but I don’t want to know who they are, job done and I’ll never 
  know. 
JC: And then you won’t have to be disappointed? 
 Will: And I don’t get the opportunity of being disappointed, there 
  you go.    Lines 605 – 621 
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 It seems as though in spite of the fact that he studiously avoids the use of 
emotional discourses, Will is determined to go ahead with donation, is in fact 
deeply committed to it. He says; “I think it’s a worthwhile thing to do and it could 
help somebody enormously” (lines 603 – 4). This remains an extremely pragmatic 
discourse, yet seems to me, given the extract above, to signal something far more 
deeply felt, a longing to be appreciated and wanted, to relate to someone through 
helping perhaps. But as Will says above, he does not want to experience the 
disappointment again of being “ignored”, it is too painful, so he resorts to the 
engineering discourses with which he is familiar, and which importantly, he 




























 D.4.7. Discourses of the Self  
 
The final theme contains psychological discourses that are self-oriented. These 
discourses reflect the donor’s potential gains from altruism. They were not used 
by all participants, although for those who did draw on them, helping others and 
helping the self appear to be inextricably bound up with each other. 
 
Extract 29 
JC: Is that an important thing for you, that idea of it being as you say, 
significant, not that you’ve gone through your life being a ‘good guy’, but 
just a really big thing, did it feel like a really big thing?  
 
James: I think it probably did towards the end, yes, er, I hadn’t realised at 
the beginning, certainly when I knew I couldn’t do it, it was a, I knew that 
feeling was going to be taken away from me and I had already got used 
to that feeling of I’m gonna have done something, and at a party you’d be 
talking to people and you’d be thinking, uh, I’ve actually done something 
here, and they’d say, “where you from, what you doing?” and you just 
don’t tell them that at all, because it’s got nothing to do with them, that’s 
not why I’m doing it, but there’s somebody, a bloke in Oxford, or 
whatever who’s now got his life back.  
 
JC: So, is it that you would have, you say you wouldn’t have needed to 
tell people at parties or whatever but it was a knowing that you’d done 
something special…  
 
James: Yeah, yeah.  
 
JC: …that was a…? 
 
James: I think I would have on purpose not told people because I would 
have liked it if I’d met somebody like that then years later I’d found it, 
“What he gave somebody a kidney! What for no reason? Ah, that’s really 
cool”, yeah, I think I’d like that, that’s nice, yeah.  
 
JC: It made you feel what, I’m interested in that feeling.  
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 James: It’s that f-, that feeling that you’ve done something significant so 
if you died tomorrow, ‘he will be the guy that…’, ‘ah yes, but he was like 
that’, ‘oh yeah, he gave somebody a kidney’, you know, that’s, that’d be 
important, nice, not just you haven’t been, you haven’t been nasty to 
people in life, but you could, something positive.  
 
JC: Like a legacy.        
 
James: Yes, you know, other people start a business, or I’ve never had 
kids, something like that, you know, you’ve brought up children, fantastic. 
I’m not really interested in kids, not really that sort of person, this was 
something different, hmm.    (Lines 184 – 220) 
 
This construction of altruistic donation would have allowed James to think of and 
experience himself as having done something deeply meaningful with his life that 
only he, and presumably the recipient, would know about, and that he wanted to 
keep all for himself. His link to not having children suggests Erikson’s 
psychosocial goal of generativity in which the psychologically healthy individual is 
able to turn their energy to helping others; an ethical position of personal sacrifice 
(Meissner, 2003). James describes his fantasy of being at a party, specifically not 
telling people, keeping his good feelings about himself all to himself, like a 
precious secret. His fantasy is that if he died, people would find out and only then 
realise that not only had he been a “nice guy”, but that he had also done 
something extraordinarily selfless. Tragically for James, this prize that would have 
allowed him to feel good about himself for the rest of his life has been taken away 
from him.  
 
By submitting to his sister’s sanctions James has been unwillingly placed in the 
painful position of the powerless younger brother. This would probably not have 
been easy to integrate with his construction of himself as “the luckiest person 
around”. Through the discursive opportunity of the interview, he may have wanted 
to redress the threats to his identity posed by this inconsistency but the effect is 
that he has once again placed himself in a position of vulnerability and exposed 
himself anew to these painful feelings, and once again has to make sense of them 
in relation with another person, me. James uses the interview to construct a new, 
acceptable version of himself in which the blame for his having pulled out of the 
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donation is placed firmly with his sister while he retains for himself the idea that he 
will be able to fulfill his wishes in the future.  
 
Altruistic donation enables donors to do something that is unquestionably ethical, 
yet at the same time, and problematically for some of them, it seems that it 
imposes constraints on what they are permitted to feel about themselves. If James 
allows himself to feel too good about what he has done and tells people, he risks 
undermining its value by benefitting from it in a way that is inconsistent with social 
expectations of altruism. This suggests that discourses of self-interest may be 
difficult for participants to reconcile with donation being constructed as “altruistic” 
and therefore only about helping another person. Consequently, James constructs 
altruistic donation as something that ought not be seen to give the donor rewards 
yet at the same time he does not deny that he was looking forward to 
experiencing rewarding feelings. Now, through disavowing public adulation for 
what he was going to do, he creates for himself a position in which he has been 
wronged, eliciting sympathy.  
 
Participants who choose to describe altruistic donation in terms of it being 
something that they will also benefit from, such as Peter’s self-esteem, or Liz’s 
feeling of satisfaction at having done something good and unselfish, are able to 
draw on a discourse of being inherently implicated in other people’s suffering and 
that any benefit to another person will also benefit themselves in an uncontested 
way. They situate a positive relationship to the self in the context of helping 
another person. The discourses the participants use to construct altruism can be 
argued therefore to play a central role in the way they experience and understand 
themselves.  
  
In direct contrast with James’ discourse of personal significance seen in the 
extract above, in which he acknowledges the significant personal feeling of pride 
that he expected to receive from donating, Richard explicitly rejects the idea that 









JC: It hasnʼt, you havenʼt had a, an easy life. 
 
Richard: Erm, [.] p-, I, I, I was going to say I havenʼt had a successful life 
but that depends how you measure it, erm, from a material point of view, 
well, Iʼm comfortable, Iʼve got what I want but Iʼve always managed to live 
ok within my means, erm, I, but as I said before, Iʼm not assertive or, er, 
and, er, so, from a economical or, or, erm, work point of view I havenʼt 
progressed to any great heights. 
 




JC: Are you conscious of it? 
 
Richard: Yes I, I am…I think Iʼm a, Iʼm maybe not the most charming or, 
or, you know, but I, Iʼm a caring s-, er guy, you know and a loving guy, so, 
I, I, I donʼt regard myself as a total failure but I, you know, well in some 
ways a bit of waste of space, erm, but erm, I donʼt know, your question 
was about?  
 
JC: Doing this [the interview], but I just wanted to pick up on that, thatʼs a 
very harsh assessment of yourself, a waste of space, particularly in the 
context that weʼre talking, I wonder whether then for you the idea 
possibly, and I donʼt know whether this is going beyond what youʼve ever 
considered, the idea of donating a kidney is in some way a r-, a way of 
repairing some of those feelings in yourself about not having achieved 
perhaps what you might have liked to have? 
 
Richard: No, I, I, I donʼt think so, I mean, I [2] erm, I have value within my 
world, Iʼm, Iʼm of value to my sons and family and friends, erm, I regard 
the body as a vehicle, er, I, I donʼt believe in an afterlife, erm, I er, d-, er, 
thereʼs an extra kidney, it may as well be used you know, I donʼt think itʼs 
going to get me any kudos in, in heaven, or, or, or anywhere else, you 
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know, erm, er, I, hope that whoever gets it, it makes a difference to that 
personʼs life but I donʼt expect to ever get to have contact or recognition 
from that person and thatʼs not the point of doing it, you know, itʼs, itʼs 
there, it may as well, if itʼs no loss to me and itʼs a gain to somebody else, 
why not? No, I, think that the vast majority of people donʼt have a 
significant impact on the world, erm, itʼs impressive to see those people 
who do have, and be nice to be in that position, itʼs just erm, an honest 
recognition, Iʼm one of the many, you know, not one of the few, if you like, 
er, thatʼs all.       (Lines 742 – 781) 
 
This exchange with Richard is immensely poignant; the extent to which he is 
prepared to make himself open and vulnerable in response to the questions is 
striking. From the start, he refuses my assessment of his life having been difficult, 
suggesting instead that he has not been successful, taking responsibility. 
Richard’s description of himself as “a bit of a waste of space” and “one of the 
many” seems to signal his resistance to valuing himself. He refuses to claim credit 
for, or allow himself to feel proud of what he is doing, insisting again that altruistic 
donation is a purely rational response to the needs of another individual. 
 
In stark comparison, Liz readily and happily links her altruism to a positive sense 
of self-worth. The way that she describes the pleasure that she gains from the 
idea of being able to help a person in need suggests a sense of accomplishment 
and importantly, agency. She is able, in this instance to really help somebody.  
 
    Extract 31 
JC: Mm. From the way you talk about it, I get the feeling and the way you 
just used that phrase “my time” I get the feeling that this is something that 
actually is of great pleasure to you… 
  
Liz: yeah it is, yes it is  
 
JC: …as an idea.  
 
Liz: Yes it is, and you know it sounds terribly goody-goody but god you 
know, it, it, if it works, it will make such a difference to someone who’s 
really struggling, and I just, that, that actually helps the probability an 
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awful lot, erm, but yeah, it does give me great pleasure, yeah.   (Lines 
102 – 110) 
 
Liz makes a direct link between pleasure and the ability to help somebody. There 
is no dilemma here for her; she is able to reconcile helping another person with 
the benefits that she will accrue from her actions. 
 
Extract 32 
JC: Can you tell me a little bit more about the feelings that are associated 
with that pleasure?  
 
Liz: Erm, I, [exhales] I suppose it’s er, it’s, it’s quite deeply ingrained isn’t 
it, the thing that you should try and help other people to erm, have a 
better quality of life if you can, and you know, so much of what we do, is 
to do with putting our hands in our pockets and donating to charity and 
stuff like that, and, and, that’s fine, up to a certain point, erm, but I guess 
when you’re a mother, you, there’s always something at the back of your 
mind too that thinks if it was my child who was really ill and who was 
going to the hospital four or five times a week for dialysis and had no life 
at all, you’d be desperate for someone to donate, you know and 
obviously, you know I am an organ donor after I’m dead, and, and I will 
cont-, I’ll do that any way, whatever’s left! [laughs] er, if it’s suitable, but 
erm, it just feels like something that can be done earlier in life with a 
better chance of working and, hopefully all round it’s a better outcome at 
the end of the day.      (Lines 111 – 129) 
 
Liz’s discourses here conflict with psychoanalytic theory that suggests that 
altruism is a defence mechanism against libidinal drives (A. Freud, 1936). By 
being open to the benefits of donation that are available to her as well as the 
recipient, Liz avoids being locked into potentially oppressive other-oriented 
sacrificial discourses. Helping others is linked by Liz to a feeling of personal 
achievement and importantly, personal involvement and empathy, she imagines 
herself in the place of a parent of a child with kidney disease and the “desperate” 
feelings that would result. Discourses of helping and self-gain are not in her case 
contradictory, but complement each other. In Liz’s case, it is the welfare of the 
recipient that is privileged and Liz’s personal benefit is secondary, yet nonetheless 
real and important for this. 
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Peter also considers the possibility that his motivation for donating is driven 
primarily by his relationship to himself, constructing donation as a means of 
shoring up self-esteem through doing something that will cause him to feel valued. 
He has a different reason for using discourses of self-gain. In an email he wrote 
after the interview, he said that the word that best described how he felt about 
what he was doing was “atonement”. Atonement is a powerful idea, often central 
to religious doctrine, that means reparation through paying a price for having done 
wrong. An atonement discourse therefore constructs altruistic donation as a price 
to be paid. Peter seems to be suggesting that he wants to help another person 
because through doing so he is able to help himself. In comparison with Liz, Peter 
constructs altruistic donation primarily as a self-help activity with an added benefit 
for the recipient.  
 
     Extract 33 
Peter: But why would anybody want to be an altruistic donor? I don’t 
know, it seems crazy, you know, but it’s taken on its own life. I’m not 
compelled to do it, I have asked myself the question, I can’t actually get a 
clear answer as to what am I getting out of it, because nobody does 
anything for nothing. I don’t need to do it, I haven’t advertised it any way 
because sometimes that might be a, oh you know, it might be reflected 
on you in a positive way, almost showing off, look you know I’ve given a 
kidney away for no reason at all. I don’t think it’s because of that so I then 
ask myself well ‘why?’ and I honestly can’t put my finger on it, but I think 
that, you know, digging deep it might be something to do with being 
valued.  (Lines 32 – 43) 
 
In this discourse of valuing the self, it appears as though Peter is not thinking 
about the recipient to any great extent. This remains the case even as he 
constructs his decision to keep his plan to donate secret because that would look 
like “showing off” which is inconsistent with a discourse of altruism. This would 
seem to support the argument that an important function of donating is to increase 
his regard for himself, and the fact that another person will benefit provides him 
with a convenient and worthwhile way of doing it. When asked to expand on the 
idea that he didn’t have any “thoughts” about the recipient, his answer is 




JC: You don’t have any sort of thoughts about...? 
 
Peter: …You take that for granted, you know, yeah, clearly it will help 
somebody, so when you sort of reflect on this yourself you’re thinking, 
well you’re not doing it necessarily to improve somebody’s life, that’s a 
consequence of what you’re doing but that’s not the reason, I think. So 
then you think well why are you doing it? So you feel good in yourself of 
having done something like this, which is probably why I’m doing it. So 
then you think, okay if that’s why you’re doing it, why do you need to do 
that? What is lacking in your life that you need such a big thing to happen 
in order for you to feel good about yourself? I think that’s probably 
something in there that…it’s probably something in there about being 
valued.       (Lines 129 – 139)  
 
Switching again from the first to the third person, moving in and out of a subjective 
and objective position, Peter describes how something that has happened in his 
life has forced him to change his view of himself, and the psychological discourse 
of self-esteem that he uses constructs altruistic donation as a method for fixing the 
damage he has inflicted on himself, so that he can “feel good” in himself, an 
emotion that is currently “lacking”. Later on he remarks that the interview feels like 
‘therapy’, suggesting that he is positioning himself as client, paralleling the way 
that he is using altruistic donation as a therapeutic opportunity.  
 
 Extract 35 
JC: Do you feel that it [the fact that “life has gone downhill”] is because of 
something that you did? 
Peter: Well yeah…But I suppose there is something internal in me that, 
you know, I, not consciously, but I built myself up and then I’ve taken it all 
away by doing something like this, so I’m kind of starting from the bottom 
again, not in terms of what other people think of me or you know how 
they value me, but probably in myself. You know inside you what sort of 
person you are, it may not be a true reflection of who you are but you 
know when you do something wrong and what sort of person you are. I 
still believe that I’m not sort of a bad guy, but I’ve made a mistake and I 
let it carry on and whether this kind of altruistic donation is some sort of 
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internal compensation to get over that, you know, I’m building up my, 
because I’ve thought about my self-esteem and I’m not conscious that I 
think it’s low but maybe subconsciously that might be what’s happening 
to…   
JC: Something is making you think that might be some, there might be 
something in that? 
Peter: Yeah and so... 
JC: And you’re linking that to having had the affair and this idea, this 
phrase “letting yourself down” is, do you feel as though you let yourself 
down, is that right? 
Peter: It’s probably something to do with that and therefore to build 
yourself up again or make yourself worthy in your own erm mind is 
probably something related to why I’m doing this, I suspect.  















D.4.8. Emotional Investment in discourses: Peter  
 
Of all the participants in the study, Peter’s constructions of altruistic donation were 
the most fluid during the interview and his conversation took several contradictory 
turns as he wondered aloud about his motivation for donating. He was also most 
open to the possibility that for him, kidney donation symbolized something other 
than ‘pure’ altruism and this willingness to think symbolically, even 
psychoanalytically, may account for his openness to alternative constructions that 
seemed to both of us to be at times contradictory: “I can’t actually get a clear 
answer as to what am I getting out of it”. Parker (2005) argues that psychoanalytic 
discourse has become an accepted way for people to talk about psychology so 
that it in effect becomes “true” for them. One of the goals of critical psychology 
research is therefore to remain reflexive about this possibility, and Peter’s 
engagement with unconscious material may have been in part a response to what 
he perceived was being asked of him in the interview (Parker, 2005). The idea 
that he must be getting something out of altruistic donation perhaps reflects his 
understanding of what he was being asked. 
 
Peter began telling me about his decision to donate the moment he walked into 
the interview room, before I switched on my recorder. At the time I interpreted to 
myself that his need to talk about what he was doing was very great. A divorced 
man in his forties from an ethnic minority background, he had a successful 
professional life but a less happy personal one. He told me how a long-running 
affair had led to the end of his marriage. He had two teenage children whom he 
felt were unappreciative of him. It seemed that through the affair he had sought to 
recreate his experience of being a doted-upon youngest child, saying that through 
the affair, he was able to get the love and value he was missing in his marriage. 
He says that it was about “knowing what it felt like for the first time to be really 
valued very emotionally, intimately.” (Lines 192 – 194) 
 
There are two distinct and quite contradictory themes in Peter’s talk, one self- and 
one other-related. In extract 33, in response to my first, open question, which does 
not mention motivation at all, he “thinks” that it might be linked to a feeling of 
needing to be valued, and that this is something buried inside him that he is  
“digging deep” to get at. He says “I honestly can’t put my finger on it” but in his 
next answer he changes his mind, appearing temporarily to reject the idea that 
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there is any personal emotional significance to donation and that it’s about 
pragmatically “offering to help someone” and that it is not “a big deal”.  
 
JC: I’m really interested in this idea that you can’t, you, you, yourself 
don’t even know in a sort of reasoned way why you’re doing it and I 
was wondering about whether it, whether thinking about the feelings 
that go with it may kind of shed some light on it. I just, can you, 
thinking back to that time when you had that initial reaction, that “Oh 
that’s sort of interesting” reaction, what were the feelings, can you 
remember? 
Peter: I don’t think there were any sort of deep emotional feelings 
about erm some sort of great gesture or, or, or even a sort of 
evangelical type of erm, no, that’s the wrong the word, it’s er, some 
sort of sacrificial erm thought process, erm. It was very, very matter of 
fact; it’s like erm offering to help somebody who, who you think might 
benefit. I know that that’s my general attitude anyway, erm to the 
embarrassment of my children, erm and this was perhaps an extreme 
form of that erm, and I don’t think, you know, I don’t think it’s a, I still 
don’t think it’s a big thing although other people I know would think, 
well hang on this is a reasonably serious operation which you don’t 
need to do and if you thought about it, you know, you weigh up the 
pros and cons, erm, it’s somebody’s life that, like a relative’s life, 
doesn’t depend on it so [.] you know why are you doing it? Erm it’s like 
a snowball, it has taken on a certain momentum which, not, not 
against my wishes, it’s not as though I can’t stop it erm emotionally or 
otherwise, I’m not committed, I’m not frightened of erm chickening out. 
It, it doesn’t, that wouldn’t bother me erm, but it erm [.] it wasn’t a sort 
of sudden thing, it wasn’t a heavily emotional erm, my perception is 
that it’s not, that there isn’t erm, er an emotional reason behind it I just, 
I just suspect that it’s to do with me in a very simplistic way being 
helpful. 
JC: But you don’t feel it’s a big thing? 
Peter: In terms of a personal erm sacrifice, or that I’m exposing myself 
to unnecessary risk, I don’t perceive it as that. It may be that, but it’s 
not, I don’t think of it as a, as a big deal.  (Lines 52 – 82) 
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Having constructed donation in terms of being valued, Peter now denies that there 
is an “emotional” reason to donate, seeming to contradict himself. At this point, I 
would like to analyse my own emotional investment in the discourse, and ask 
myself the question I was asking Peter. Why was I interested in altruistic kidney 
donation and what was my initial response on learning of its existence? My 
response to it reflects my own unconscious process and from an inter-subjective 
framework, in which meaning is co-created, this can be used to gain a more 
nuanced understanding of Peter’s experience. When I reflect on my own response 
to the idea of living organ donation, the first thing I notice is also conflict; a distinct 
yet unfocused sense of uneasiness, even queasiness around the intimacy and the 
violation of bodily integrity that it involves. I feel that there is a sacrificial element 
to it, the donor is submitting to something and not trying to resist any longer, as 
though they are offering themselves up. Peter describes the process as “like a 
snowball”, suggesting that he is allowing himself to be taken along by it. This 
might be interpreted as a way for him to avoid having to think anymore about the 
feelings that go with it, feelings that might be either unavailable to conscious 
evaluation because they need to be defended against, guilt or shame for instance. 
There does seem to be evidence in the text to support the suggestion that Peter is 
reluctant to experience the unpleasant feelings that go with his attempt to increase 
his sense of self-value, for instance, when he denies that his decision to donate is 
not “heavily emotional”.  
 
In extract 35, Peter returns to the theme of valuing himself and constructs altruistic 
donation as a form of internal compensation for a wrong he feels that he has 
committed, a form of reparation (although it is not clear to whom, to himself 
possibly?) through the mutual act of helping:  
 
“I still believe that I’m not sort of a bad guy, but I’ve made a mistake and 
I let it carry on [the affair] and whether this kind of altruistic donation is 
some sort of internal compensation to get over that, you know...”  
 
Peter’s discursive about-turns left me feeling disoriented during the interview. Is 
altruistic donation an emotionally significant act for him or isn’t it? I am left with 
two conflicting interpretations of Peter’s split emotional investment in the 
discourses he draws on to describe altruistic donation, with no way of choosing 
one over the other. In Peter’s active, questioning stance to the research interview I 
have wondered whether there may paradoxically be the possibility that he does 
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not actually want to think too deeply or feel too strongly about becoming an 
altruistic donor because of the very uncomfortable feelings associated with his 
sense of the loss of self-worth. Perhaps he is using the interview to let himself feel 
as though he is actively considering his motivation, except that it’s actual function 
is a sort of emotional smokescreen. From this perspective, his discursive 
repertoires might be seen as having a defensive function. Each time that he drops 
his guard and describes donating in terms of self-value, he appears to then 
reverse his position, downplaying the emotional significance of altruistic donation.  
 
After the interview Peter sent the following in an email:  
 
“There is only one thing that I was thinking about subsequent to the 
interview and it was that the word I was searching for during our talk; 
“atonement”, which seemed to encapsulate probably what was and is going 
through my mind as to why I might be doing this, together with all the other 
reasons I gave you”.  
 
The notion of ‘atonement’ does seem to lend evidence to the argument that 
Peter’s emotional investment in his particular construction of altruistic donation 
affords him a way to subjectively experience himself as acceptable again, to feel 
loveable once more. He was treating the research interview like a confession. 
Does this mean that donating his kidney means that he will feel absolved of his 
guilt? It seems that Peter is donating not to save the recipient of the kidney, but to 
save himself. By giving a kidney to a stranger, he says that he is doing it simply to 
help the individual, but in unconscious fantasy, we might think of the way in which 
he is representing and attempting to repair the damage he has caused in others 
and in himself. He says, with a sense of careful consideration, that the value he 
will gain from donating is not about getting something [such as praise or 
admiration] from other people, but; “the value is within myself” (line 219).  
 
I have suggested, based on the text, the research relationship and inter-subjective 
experience, that one possible psychoanalytically informed explanation for what is 
happening might be that the feelings that underlie Peter’s desire for “atonement” 
are too anxiety provoking to be easily bearable for him. Through the possibility of 
altruistic donation, Peter might have found a way of ridding himself of these 
uncomfortable feelings and re-experiencing himself as the kind, caring, generous 




The aim of this research was to analyse discursive constructions of altruistic 
kidney donation in interviews with prospective donors, and to explore the 
subjective experience these discourses allow donors and others. The intention 
was to develop a more useful understanding of how these individuals think about 
their wish to donate. Currently, people who want to donate a kidney to a stranger 
are either lauded, as in the media, or regarded with implicit suspicion and as a 
potential risk, as in the academic literature. This binary understanding of altruistic 
donors constructs them either as heroes or as potentially ‘mad’, and forecloses on 
the possibility of a more nuanced, and therefore useful, conversation, one that is 
able to take account of donors’ own discourses and the implications of these for 
the practice of altruistic kidney donation.  
 
The methodology of the study has integrated several analytic frameworks; a 
Foucauldian approach to discourse analysis, positioning theory (Davies & Harré, 
1990), the psycho-discursive approach of Wetherell (1998) and psychoanalytic 
theory (Frosh & Saville Young, 2008). A non-pathologising psychodynamic 
approach to counselling psychology has been drawn on to bridge the 
epistemological gap between social constructionism and the psychoanalytic 
assumption of an unconscious mind that can be interpreted.  
 
5.1. Summary of analysis  
 
A focus on ‘discourse-as-knowledge’ (Hook, 2001, p542) has driven the discourse 
analytic approach. The idea that psychological health and altruism are 
incompatible came originally from psychoanalytic theory with the work of Anna 
Freud (1936/1966), in which altruism was constructed as pathology. It is still 
characterized by some psychoanalytic writers as an adaptive defence linked to 
narcissism, even though it may not be considered pathological (Seelig & Rosof, 
2001). This pessimistic construction of altruism in psychology was compounded 
by a “hedonistic paradox”, the theory of self-interest posited by behaviourist and 
biological psychology in the middle of the twentieth century that positioned 
altruism as incompatible with dominant theories of human behaviour. Altruism has 
therefore been constructed for many decades as an interesting intellectual 
problem that belongs more to the theoretical discipline of philosophy than 
psychology. In recent years however, a more optimistic evidence base has been 
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proposed by social psychology in support of a claim that altruistic motivation and 
behaviour is founded on empathic understanding (Batson, 2011; Mikulincer et al., 
2005). This allows for the possibility of altruism in psychology, re-constructing it as 
a positive human characteristic with a biological base, rather than as evidence of 
psychopathology. What is more, this approach recognizes the possibility that an 
individual’s motivations to behave in an altruistic way may not be available to 
conscious thought (Batson, 2011).  
 
For coherence in presenting the results, participants’ discourses were grouped 
into three broad themes. The first group includes discourses in which altruistic 
donation was constructed as other-oriented, drawing on notions of altruism, 
morality, sacrifice and ethics and as being for the sole benefit of another person, 
not the donor. These discourses were consistent with religious and socio-cultural 
traditions of helping those in need. The needs of the self were almost aggressively 
minimized through these discourses, but paradoxically, they also operated to 
construct the donor as omnipotent life-giver, directly intervening to prevent the 
death of a stranger. Anonymity meant that recipients were positioned as virtually 
invisible; silent, disempowered and dependent on the donor. Some participants 
resisted having to think about the recipients and their experience, other than in 
abstract terms. Emotion discourses were drawn on to describe the feeling of being 
compelled to donate and of it being something felt to be “obvious” to the donor, as 
something defining about their identity.  
 
I have argued that these discourses of obligation make donors’ claims difficult to 
contest. The assertion of obviousness enabled participants to resist questioning in 
the interviews to some extent, preventing a conversation about whether what they 
were proposing to do was in need of examination. Emotion discourses created an 
important drawback for participants however, since they entailed a risk that others; 
in particular family and friends, would think that the donor was ‘mad’ for what they 
were doing. In these disagreements, emotion becomes discursively equivalent 
with irrationality. The experience of a negative reaction from family and friends 
was common to all the participants. Participants struggled against being 
positioned in this way by others, using rational discourses to accomplish this. 




The decision to donate apparently tended to evoke a degree of anxiety and 
opposition in other people, to the surprise of the participants, who had not 
anticipated such a reaction, in part this was because they saw it as such an 
“obvious” thing to do. To counter this response, participants turned to “rational” 
discourses of medicine and engineering, which incorporated ideas about 
acceptable levels of risk and the commodification of body parts, allowing them the 
subjective experience of being both right and moral. Furthermore, keeping the 
decision as private as possible was not only consistent with available discourses 
of altruism, but had the added benefit of protecting donors from the threat of 
further perceived attack. Rational discourses were used to construct altruistic 
donation as a safe, measurable, quite unremarkable procedure. Through them, 
participants positioned themselves as sane, highly rational individuals, aligned 
with the culture of science and medicine. Doctors and other medical professionals 
are usefully positioned by these discourses as trustworthy and benevolent, with 
only the donor’s best interests at heart.  
 
Parallels were drawn constructing altruistic donation as equivalent to other types 
of medical donation, such as blood and even organs after death, as though there 
were no difference. Even the donor’s death can be constructed as being 
acceptable using these discourses. This is a somewhat paradoxical idea in the 
context and runs directly counter to prevailing medical discourses in which it is 
unacceptable for the donor to be harmed. I have suggested that this dualism, 
separation of the mind and body, in which the self is not associated with the 
physical parts (which can die) might be a way of managing feelings about death. 
By reducing their physical bodies to parts that can be re-used, participants might 
to some extent find a way to face their own future non-existence. In this way, risk 
discourses enable them to disassociate themselves from their own mortality, 
reconstructing their corporeality in terms of utility.  
 
Discourses in the third group were self-oriented, and included self-esteem, self-
worth and reparation. Some donors resisted these discourses and the attendant 
construction of their own needs outright. Those who did use them constructed 
altruistic donation as a legacy; describing it as a way of giving something back to 
the universe in return for their own perceived good fortune. One participant drew 
on an atonement discourse to suggest that for him, donation was a process of 
reparation for damage he had inflicted on his own psyche through past behaviour. 
These discourses were often highly personalised – the good feelings that would 
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be created by donating were private, to be kept safely inside, like a source of 
nourishment for the future. By keeping any personal benefits protected inside and 
hidden away, deflecting attention and praise, discourses of self-interest could be 
reconciled with those of altruism as being solely for the benefit of another person. 
For the one participant who was able to reconcile herself to the idea of benefitting 
from donating in a positive way, it seems that she was able to do this by 
embracing the communal nature of suffering, able to think about the recipient as 
an object and feeling herself to be implicated in others’ lives, thus avoiding the 
notion of altruism as self-sacrificial.  
 
The methodological approach of this study integrated a social constructionist 
discourse analysis with an additional, intra-psychic and inter-subjective 
framework. The extracts for this next level of analysis were chosen because they 
represented moments in the interview in which the participant seemed to have a 
particular emotional investment in the discourses they were using. Overall, the 
use of a psychoanalytic framework provided a way of engaging with the possibility 
of inter-subjective meaning-making in the interview and for a tentative formulation 
of the participants’ unconscious investment in the discourses they chose to use. 
Although the discourse analysis allowed for some consideration of the possible 
subjective experience granted to the participants by their discursive constructions, 
employing a psychoanalytic framework allowed this understanding of subjectivity 
to be made richer, or “thickened” as Frosh & Saville Young (2008) suggest. 
However, the extent to which a psychoanalytic formulation could be made was 
necessarily limited by the amount of personal information that could be gathered 
in the research interview and the fact that interpretations could not be given to the 
participants for validation.  
 
In these accounts of participants’ emotional investment in their discourses, 
psychoanalytic ideas about the way individuals experience themselves and other 
people through a mixture of fantasy and reality; object relations and defences 
against anxiety were used to theorise possible unconscious motives for donating. 
From this perspective, it is possible to suggest that for some donors, altruistic 
donation may have relatively little to do with their feelings and thoughts about the 
future recipient of the kidney, and may be formulated instead in terms of the 
donor’s unconscious experience of self and other in fantasy. Altruistic donation 
can be thought of in terms of a possible response to loss in the donor’s life, a way 
of making concrete feelings about loss that cannot be symbolized in language. 
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This suggests a profound rethinking of the notion of “altruistic”. Donation therefore 
becomes an embodied and psychic response to perception of a socially and 
technologically constructed need. In allowing the violation of their physical 
integrity, the breaching of their actual physical boundary, a physical space is 
created inside the donor, and something of their unconscious experience may be 
communicated, as though they are saying; “Look at what I have given of myself”. 
Within this actual space created in their torso, an unconscious recognition of an 
intra-psychic or inter-subjective lack may be represented. Frosh’s (1999) 
description of Lacan’s theory is useful in thinking about how this lack symbolizes 
the donor’s unconscious fantasy of their relationship to the recipient; “Lacan 
focuses on how the subject becomes formed in ‘otherness’, how identity is always 
produced by the insertion of the subject into something outside itself” (p139). It is 
interesting that participants do not seem to allow themselves to experience any 
anxiety at the invasive nature of the operation and this may say something about 
the extent or not to which they experience themselves as bounded. Instead, 
anxiety is split off for other people to feel and is represented in the tension that is 
created between the discourses outlined above. Concerns about altruistic 
donation are felt not just by the families and friends of donors, but also by the 
health professionals who engage with altruistic donors. These concerns seem 
never to be acknowledged in public however, as if to do so is somehow 
unacceptable. In the media any discussion of altruistic donation is constructed 
only in terms of its morality, which is found to be unquestionably good and the 
donor is fervently idealized. We might ask ourselves what would a more complex 
discourse look like here?  
 
5.2. Relating to existing knowledge 
 
Comparing the current study to existing research in the same area is difficult 
because there are no qualitative approaches to altruistic organ donation that have 
been found at the time of writing. The closest study in methodological aims is 
Franklin & Crombie’s (2003) study of directed kidney donors. Franklin & Crombie 
(2003) present a phenomenological content analysis and ethnographic study of 
together, but do not attempt to integrate them, treating them as two separate but 
compatible approaches.  
 
Existing research on altruistic donors is interested in their psychological 
assessment, mostly before, and occasionally after, donating. I have argued that 
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participants’ and expert discourses around altruistic donation are likely to have 
been influenced by the implicit association that this literature makes between 
altruistic donation and the possibility of psychopathology, requiring donors to 
defend themselves against the presumption of the possibility of mental illness. 
The current study therefore represents an addition to the existing research, in that 
its methodology is guided by a non-pathologising stance in which understanding 
the subjective experience of six altruistic donors is the goal. In this section, I will 
draw out the points at which the findings of the current study can be related to 
what is already known about altruistic kidney donation.  
 
As reviewed in the first chapter, most of the academic literature on altruistic kidney 
donation to date has focused on efforts by transplant assessment teams to rule 
out the possibility of mental illness or personality disorder in the donor. This 
association between altruistic donation and potential mental illness is not reflected 
in the media however, which feature only stories of heroism and self-sacrifice. But 
it seems that these discourses of selflessness are ignored or rejected by those 
who are closest to the donors, their siblings, parents and friends, who instead 
draw on discourses of madness to criticize the donor’s intentions. They are the 
sole negative voices that have to be confronted by the donors, and this often 
leads to resentment and confusion. This finding has been reflected in one of the 
very few outcome studies of “altruistic” donations (Massey et al., 2010). The risk-
averse discourses of the experts, and the way in which these coincided with what 
seemed to be the positions taken by the donors’ family critics, resulted in the 
same discursive effect; the positioning of the donor as “possibly mad”.  
 
Expert discourses of psychopathology can be accounted for in terms of the legal, 
ethical and social responsibility of the medical authorities to protect the donor (and 
by extension, the hospital trusts) from potential harm, and although this aim is not 
disputed, I would like to suggest a further explanation for it using the experience of 
the donors’ families. Within the current study’s chosen methodology, the source of 
the families’ opposition cannot be understood from donor discourses alone, since 
a psychoanalytic and psycho-discursive psychology perspective would suggest 
that they likely contain an element of fantasy and projection. I have suggested that 
one possible explanation for the anxiety felt by others is that it represents an 
otherwise unspoken social response to the idea of organ donation.  
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The idea of social defences against anxiety in the medical profession was first 
suggested by Isabel Menzies Lyth, in her study of the unconscious institutional 
processes at work in nursing (1960). Lyth (1960) drew on a Kleinian formulation in 
which powerful symbolic representations of unconscious infantile anxieties require 
a defensive response if they are not be become overwhelming. These defences 
are then built into the socially structured systems of medicine and the hospital 
(Lyth, 1960). I would like to extend this argument to organ donation and suggest 
that unconscious anxiety may also underlie policy and the response of 
professionals to altruistic donors, which is itself a reflection of the focus in the 
expert literature on assessment and potential pathology in the altruistic donor. 
Professionals involved with donors are able to defend themselves against anxiety 
through the application of these discourses. Medical discourses of the desperate 
shortage of organs for transplant are used to further shore up this group defence.  
 
Within medical discourses, where death is constructed as a technological failure 
(Lock, 2002b), a parallel process with that of the altruistic donors in this study can 
be argued to be taking place, in which death is consistently disavowed. A British 
Medical Association report into organ donation argues that; “people are still dying 
unnecessarily” (BMA, 2012, p5). There are two interesting ideas contained in this 
discourse; firstly, the increase in the number of people awaiting donor organs is 
presented as a natural event, rather than as a product of the technology of 
transplant surgery, and secondly, it contains the idea that death is unnecessary.  
 
Such discourses allow for the suggestion to be made that patients who are about 
to die who have consented to become organ donors, are at their last moment, 
artificially ventilated in order that their organs be kept alive for transplantation in a 
procedure called “elective ventilation” (BMA, 2012). Whilst the BMA does not 
currently advocate this procedure, arguing that it is interested only in opening up 
debate, the fact that it is part of an apparently rational debate on organ donation, 
with no corresponding discussion about its implications for the nature of the death 
of the donor suggests that the medical profession is itself engaging in defending 
itself from thinking about death. Medical discourses on organ donation currently 
do not seem to allow a space to question what might going on here. Without 
explicitly recognizing the inherent paradoxes, the same report points out that 
advances in the medical treatment of trauma have led to a reduction in the 
number of deceased organ donors.  
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Anthropologists have characterised the shortage of organs as itself a social 
creation, arising as a result of technology and the development of transplant 
surgery and immuno-suppressant drugs (Lock 2002b; Scheper-Hughes, 2007). A 
new charity in the UK, started by altruistic donors, recently began urging people to 
“Give a Kidney”. From the psychosocial perspective employed in the current 
study, it can be argued that the medical and psychology literature is currently 
failing to address important ethical questions about the extent to which individuals 
feel compelled by these official discourses of shortage and feel that they have to 
respond, and to think about where this process might logically lead, as well as the 
ethics of allowing one individual to give away a part of themselves to another. 
Scheper-Hughes (2007) argues that living donors should not be honoured 
because of the sense of obligation that this creates for some.  
 
Discourses of trust in medicine and medical people were noted in Fellner & 
Marshall’s (1968) study of directed kidney donors, and are also present in the 
discourses of the participants in the current study. This highlights the altruistic 
donor’s deliberate decision to engage with the clinic. With this particular method of 
helping, altruistic donors are choosing to put themselves into the hands of doctors 
and nurses and engage with a setting in which they can be cared for and 
examined thoroughly in many hospital visits and tests. There may be a further 
parallel here with the work that medical professionals (and psychologists) choose 
to do. Speck (1994) suggests that for people who choose to work in settings 
where people suffer, or are ill and dying, an unconscious attraction to this kind of 
work lies in the way that the work serves to maintain a fantasy that bad things 
happen to other people.  
 
The compelling nature of organ donation for the participants in the current study 
has also been found in existing research with directed donors (Franklin & 
Crombie, 2003; Gill & Lowes, 2008; Lennerling et al., 2003). In these studies, the 
reliance on emotions in the decision, as opposed to “rational” thought, has been 
identified, but not questioned. The current research goes further in addressing the 
way that altruistic donors use ideas about emotions and rationality in their 
discursive repertoires, suggesting the possible subjective experience that each 
allows for. The current study has also used psychoanalytic theory to understand 
the feeling of instant recognition on the part of participants to the idea of donating 
and discourses of “obviousness” with which they describe these feelings. This 
dual focus has shown how altruistic donors use emotion discourses to 
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demonstrate their goodness, and rational discourses to resist being positioned as 
emotional if they perceive this to be a criticism. Their instantaneous response to 
the idea of donating is constructed as evidence of the “rightness” of what they 
want to do.  
 
I have found Lemma’s (2010) work on body modification to be useful here, in 
which she describes how people feel “compelled” to modify the exterior of their 
bodies, either in actuality or in fantasy, and argues that this feeling of compulsion 
signals that the body is being used to communicate something of the individual’s 
internal world and object relations. This has resonance for the current study, in 
which this feeling of compulsion was common to participants. Indeed, a common 
theme in donors’ discourses is their “feeling” or “knowing” that this was something 
they really wanted to do, or had to do, once they knew that it was possible. 
Lemma writes; “Our relationship to our body is probably the most concrete marker 
we have of how we feel about ourselves and about others” (2010, p7), and goes 
on to describe how because the body develops in relationship with others, in 
changing the body, something is being expressed about the “quality of internalised 
relationships” (p4). I suggest that this notion of the embodied nature of relationality 
can be applied to the altruistic donors in the current study. Organ donation is an 
internal modification that might be thought of as creating a space to allow the 
donor to start object relations, reflecting Lacan’s idea of subject formation (Frosh, 
1999).  
 
5.3. Reflexivity  
 
Reflexive work has provided a way of thinking about the epistemological approach 
of this study. Specifically, reflexivity has focused on what can legitimately be 
interpreted in research. In this section, I show how important it has been to attend 
to my own responses to the discursive practices around altruistic donation. 
 
While thinking about possible psychoanalytic interpretations of participants’ 
discourses, I experienced a feeling of doubt in response to talk about the 
‘obviousness’ of what they were doing. I wondered whether this signaled a 
resistance to thinking about possibly difficult feelings around donation, a way of 
foreclosing on ambivalence. Altruistic kidney donation can be very clearly 
constructed as an ‘obvious’ thing to do in medical and utilitarian terms, with its low 
risk of physical harm and clear benefit to the recipient. And yet, it is striking that in 
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spite of the rationality of these discourses, a sense of unease and anxiety 
remained for me when I reflected on the feelings these discourses evoked. 
Significantly I think, the ambivalence I have felt from the start of the research has 
not been changed by the process of thinking very carefully about what is being 
said and possibly felt by donors. I have understood this as a reflection of my 
unconscious relationship to the positions made available – the “interplay of 
subjectivities” that arises in the interview that Rizq (2006, p622) describes, and I 
attempted to make use of it in the psychoanalytic interpretive strategy. This 
illustrates a strength of the method, in that it allows for reflexive work on the part 
of the researcher to be fully incorporated into the analysis, rather than remaining 
as an afterthought to be accounted for like a confounding variable in quantitative 
research.  
 
Throughout the entire period throughout which the research has been conducted, 
I have found myself shifting constantly between two positions in relation to 
altruistic donation; I am split in my response to the notion of organ donation. At 
times, I find that I can (almost) take the position of the donors themselves and 
accept their constructions of donation as a purely humanitarian thing to do. I 
admire their generous offer in response to a need in others. At other times, I 
experience an indistinct uneasiness and anxiety that is difficult to describe. This 
uneasiness seems to be in response to the idea of the body as a machine, a 
source of organs that can be divided up and stuck into other body machines. I 
believe that anxiety about this “hybridization” (Lock, 2002) is a common response 
and is reflected in periods of public anxiety that arise from time to time in response 
to advances in medical and scientific technology that are perceived to be “un-
natural”.  
 
It is interesting to consider where this ambivalence or split-ness comes from, and 
this is an area in which psychoanalytic theory has been useful in the current study. 
I would like to suggest that what I (and apparently others) experience in response 
to donors, in addition to “boundary anxiety” (Howson, 2004), may also be partly 
envy and discomfort at being made to feel less ‘good’. The ‘sacrifice’ that altruistic 
donors make positions those of us who do not want to give away one of our 
kidneys as not as good, as more selfish, as less willing to care for others. Asking 
the question, which donors implicitly ask through their action; ‘Why isn’t everyone 
doing this, why aren’t I doing this?” leads to the possible conclusion, that I must 
not care about other people as much as the participants do and am therefore 
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more selfish. Reflecting on this is uncomfortable. I would rather not have this 
feeling. It is much easier to turn the approbation on the donors and I argue that 
this is one of the reasons that the people closest to the donors are the most 
critical of them.  
 
Through a reflexive attempt to dissect out which responses are personal, internal 
and relating to my own subjective experience, and which can be considered to be 
objective and therefore “fair” and valid (if any), it is possible to understand how 
difficult a task it is for society and the clinic to respond to altruistic donation. My 
own misgivings highlight the extent of the ethical responsibility faced by the 
medical and allied professionals who are being asked by prospective altruistic 
donors to facilitate their wish. The confusing array of emotions and beliefs that 
constitute any considered response to altruistic donors has to be somehow 
organized into a coherent approach in which the needs of many have to be 
considered. This places an enormous responsibility on the individuals who are 
tasked with taking the decision as to who will, and who will not, be allowed to 
donate. Through the use of a method that looks at both the social and the 
psychological, the current study is able to acknowledge the tensions, complexity 
and contradictions that are inevitably felt by these individuals, and points to a 
possible site of intervention for Counselling Psychology research of this type.  
 
5.4. Evaluating this research 
 
This section contains a discussion of the methodology used in the current study. 
Considerations of validity in qualitative research have been discussed in the 
methodology chapter. The discourse analytic and psychosocial methodology used 
in this study evolved out of a process of thinking about and trying to understand 
altruistic kidney donation. This approach begins with Foucaultʼs theory, which 
suggests that as individuals we are constituted by discourses that are available to 
us in the social realm. The attention to the social construction of our embodied 
selves is supported by Lemma (2010), who suggests, “the body…is a social body” 
(p19) and Lock (2002b), who extends the idea by arguing that organs themselves 
also have social meanings. Participants in the current study construct their 
physical selves in ways that are in line with contemporary medical discourses of 
the body. This view of the body draws on mechanical discourses and the 
assumption that we all possess potential “spare parts” that can be used to save 
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the life of another individual once they can no longer support life in their original 
body. In expert (medical) discourses of organ donation (eg. BMA, 2012), saving 
lives becomes the paramount and utterly uncontested goal. Public discussion 
expressing any doubts towards this approach to living and dying is resisted 
through the use of these expert discourses, seemingly because of the fear that 
any questioning of the ethical basis of transplant surgery will result in a negative 
effect on the numbers of people offering to donate their organs. Lock (2002a) 
argues that biomedical knowledge and practice reifies and fragments parts of the 
body. 
 
“In order for body parts to be made freely available for exchange, they 
must first be conceptualized as thing-like, as non-self and as 
detachable from the body without causing irreparable loss or damage 
to the individual person or generations to follow”  (p71).   
 
These discourses assume that the idea of not wanting to donate organs after 
death is irrational, and may even be immoral, since morality is constructed in 
terms of the number of lives saved from disease and death. Participants in the 
current study also drew on discourses in which they described their motivation to 
donate in ways that are consistent with social constructions of altruism. These 
discourses are widespread in the culture and are particularly prevalent in the 
moral codes of the major religions. Additionally, all participants had already 
entered the formal and legal assessment process at hospital and had become 
practiced at using discourses of self-sacrifice when they are asked about their 
motivation to donate. The social aspects of altruistic donation are unavoidable and 
powerful. I would argue that attending to the social constructions that altruistic 
donors draw on provides a method capable of answering the first two research 
questions in the current study.  
 
However, a pure social constructionist approach does not allow much scope for 
the possibility of linking linguistic constructions with internal experience (Willig, 
2008) but by using in addition psycho-discursive and psychosocial methods, it 
becomes possible and indeed necessary to question an individualʼs possible 
subjective investment in their discursive positions and how these “can be seen to 
intertwine with the constructive power of discourses” (Frosh & Emerson, 2005, 
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p308). Judith Butler (1997) has argued for the need to integrate Foucault’s theory 
of the way in which social power is taken in by individuals to constitute the 
personal and psychological with a theory of the psyche, and to use the two 
perspectives to help us understand the other. I would situate the current research 
in this approach. The psychoanalytic notion of the unconscious offers a way to 
think about a participantʼs emotional investments in the discourse they use. Lacan 
argues that the unconscious subject and language constitute each other; 
language is the medium by which we understand what it is to be human (Parker, 
1997).  
 
In field notes, I recorded the sense that I had during and immediately after several 
of the interviews that in focusing solely on discursive constructions, I would be 
missing the emotions that were underlying participantsʼ discourses. I realized that 
I was certainly neglecting an important aspect of my own experience of 
responding to participants. The intensely physical nature of the relationships that 
altruistic kidney donation involves was too visceral – literally too embodied - to be 
satisfactorily accounted for with a purely discursive focus. For this reason, it was 
important to consider how participants related to their own embodiment, both 
consciously and unconsciously, as well as how the body is constructed socially, 
and what this might signify in psychological terms. In light of this, the absence of 
holistic body discourses in both expert and participant discourses was striking. It 
was as though the body as a subject was not relevant to a discussion about organ 
donation other than in terms of its utility. Only during periods of public disquiet, 
such as during the Alder Hey scandal, does the body and society’s relationship 
towards it comes temporarily into focus, only to be repressed with “modern” 
discourses of logic and rationality.   
 
One early, striking result of attending to participantsʼ emotional investment in the 
interviews was a sense that some were discursively avoiding making links 
between their behaviour and their feelings. This pointed towards the possible 
interpretation of altruistic donation as an unconscious communication. 
Participantsʼ tendency to describe their decision in concrete terms was illustrated 
in the way that all of them drew on risk discourses, rejecting self-interest. 
Psychoanalytic theory might suggest that for some participants, self-interest has 
been split off or “given away” because it is on some level unacceptable. I have 
argued that understanding altruistic donation is best served through exploring both 
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the donor’s use of social constructions – for organ donation is an acutely social 
behaviour, constructed, legislated and assessed according to the discourses 
available to a subject at a certain cultural and historical juncture – as well as by 
thinking tentatively about what may be taking place intra-psychically and inter-
subjectively for the participant in this intensely personal, intimate response to the 
suffering of a stranger, or indeed, their own suffering. 
 
Parker (2005) urges the researcher to think about the story told by the participant 
in the interview as one version and to ask why it takes the form that it does – it is 
only “a particular account on a particular occasion” (p67). Frosh & Emerson 
(2005) agree when they argue that interpretations of the text must be treated 
reflexively, as discursive constructions themselves, the effects of which can be 
examined and discussed. There is a danger of using psychoanalytic theory to 
contradict the participants and invalidate their discourses (Parker, 2005). 
However, I have found that the struggle to remain rigorous without feeling that I 
am being critical of the participants has in fact been helped through using 
psychoanalytic theory. It has given me a third position (Britton, 1988) and the 
creative space to think about what the possible unconscious experience of the 
donor and others, at an individual, institutional and societal level.   
 
An evaluation of this research requires a critical appraisal of the extent to which I 
have been able to satisfactorily analyse and interpret using the two different 
analytic frameworks - the discursive and the psychosocial. The potential for 
contradiction that is inherent in an attempt to synthesise these two epistemologies 
comes to the fore in thinking about the ethical treatment of participants’ research 
interviews, which I have discussed. There is a risk that the analysis of the extra-
discursive can function as a way of undermining the participant’s own discourses. 
That is, by making a psycho-dynamically informed interpretation of the 
participants’ words and actions, I will be saying that I, rather than the participant, 
know what is really going on. This would be unethical from a social constructionist 
standpoint.  
 
To address this inescapable tension between the two epistemological positions, a 
tension, which I would argue is also present in counselling practice that uses a 
psychodynamic framework, in my presentation of the analysis in the current study, 
I have chosen to separate the discursive analysis from the extra-discursive 
analysis. The reason for this was to make my methods as transparent as possible, 
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but one perhaps unwelcome effect of this separation has been to artificially 
highlight the differences between what the participant is saying, and my 
interpretation of their possible emotional investment in particular discursive 
resources. One way to assess whether or not the psychosocial analysis is 
experienced as an imposition of theory that has no meaning for participants would 
be to integrate these two analytic frameworks in the writing up of the analysis. If 
the two could be synthesized in a way that would read as internally coherent, and 
grounded in the text, I believe that this would go some way towards being able to 
argue that the two analytic frameworks can co-exist.  
 
In place of this, I have tried to ensure that in writing the accounts of the 
participants’ emotional investment in discourse, there is nothing in my 
interpretations that runs directly counter to, or appears to contradict what the 
participants are saying. Keeping in mind the two-person psychology of relational 
psychoanalytic thinking has helped in this, because it has required a reflexive and 
explicit focus on my own role in the co-construction of meaning. A psychoanalytic 
understanding of the importance of ambivalence in subjective experience may 
also be helpful here.  
 
The analytic process has highlighted the risks that are inherent in any attempt to 
tease out the social and the discursive from the psychological and the internal, 
and this reflects my own position, in which the social and the psychological in our 
subjective experience are never truly isolated from each other. I have undoubtedly 
experienced the attempt to hold these two analytic frames as difficult, and in 
response to this, have endeavoured to phrase my interpretations as tentative 
suggestions, rather than statements. This is particularly important in a 
psychosocial analysis, but it also applies to a large extent to a discourse analysis.  
I think that this is where my experience as a practitioner has been useful, giving 
me the confidence to take this stance. This is important because making a 
suggestion, or asking a question, in which the researcher acknowledges that this 
is a subjective process, does not have the same ethical implications as making a 
statement as though it were fact. As a counselling psychology researcher, if I am 
to make any kind of interpretation whatsoever, I feel that it is important to give 
myself permission to ask questions, without needing necessarily to arrive at an 




5.5. Strengths and limitations of this research  
 
In using the term “altruistic donation”, this research is inevitably positioned within 
contemporary social and cultural discourses and the associations with altruism 
these entail. This may have resulted in certain alternative discourses not being 
made available to me in the interviews, discourses that do not fit the cultural 
expectations surrounding altruism, for example, and this is a limitation of the 
present study.  
 
Recruiting participants through the NHS meant that participants were protected as 
far as possible from potentially negative effects of taking part in the research, part 
of meeting the ethical requirements of a study of this nature. However, my 
inevitable association with the hospital department in which the participants were 
being assessed will likely have had the effect of suppressing possible discourses 
in participants’ interview. This will have a negative impact on validity (Yardley, 
2008). To counteract this as much as possible, I separated myself from the 
hospital in the participant recruitment and interviewing process, but it is 
nevertheless likely that a link with the hospital would have remained in the minds 
of the participants. This may have had the effect of encouraging particularly 
clinical discourses and discouraging discourses that participants considered did 
not fit with an “official” viewpoint and may explain the preponderance of this type 
of logical discourse. 
 
In a similar vein, my role as a trainee counselling psychologist would have 
inevitably created beliefs on the part of the participants about what I was 
expecting from them, and may have led to them using psychological and 
psychoanalytic discourses in their conversations with me. Parker (1997) describes 
how psychoanalytic discourses have become part of the way that people 
understand what psychology is, with the result that individuals describe 
themselves using psychoanalytic ideas. It has been necessary therefore to be 
alert to instances where participants have used psychoanalytic discourse and to 
take care not to collude in this practice and use these discourses as evidence of 
the “truth” of such theory because it comes from the participant. Parker (2005) is 
critical of “psychoanalytic” research because it is; “…an analysis of contradictory 
pathological experience as itself already interpreted by psychoanalysis” (p105).  
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A strength of this research is that it meets Yardley’s (2008) criteria for validity in 
qualitative research, which are outlined in the methods chapter. Taking Frosh & 
Saville Young’s (2008) measure of validity in psychosocial research, the current 
study’s analytic approach to the text has generated useful material for thinking 
about the psychological phenomena that arise in relation to altruistic kidney 
donation. Only through the detailed consideration of the social expectations 
placed on the individual and encoded through discourses, together with the effect 
of, and response to these discourses by the individual from an internal, 
psychological perspective, is it possible to come to a holistic understanding of 
such a complex act. Attending to either the discursive or the phenomenological in 
the case of altruistic donation would have, in my opinion, limited these findings.  
 
Another strength of this research is topicality. At the time of writing, the British 
Medical Association has just published a lengthy report aimed at generating public 
debate on increasing the numbers of organ donors in the UK (BMA, 2012). It is 
possible to argue that by examining the language used by altruistic kidney donors 
to explain what motivates them offers a perspective on the ways in which society 
and individuals think about organ donation that can contribute to this debate. More 
practical applications of the research will be considered below.    
 
5.6. Suggestions for further research  
 
I have found the absence of the recipients’ voices in this research to be striking. 
They are neglected in the discourses of the donors in the current study. There is a 
presumption that recipients of organs will be grateful and willing recipients of 
altruistic donors’ kidneys. This is in contrast with evidence that patients who 
receive transplantations from deceased or related donors experience ambivalent 
reactions to their donated organs (Franklin & Crombie, 2003; Lock, 2002b; Sharp, 
1995;). Future qualitative research might usefully consider the position and 
subjective experience of kidney patients in relation to living anonymous donors, in 
order to understand what effect, if any, the nature of the donation has on a 
recipient.  
 
Secondly, it would be useful to design and carry out an outcome study as a follow-
up to the current one, interviewing altruistic donors after they have donated. By 
using the same methods it might be possible to further understand the 
psychosocial aspects of their experience. In particular, I would want to pay 
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attention to the intra-psychic and inter-subjective aspects of their experience in 
order to explore the suggestions that I have made in the current study that 
altruistic donation can be theorized from a psychoanalytic perspective as 
unconscious communication. This would be a way of measuring the validity of the 
interpretation.  
 
Lastly, due to time and word limits, it has not been possible to carry out or analyse 
interviews with medical professionals; the physicians, surgeons, specialist nurses 
and psychologists who are involved in transplant surgery and who are required to 
assess, operate on and treat living organ donors and recipients. Their discursive 
constructions and emotional responses to altruistic donation are of central 
importance in the process. A further study that includes medical personnel would 
be of interest in building a more complete picture of approaches to organ 
donation.  
 
5.7. Relevance of this study to counselling psychology ontology -   
 Understanding another’s subjectivity 
 
With this research I have attempted to do what Willig (2005) describes as thinking 
“…more creatively about how to facilitate alternative subjectivities for ourselves 
and those we work with” (p33). In a detailed reading of Foucault’s theory of how 
subjectivity is constructed by the individual, Judith Butler (2005) describes how 
Foucault argues that it is not possible for a process of reflexivity to fully reveal the 
subject as an object to itself. At this point, Butler (2005) suggests, Foucault’s 
thinking is consistent with the psychoanalytic idea of the unconscious that can 
never be fully consciously understood. Butler writes; “…to take responsibility for 
oneself is to avow the limits of any self-understanding, and to establish these 
limits not only as a condition for the subject but as the predicament of the human 
community” (2005, p83). 
            
Butler (2005) suggests that there are “epistemic limits” to knowing another person, 
that demanding a person “give an account” of themselves must fail to some extent 
in order for it to be true (p43). “When we claim to know and to present ourselves, 
we will fail in some ways that are nevertheless essential to who we are” (Butler, 
2005, p42). I understand this as meaning that it is not possible, nor is it even 
desirable, to account fully for the subjective experience of another individual, and 
that to claim to do be able to do so is unethical.  
 201 
 
Altruistic donation does not seem to fit with the prevailing clinical discourses on 
organ donation. “Understanding” the altruistic donor therefore presents us with a 
puzzle. As counselling psychologists, we struggle in our work to “understand” the 
subjective experience of our clients. This research has demonstrated that allowing 
the self to be affected by the other is one way of understanding the experience of 
another person. This approach to counselling psychology practice and research 
reflects Benjamin’s (1990) theory of intersubjectivity and mutuality. Ultimately, it 
may be that all that can be concluded from the discourses of the altruistic kidney 
donors who have participated in this study is that they have chosen to “become 
undone in relation to others” (Butler, 2005, p136). 
 
As we ask to know the other, or ask that the other say, finally or 
definitively, who he or she is, it will be important not to expect an answer 
that will ever satisfy. By not pursuing satisfaction and by letting the 
question remain open, even enduring, we let the other live, since life might 
be understood as precisely that which exceeds any account we may try to 
give of it. (Butler, 2005, p43) 
 
5.8. Practical applications of this research 
 
Throughout this study, the construction of their decision to become altruistic 
kidney donors has been characterised by conflicting discourses and subject 
positions, suggesting that even when the donors seem sure of what they are 
doing, altruistic organ donation is far from straightforward in psychological terms 
for other people involved. It follows from this that the regulation and practices of 
altruistic organ donation is similarly far from straightforward. The fact that 
psychologists are required to play a role in this process poses important questions 
for our understanding of subjectivity and what this means for validity in 
assessment. One practical application of this research might therefore be to 
incorporate some of its findings into assessment protocols for living non-directed 
donations. This would involve taking what might be considered to be a more open 
stance to the possible unconscious motivation of the donors, rather than 
remaining within an existing framework that is discursively bounded by society’s 
prescriptions for what is expected of altruistic individuals.  
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This study has identified a tension between the current social and psychological 
understanding of “altruistic” donation that raises doubts about the ethics of 
enabling donors to undergo the surgery they are requesting. There needs to be a 
conversation about the intra-psychic needs of the donor that they might be 
attempting to meet through their action. This would mean allowing people such as 
doctors, nurses, psychologists and the public the discursive space to consider 
alternative discourses around altruistic donation than those that are currently 
available. I have argued that discourses constrain individuals at one of either two 
poles – the altruistic donor as either mad or saint - and I am suggesting that these 
discourses need to be opened up in order to acknowledge that the “altruistic” 
donor may partly be meeting their own needs in a non-pathologising way. In 
principle, there need not be conflict in both donor and recipient benefitting, in fact, 
it could be argued to lend greater agency to all parties were this to be 
acknowledged. Training could be provided that incorporates this approach. In 
contrast, one radical response to the ideas presented in this study is that 
“altruistic” (non-directed) donations are stopped entirely in order to avoid the 
possibility that donors may be inadvertently harming themselves. However, this 
has important implications for ideas about “altruism” to in society. I am deliberately 
refraining here from a debate about the nature of altruism itself because I argue in 
this study that what the participants are doing is something more psychologically 
complex than can be currently understood through theories of altruism.  
 
From the psychological and discursive themes identified in this study, a significant 
problem, and therefore a potential solution, lies with the current official and 
societal designation of this type of organ donation as “altruistic”. This discursive 
repertoire, which is encoded in policy and practice, carries with it a set of powerful 
and compelling social values that are both constraining and seductive, and to 
which it appears that some individuals feel compelled to submit themselves. 
Paradoxically though, because of the technological nature of their altruistic action, 
is not just the donors themselves who pay the price for their benevolence, their 
desire to “help” implicates others in the conflict between the social and 
psychological experience of altruism.  
 
Separating living non-directed kidney donation from discourses of altruism would 
mean that it could be constructed in a way that could accommodate a wider range 
of motivations and subjective experience. If psychological benefits to the donor 
from altruistic donation can be considered, as well as its wider societal benefits, 
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this then becomes a subject position available to the donor with a concomitant 
reduction in conflict. A more nuanced understanding of the donor’s motivation, 
taking into account a more detailed appraisal of the subjective experience of the 
donor as well as it’s social constructions would free all parties from the current 
constraints that altruism places on it, and would mean that a more valid 
assessment of the needs of donors’, recipients and society as a whole could take 
place. This is another practical application of the current research. To begin with, 
it would require psychologists to enter the public debate and could take the form 
of actively engaging with official committees and patient and professional groups 
involved in organ donation policy, or initiating a specifically psychology-led 
approach.  
 
The interface between the ethics of the individual, the clinic and society creates a 
space in which Counselling Psychology, with its willingness to consider individual 
and social experience in pluralistic theoretical terms, is perfectly placed to 
intervene. In a recent report, the British Medical Authority supported measures to 
increase the number of organ donors in England and Scotland advocating the 
adoption of an “opt-out” approach to organ donation. Increasing the number of 
organ donors in this way inevitably involves an increase in the role of the state in 
peoples’ deaths. It implies that unless an individual actively opts out of donating, 
their body effectively becomes the property of the state on dying. The BMA’s 
position is that this remains ethically justifiable, since the consideration given to 
opting-out by the individual is the same as that which has to be given to opting in, 
as in the current system. I am arguing that psychology has a role to play in this 
debate and that as counselling psychologists, we can use our capacity to 
deconstruct language and feelings, and bear anxiety, as a way of allowing a 
discursively thicker debate on organ donation, joining the public debate about the 
extent to which society is prepared to involve itself in the way that individuals are 
allowed, or choose to die.  
 
This could be extended to other contemporary ethical questions about technology, 
medicine and the body, and how society assigns value to individual lives and the 
extent to which death can be managed. This could include, but not be limited to, 
debates about the ethics of all aspects of organ donation, the legal time limit for 
abortion, the gestational age at which medicine should routinely strive to keep 
severely premature infants alive, or whether parents have the right to conceive 
babies with the expressed purpose of providing genetically compatible body 
 204 
material for a terminally ill sibling, as well as about end-of-life care and voluntary 
euthanasia. These are all areas in which a discourse analytic and psychosocial 
approach might be put to use, in a critical engagement between psychology and 
the effects of discourses of technology on individuals.  
 
This study has demonstrated the utility of a reflexive, psychological approach to 
the constitutive power of discourse in public life, and to questions about what we 
as a society want from the operation of technology through and on individuals. It 
has shown that using language, ideas and anxiety about “altruistic” donation can 
be deconstructed and approached from alternative perspectives that are non-
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This study will use Foucauldian discourse analysis to identify the discourses that are 
used when individuals volunteer to become altruistic kidney donors in a London NHS 
renal unit. These are the discourses of the donors themselves, and those of the 
health professionals whose job it is to carry out psychosocial evaluations of the 
donors. It will consider what implications these discourses have for the subject 
positions of the individuals involved, and for the practice of clinical assessment of 




Organ donation, and increasing the number of donors, is a current concern of the 
NHS. Over a picture of a seriously ill woman, a national media campaign running in 
the UK asks: “Would you take an organ if you needed one?” The intended message 
is clear; most people would probably be willing to accept a donated organ, yet only 
27% of people in the UK are registered organ donors (NHS Blood and Transplant, 
2010a).  
 
Although practiced outside the UK since the 1990s, altruistic kidney donation has 
only been legal in the UK since September 2006. Altruistic donation is defined as the 
anonymous donation of a kidney by a living individual to an unknown recipient 
(Human Tissue Authority, 2006). In 2007-8, 10 altruistic donations were approved, 
and in 2008–9 this rose by 50% to 15. These numbers are obviously very small in 
comparison with directed donations, of which there were 927 in 2008–9 (Human 
Tissue Authority, 2009) 
 
There is a large shortfall in the number of good quality donor organs compared with 
people who are waiting for transplants in the UK. Currently, there are 6883 people 
registered as waiting for a transplant (NHS Blood and Transplant, 2010b). In 2008–9, 
a total of 2330 kidneys were transplanted from all donors, both deceased and living 
(NHS Blood and Transplant, 2010b). Patients with end stage kidney disease who do 
not receive a transplant depend on dialysis to stay alive. Dialysis is more expensive 
than transplantation and highly disruptive to the lives of kidney patients, who are at 
risk of mood disorders such as depression (Finkelstein & Finkelstein, 1999).  
Persuading more people to join the organ donor register, or finding more living 
donors is therefore a priority for the NHS. However, both directed and non-directed 
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donation are ethically complex because unlike the typical surgical patient, who 
consents to invasive surgery that is intended to prolong or increase the quality of 
their life, donors are healthy individuals consenting to surgery that has the potential 
to harm them (although the risks are low). This means that psychosocial implications 
of donating are central to ethical considerations.  
 
Individuals who volunteer to become a living kidney donor to a stranger might be 
considered to be extreme examples of organ donors, yet the absence of a direct 
emotional motivation, such as a family member needing an organ, means that these 
individuals present a unique opportunity for study. It is as if one of the major 
“confounding variables” in an experiment has been removed. In proposing to 
research the motivation of such individuals, it is hoped that the current study will 
contribute to a better understanding of organ donation, why people do it, and how 
others might be persuaded to. This study will also provide psychological therapists 
who work with living organ donors, the relatives of deceased donors and organ 
recipients with a better understanding of a psychologically complex issue.  
 
The aim of this research will be to explore the motivation of altruistic donors. It will 
take a critical realist epistemological approach. The reason for this is that the 
assessment of altruistic kidney donors is notable for the fact that unlike directed 
donation, or other forms of donation such as blood or bone marrow, there is a subtle 
assumption from the start of the risk of psychopathology. Social constructions of 
altruism and altruistic donation serve to make health professionals wary. In line with 
Willig (1998), this study intends to use Foucauldian discourse analysis to question 




The following research questions will be addressed in the current research:  
 
1. How do people who want to be altruistic kidney donors construct their decision in 
terms of the discourses that are available to them?  
 




3. What are the implications of any different discourses for the practice of clinical 





The majority of research into motivating factors in kidney donation has been focused 
on donors who have a relationship with the recipient; directed donation. Adams et al. 
(2002) argue that altruistic donation shares many psychosocial features with the 
decision to donate a kidney to a relative or non-related person with whom the donor 
has a relationship (eg. a partner or friend). From an assessor’s point of view, issues 
of informed consent and legal capacity are the same for both types of donation. 
Therefore, in light of the paucity of empirical research on altruistic donation, the 
proposed study will include in its review the larger literature on directed kidney 
donation and other types of organ donation.   
 
Additionally, as Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine (2008) argue, Foucauldian discourse 
analysis aims to draw on different forms of text so that discourses and power 
relations can be compared. This means that both theoretical and research literature 
should be considered to be a type of “expert” text in the current study and will be 
included in the analysis. Accordingly, in addition to the theoretical and research 
literature on organ donation, other relevant literature that informs experts’ discourses 
will also be included. An example of this is the large literature on altruism, with 
competing theoretical approaches, and a sub-section of this is the literature on 
altruism in medicine. As a result, the literature review will be integrated into the 
research, and will be conducted and updated throughout data collection and 
analysis.  
 
No qualitative research with altruistic donors has been found. Gohh et al. (2000) 
present a case study of a woman who successfully completed an altruistic donation 
in the authors’ clinic, briefly describing the motivation of the donor but this is not 
qualitative research and makes no claims for textual analysis. Similarly, Hoyer 
(2003), a German surgeon, gives an account of his own experience of donating a 
kidney to a stranger and the considerable opposition he received from his peers, 
explaining that he considered his act to be part of the tradition of Christian charity. 
Jacobs et al. (2004) include a section on some of the motivating factors of 49 
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prospective donors but as the authors do not give any details of an analytic strategy 
or methodological approach to the data, it is not clear how these were arrived at.  
 
There is some qualitative research with directed kidney donors. Belle-Brown et al. 
(2008) used a phenomenological approach to explore the experience of 12 directed 
donors, and found that three key themes emerged in the decision making process. 
These were; the experience of a loved one’s illness and suffering, intra-personal and 
social factors, and the powerful emotions associated with the opportunity to give 
someone life (Belle-Brown et al., 2008). Franklin & Crombie (2003) also give a 
qualitative account of parents’ and siblings’ decisions to donate a kidney to family 
members. Using content analysis in a phenomenological framework, Franklin & 
Crombie (2003) found that although no donors expressed regret for their decision 
and all described increased self-esteem afterwards, the decision to donate was more 
problematical for siblings than for parents, which in some cases led to psychological 
distress. Some siblings expressed regret that the decision had not really been theirs 
at all, suggesting that implicit coercion meant that they were not able to refuse. A 
particular strength of this study was the large number of participants – twenty donors 
- as well as the recipients of the kidneys, who were interviewed.  
 
Since altruistic kidney donation is a relatively new clinical procedure, and is much 
less common than directed donation, much of the literature is not empirical. Instead, 
it consists of descriptions of how transplant clinics have developed their assessment 
procedures for altruistic donors. These have generally evolved from the procedures 
used for assessing directed donors. Adams et al., (2002) and Jacobs et al. (2004) 
are examples of this type of article, and describe, in varying degrees of detail, 
psychological assessment and contra-indications to altruistic donation. The aim of 
these assessments is to ensure informed consent and capacity, and avoid negative 
psychosocial outcomes for donors. To do this, they rely on a combination of clinical 
interviews, personality and psychopathology measures to evaluate whether altruistic 
donors meet the criteria for psychopathology.  
 
Kranenburg et al. (2008) carried out a careful systematic review of this concise 
clinical literature on altruistic donation and found that although there are similarities in 
approach, with five articles describing an interview and psychometric testing, there is 




Links between psychopathology and altruism  
 
Jacobs et al. (2004) suggest that altruistic donation has been traditionally mistrusted 
by the medical community because of a presumption of psychopathology in altruistic 
individuals. Roff (2007) discusses the ethical implications of regulating altruistic 
donation and argues that throughout the 20th century, the dominant moral philosophy, 
derived from economic theory, has positioned altruism as incompatible with 
rationality. This, Roff (2007) suggests, is the reason that altruistic donors have been 
traditionally met with suspicion. Baskin (2009) suggests the possibility of “psychotic 
altruism”, in an article on his own assessment of a prospective donor, which is when 
an individual with delusional thinking behaves in extreme ways that deny their own 
needs (p378).  
 
Quantitative empirical studies are rare. Henderson et al. (2003) used a prospective, 
hypothetical design to assess 93 individuals who autonomously approached the 
authors’ transplant centre in Canada offering to donate to a stranger. They employed 
a series of mental health measures and a clinical interview that they adapted from a 
validated adult attachment interview. Henderson et al. (2003) found that “suitable” 
donors were more likely to express a desire to make a substantial improvement in 
another person’s life with an acceptable level of personal cost, had a consistent 
spiritual belief system and previous experience of transplantation or medicine. They 
were also more likely than a control group to be considered to be altruistic by 
objective standards, so were more likely to have been blood donors, community 
volunteers and/or be registered bone marrow donors (Henderson et al. 2003).  
 
Henderson et al. (2003) suggest that contrary to assumptions, altruism expressed 
through kidney donation can be consistent with psychological health. A limitation of 
this study is the hypothetical design, because altruistic donation was not legal in 
Canada, and this may have influenced the results. The individuals who agree that 
altruistic donation is a good thing in principle may not be the same individuals who 
are prepared to complete an altruistic donation.  
  
Landolt et al. (2003) also surveyed peoples’ hypothetical willingness to be altruistic 
donors and found that 29% of 500 people contacted said that they would be willing 
(in principle) to be altruistic donors. Those people were more likely to score highly on 
openness to experience and agreeableness using the NEO-PI. Again, a limitation of 
this finding is that the results may have been different than for actual donors. There 
 211 
is support for the findings of Henderson et al. (2003) and Landolt et al. (2003) 
however. Jacobs et al. (2004) gave a positive account of the motivations of 49 actual 
altruistic donors at their clinic. As discussed above however, accounts in Jacobs et 
al’s (2004) study appeared to be largely anecdotal, rather than the result of a detailed 
qualitative analysis.  
 
Positive psychosocial factors for altruistic donation 
 
Adams et al. (2002) reviewed the findings on altruistic donors and concluded that 
ethically acceptable motives for non-directed donation are; altruism, religious beliefs, 
a desire to reciprocate to society and a desire to honour an individual who died 
waiting for a transplant.  
 
Adams et al. (2002) point out that there is no comprehensive understanding of the 
psychological and emotional impact and motivation for altruistic donation. Rodrigue 
et al. (2007), support this view and suggest that agreement on the scope of 
assessments of anonymous donors is currently limited because of a lack of data on 
psychosocial outcomes for anonymous donors.  
 
In a response to the expansion of the practice in the US, an article by Dew et al. 
(2007) recommends guidelines based on clinical consensus for the psychosocial 
evaluation of altruistic kidney donors. The authors suggest that the following factors 
will protect against poor psychosocial outcome; the absence of psychopathology 
present or in the recent past, no substance abuse/dependence, knowledge of risks 
and benefits for donor and recipient, little or no ambivalence, realistic expectations 
about outcome, a history of medical altruism, a history of reasonable adaptation to 
life stressors, and support from the family for donation.  
 
“Contra-indications” to altruistic donation 
 
Jacobs et al. (2004) argue that most contra-indications to altruistic donation are the 
same as for directed donors, such as active grief or severe depression. However, 
Adams et al. (2002) point out that it is not known whether the psychosocial outcomes 
for directed donors are the same as for non-directed donors. One small-scale 
exception to this is by Jendrisak et al. (2006), who followed up seven non-directed 
donors three months after transplant and found that they all had positive 
psychosocial outcomes.  
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Dew et al. (2007) suggest a list of characteristics that they consider to be factors that 
are likely to contribute to poor psychosocial outcome following altruistic donation. 
These are; significant psychiatric disorders, either past or ongoing, substance 
abuse/dependence, limited ability to understand risks and benefits for both donor and 
recipient, ambivalent or unrealistic expectations, motivation that reflects a desire for 
recognition or a personal relationship of some sort, family stressors or obligations, 
expectation of secondary gain, a poor relationship with family or a family that does 




Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA) 
 
Willig (2008) suggests that FDA looks for discursive resources available within a 
culture, the institutional practices these discourses are bound up in and the 
implications this has for individuals’ experience of subjectivity, material conditions 
and practices.  
 
Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine (2008) argue that individuals ground their claims of truth 
in their subject positions, which allows them to manage their moral positions. The 
decision to volunteer as an altruistic kidney donor is essentially a moral one. The 
intention in the current research is to understand the donors’ experience of 
subjectivity and material conditions in this decision. It is therefore appropriate to 




Selection criteria for participants will be determined by involvement in the altruistic 
donor programme of the renal unit of the Royal Free Hospital, London. The benefit of 
this strategy is that it will ensure that the same assessment process is being 
described, as institutional differences are likely to exist. Conversely, this approach 
risks limiting the scale of the research, which may result in impoverished data.  
 
Selection of participants will be non-random and purposeful. There will be two 
groups. The first will be around five individuals who have approached the renal unit 
of the Royal Free hospital during 2010 indicating a desire to donate a kidney to a 
stranger. Individuals in this group will be called “prospective donors”. It will not be 
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necessary for donors to be accepted onto the transplant programme for their 




Prospective donors will be contacted by letter and research interviews will take place 
after the prospective donor has been assessed by the Royal Free Clinical 
psychologist and given the results of this assessment. It is possible that as a result of 
this strategy, prospective donors who are not accepted onto the transplant 
programme because of psychological factors may also decline to take part in the 
research study. In order to minimise this likelihood, the donor will be contacted by the 
researcher around 48 hours after their assessment by the psychologist. This will 
allow the participant some time to process their experience. It will be made explicit 
both in writing and in person that the interview is for research purposes only and will 
have no retrospective bearing on the decision of the assessing psychologist. It’s 
possible that a participant who has been turned down in their application to become 
a donor will draw on different discourses in an interview and it will be necessary to be 
mindful of this in the analysis.  
 
A further drawback of this strategy is its reliance on individuals volunteering during 
the research period. The number of participants is a realistic estimate arrived at after 
consultation with the hospital’s renal psychologist. 
 
A second group of participants, also purposefully sampled, will be “experts” drawn 
from the hospital’s professional staff involved in the assessment of prospective 
donors. The intention is to represent all the professionals who take part in the 
assessment process, including a psychologist who carries out the psychosocial 
assessment, and nurses who provide the initial screening of volunteer donors. It is 
expected that this group of participants will have less incentive to take part in 
interviews. If recruitment proves difficult, existing texts from written protocols and 




This study will employ a qualitative, longitudinal design, interviewing the participants 
at two points in time. The approach will be Foucauldian discourse analysis. Willig 
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(2000) and Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine (2008) suggest that texts selected for FDA 
should allow access to a continuous experience over time.  
 
Text collection strategy 
 
For prospective kidney donors and “expert” participants, semi-structured interviews 
will be used. Semi-structured interviews are indicated as most suitable for discourse 
analysis (Parker, 1992). The suggested interview schedules for both sets of 
participants are in Appendix 1. This will be piloted with a prospective altruistic donor 
from outside of the Royal Free hospital. Interviews will be recorded on a digital 
recorder and transcribed in detail.  
 
After the transcripts of interviews have been analysed, participants will be given the 
opportunity to read and comment in a second interview. Willig (2008) suggests that 
giving participants the opportunity to challenge or correct the researcher’s 
assumptions adds validity in qualitative research. There is a risk that this may result 
in participants withdrawing from the research and this will be allowed for in the 
timetable. Withdrawal is more likely if participants are not adequately informed about 
the nature of discourse analysis, therefore it has been made explicit in the 
information for participants. The second interview will focus on the participant’s 
response to the analysis of their first interview. This may result in further discourses 




Discourses relating to official policy and regulation of the assessment of altruistic 
donors will be drawn from documents such as those available on the Human 
Transplantation Authority website (www.hta.gov.uk). There is material available in 
the general media, such as articles that have been written on the subject containing 
interviews with donors. The research literature will also form part of the text to be 
analysed and will be incorporated throughout the study.  
 
Analytic Strategy  
 
Feasibility – Is Foucauldian discourse analysis an appropriate analytic strategy to 
answer the research questions?  
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Analysis of texts will be guided by the stages suggested by Willig (2008) and Parker 
(1992). In line with Gillies (1999), the current study will use discourse analysis to 
identify the dominant discourses that both donors and experts use to construct their 
positions, and the function and effect of these discourses. Willig (2000) suggests that 
through discourses, subject positions are made available to individuals.  
 
Discourses in use in organ donation are readily discernible. An example can be seen 
in the current national media campaign that highlights a personal, almost self-
interested approach to organ donation by raising the spectre of a loved one, such as 
a child, who may one day need an organ. This suggests the use of anticipated guilt 
as a motivating factor. Anticipated guilt is a discourse from social and health 
psychology and the authors of the media campaign draw on it to achieve their aim of 
increasing the number of organs available for transplant. The proponents of altruistic 





The following is an example of discourse analysis relating to the first four stages of 
the six stages of discourse analysis described by Willig (2008), applied to the text of 
an anonymous altruistic donor’s blog. The writer is in the process of being assessed 
as a donor (See Appendix 2 for transcript.) The four stages are to identify i) 
discursive constructions, ii) discourses, iii) the function or action orientation of the 
discourses, and iv) how the discourses allow the writer to position herself in relation 
to her decision (Willig, 2008). This example also utilises some of Parker’s (1992) 
steps in his description of the method.  
 
The discursive object in this case is determined by the research question, and is the 
decision to be an altruistic donor. The donor draws on a moral discourse to construct 
her decision, in which the needs of others are prioritised, and selflessness is 
virtuous. This is also consistent with a religious discourse, and contains the idea that 
“knowing the change it can make in someone’s life” (line 82) is “rewarding” (line 83). 
This religious discourse is evoked when she writes; “please pray that this works out 
well” (line 77). The donors’ reward comes from knowing that someone else has been 
helped, which is also consistent with the secular, psychological discourse of altruism. 
This is an example of where contrasting discourses overlap to construct the same 
“object” in different ways (Parker, 1992).  
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The fact that she has written the blog suggests an awareness of the attitudes of 
doubt about her decision, so implicitly refers to a counter-discourse of individualism 
that is implied by those who question her motivation. This suggests that she is using 
altruism and morality discourses to justify a decision that many may consider 
incomprehensible, positioning herself within a framework of morality.  
 
The second discourse she uses is of destiny or fate. She talks about her decision to 
donate as being inevitable, an irresistible force; she “cannot sit back and deny 
someone in need” (line 69). It is as if it is part of her essential human nature and not 
a matter for free will: “I had to put myself forward” (line 45). The function of the 
destiny discourse may be to absolve her. It suggests that the responsibility for the 
decision may even be out of her hands. It could therefore serve to put an end to 
debate because she has no need to question it further herself, and implies that 
others need not do so either. The decision is final: “So now I am not going to sit back 
and wait until I die before I can help someone” (lines 73-74). 
 
Finally, when she talks about donation being a safe thing for her to do, both for 
herself and her family because there is no history of kidney disease, she is using a 
scientific, rational discourse to demonstrate that she has considered the physical 
risks to herself. It also draws on the legal discourses of capacity and medical ethics. 
She is not putting herself in undue danger and her approach to her body is pragmatic 
and utilitarian, she has spare parts so they should be put to good use: “someone 
really in need might as well have one of them” (lines 21-22). This discourse allows 
her to communicate her sanity, to demonstrate that she has considered whether 
donating a kidney may be personally harmful to her own health and found that it will 
not. She is positioning herself as a rational, autonomous individual, capable of 
assessing evidence and risk scientifically. This discourse also allows her to take the 
subject position of a sane and humane person. She also positions other donors in 
this way. The discourse, if not the positioning, is likely to be shared by both the donor 
position and the expert position.  
 
In comparison, the potential recipients of donated organs are relatively invisible in 
these discourses. They are positioned as victims who are dependent on others for 
healthy life. This positions people with kidney disease as helpless and has ethical 






Altruistic donors are assessed by “experts”; medical and psychology professionals 
whose responsibility it is to ensure that the donor has the legal capacity to consent to 
undergo an operation of this sort. Assessments have their theoretical basis in cultural 
constructions of psychiatric diagnosis and psychometrics; discourses which position 
the assessors as experts and the donors as patients (Parker et al., 1995). 
 
Expert discourses available in the literature include Henderson et al.’s (2003) use of 
an adapted attachment interview, suggesting that one of the discourses that experts 
draw on is attachment theory. Participants who were not considered to be suitable 
significantly differed in their view of donation as a way of “making a statement 
against their families” (Henderson et al., 2003, p206).  
 
Challenges and limitations associated with FDA as an analytic strategy 
 
It is evident from the brief analysis outlined above that there are limitations 
associated with a social constructionist approach to research and FDA. Although the 
donor’s personal psychological and embodied experience is acknowledged, these 
are considered to be secondary to a discussion of external, discursive resources 
(Willig, 2004). Thus compared with a phenomenological approach, acknowledgement 
of the individual’s agency is limited since it is assumed that people are not ultimately 
free to determine their own experience of selfhood and subjectivity.  
 
Sims-Schouten et al. (2007) suggest that the issue of embodiment is problematical 
when taking a strictly relativist approach to research in psychology research. The 
result of this is that it is potentially disempowering, for an individual if their experience 
of serious illness such as physical pain is discussed in purely relativist terms. There 
is a possibility that participants in the current research will be disappointed that their 
subjective experience has been neglected in the analysis.  
 
One solution to this is to take a critical realist epistemological approach to the 
research as Sims-Schouten et al. (2007) and Parker (1992) argue. To that effect, the 
epistemological approach taken in the current study will be that end stage renal 
disease is a real, material condition, or extra-discursive factor, that is both 
independent of, and contextualised by, the discursive practices of modern western 
medicine (Sims-Schouten et al., 2007). This means that all of the practices and 
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subject positions taken by donors and experts ought to be considered in relation to 
the extra-discursive factor of kidney disease. This epistemological position will be 
acknowledged to participants in the written information they are given. It will also be 
made explicit in person by the researcher during the debrief after the interview.  
 
Secondly, in focusing on the donor and ignoring the recipient of organs, does this 
analytic strategy neglect and disempower recipients of donated kidneys? This 
dilemma effectively illustrates why the critical realist position is relevant here. The 
extra-discursive factors are the material conditions; their illness means that the 
patient on the kidney transplant list is in a less powerful position, there is little they 
can do other than wait. It suggests that it will be important for the current study to 
include a discussion of power in the relationship between donor and recipient, in 
addition to power in altruism and the relationship between expert and donor. Is it 
important to the donor that they potentially hold the power of life over another 
individual? This will be addressed in the interviews and literature review. To 
counterbalance, it is expected that the experience of recipients will be implicitly 
represented in the expert positions and discourses, since the professionals who work 




What are the potential risks for the participants?  
 
Prospective donor participants may be distressed after an interview in which they’re 
asked to talk about their emotional and family history. As the researcher, I will make 
a telephone number available for the participants to call me for one week after the 
interview in the event that they experience distress. Information about aftercare in the 
form of the participant’s GP, NHS Direct and the Samaritans will also been given in 
the participant information letter and contact information is given. The participants will 
also be able to contact the researcher if necessary via the Renal Unit psychology 
office.  
 
NHS ethical approval will be required using the IRES system. Ethical approval will 
also be required from the Royal Free Hospital’s local ethics committee.  
 
Recordings of interviews and transcripts will be kept in a locked cabinet in the 
researcher’s home. Recordings will be destroyed once they have been transcribed. 
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Transcripts will have personal identifying information removed and personal details of 
participants will be kept separately, also in a locked cabinet.   
 
What are the potential risks for the researcher?  
 
Interviews with participants will take place in hospital consulting rooms in order to 
safeguard the researcher.  
 
There are risks and benefits of undertaking research whilst working in the renal unit. 
As a trainee Counselling Psychologist, I will be counselling dialysis patients. This is 
likely affect the way I think about and approach prospective donors and will require 
that I undertake regular reflective practice and clinical supervision and include this in 
the reflexive sections of the study.  
 
A benefit of being part of the unit means that there will be a source of informed 
emotional support for me as the researcher and the participants if the research 
process demands it.  
 
Relevance to Counselling Psychology and practical applications of the 
research 
 
There are a number of ways in which this research is consistent with the ethos of 
Counselling Psychology. The theoretical relevance is suggested by Widdicombe 
(1995, cited in Willig, 1998), who argues that participants redefine themselves and 
their situations when they take part in discourse analysis, and in doing so they are 
empowered.  
 
Moreover, this research will attempt to understand individuals who may be positioned 
outside what is considered “normal” in the dominant culture and this ideographic 
approach is also consistent with the aims of Counselling Psychology.  
 
Thirdly, Willig (2008) suggests that Foucauldian discourse analysis looks for 
institutional practices that discourses are bound up in, and the current study will 
focus on the practice of assessment of individuals by psychologists. Parker (1992) 
suggests that when we consider assessment in psychology and medicine, we ought 
to pay attention to the role of power in the relationship between the individuals 
concerned and between the client and psychology as a whole. Power and the 
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assessment of clients are of interest to Counselling Psychology, which prizes the 
client’s agency.  
 
This research will have practical applications in renal counselling, as well as for 
applied psychologists and health professionals working with other types of organ 
donation. It is hoped therefore that it will be of interest to individuals who provide 
psychological therapies to living organ donors, their families, and the recipients. It will 
also provide a discussion that will be relevant to psychologists whose role it is to 
assess clients, in all settings, not just those who work in the areas of clinical and 
















































































































































































































































































Appendix D4 – Letter detailing amendments for NHS Ethics committee 
 
 
9, Lyncroft Gardens 
Ealing 
W13 9PU 
Surrey Research Ethics Committee 
Education Centre 
Royal Surrey County Hospital 
Egerton Road 
Guildford, Surrey 
GU2 7XX  
 
16 June, 2010 
 
Study title:    What motivates altruistic kidney donors? A  
    discourse analysis 
 
REC reference number:  10/H1109/37 
 
Dear Mrs Jackson, 
 
Further to your letter dated 14.6.10 detailing requests from the Research Ethics 
Committee in response to the above application, please find enclosed the following 
documents:  
 
1. Participant Information Sheet for health professionals (Version 1.1; Date: 
16.6.10).  
2. Consent form for health professionals (Version 1.1; Date: 16.6.10). 
3. Letter of invitation for health professionals (Version 1.1; Date 16.6.10). 
4. Revised letter of invitation for donor participants (Version 1.2; Date 16.6.10) 
 
As requested, I would also like to confirm the following recruitment procedures:  
 
(i) Donor participants will be identified by the clinical psychologist who is the 
department lead, Dr Jeff Cove. Following the first contact, a letter of invitation 
(version 1.2; Date 16.6.10) and Participant Information Sheet (version 1.1; Date 
18.5.10) will be sent to participant. As requested by the REC, contact information for 
my Academic Supervisor will be given and this is reflected in the version 1.2 of the 
letter of invitation. 
 
(ii) For health professional participants, I will approach the Manager of the health 
professional with a request to send the health professional a letter of invitation 
(Version 1.1; Date 16.6.10) and a Participant Information Sheet (Version 1.1; Date 
16.6.10). As requested by the REC, contact information for my Academic Supervisor 
will be given.  
 































































































































































Appendix D7 – Letter of invitation to participants 
                       
Department of Psychology  
School of Social Sciences 
City University 
Northampton Square 
London, EC1V 0HB 
 
8 March, 2011 




Thank you for giving me permission to contact you and to invite you to take part in 
my research project about altruistic kidney donors. I understand that Jeff Cove 
telephoned you earlier today regarding this.  
 
I have been given permission by the Royal Free and the NHS to carry out this 
research and can assure you that all your details remain confidential. I do not share 
the content of interviews with anyone at the Royal Free and the study is completely 
separate from the assessment process there. The study will be go towards my 
qualification in Counselling Psychology at City University, London, and will hopefully 
be used to give people a better understanding of altruistic donation. 
 
The attached information sheet will give you some more information. Once you have 
read this, if you have any questions, are interested in discussing this research before 
you make a decision, or you would like to arrange to take part, please contact me in 
one of the following ways:  
 
By telephone: 07549 499 591 
By email: Julianna.challenor.1@city.ac.uk 
By letter to: Julianna Challenor, c/o N. Hann, Department of Psychology, School of 
Social Sciences, City University, Northampton Square, London, EC1V 0HB. 
 
If you prefer, you may contact my academic supervisor, Susan Van Scoyoc, 
Consultant Psychologist. Email: susanvanscoyoc@mac.com  
 
The interview will be recorded on a digital audio recorder and will take about an 
hour. It can take place either in your home, or if it’s more convenient for you, at City 
University in Islington, for which your travel expenses will be reimbursed. If you 
decide that you do not wish to take part, you need do nothing else and I will not 







Counselling Psychologist in training 
City University, London  
Email: Julianna.challenor.1@city.ac.uk 
Tel: 07549 499 591 
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Appendix D8 – Information sheet for participants 
  Department of Psychology  
City University 
Northampton Square 
London, EC1 0HB 
 
5 May, 2011 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR STUDY: 
“What motivates altruistic kidney donors” 
 
I would like to invite you to take part in a research study. Before you decide I would 
like you to understand why the research is being done and what it would involve for 
you. I will go through the information sheet with you and answer any questions you 
have. This will take about ten minutes. Talk to others about the study if you wish.  
 
Part 1 tells you the purpose of the study and what will happen if you take part. Part 2 
gives you more detailed information about the conduct of the study. Please ask me if 




1.1 What is the purpose of the study? 
 
The main purpose of this study is to go towards my qualification in Counselling 
Psychology called a DPsych. The aim of the study is to look at the way prospective 
altruistic donors think and talk about their decision; how they explain this decision 
and their personal reasons for wanting to donate. The type of research that I am 
doing is called qualitative research.  
 
1.2 Why have you been invited?  
 
You have been given this information sheet because you have been taking part in an 
assessment to become an altruistic kidney donor. I would like to invite you to take 
part in an interview and be part of my research. I am hoping to interview around five 
potential donors.   
 
1.3 Do you have to take part?  
 
The interview is only for my research and is not part of the Royal Free assessment 
process. It is up to you to decide to join the study. I will describe the study and go 
through this information sheet. If you agree to take part, I will then ask you to sign a 
consent form. You are free to withdraw at any time, without giving a reason. This 
would not affect your application to become an altruistic kidney donor if assessment 
is still ongoing. 
 
 
1.4 What will happen to you if you take part?  
 
I would like to meet with you twice. In the first meeting I will interview you about your 
decision to become an altruistic kidney donor. It will probably last around an hour 
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and a half and will be relatively unstructured, like a conversation. The interview will 
be recorded on a digital voice recorder. In the study, your real name will not be used 
and any identifying details will be removed.  
 
When I’ve analysed your interview, I’ll arrange for us to meet for a second time for 
you to tell me what you think of my analysis and to add anything you think we’ve 
missed. This second interview will probably take around 45 minutes. The time 
between the first and second interview will be between two and six months and will 
be arranged at a time convenient to you.  
 
1.5 What will be done with the data?  
 
Along with interviews from other altruistic donors, I will analyse what we have talked 
about. I will be looking at the way that you describe things and the implications of 




Any expenses you incur in travelling to be interviewed will be reimbursed.  
 
1.7 What will you have to do? 
 
All that I will be asking you to do is to talk to me about what made you decide to 
become an altruistic kidney donor.  
 
1.8 What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
 
Talking about subjects that are very important to us can sometimes stir up difficult 
emotions. This is normal and things will usually get settle down after a day or two, 
but if it happens and you feel that you want to talk to someone, there are several 
things you can do:  
 
1. In the days following the interview, you can contact me if you need to talk through 
anything that the interview may have raised for you. Please leave a message on the 
following number and I will return your call as soon as I am able to: 07549 499 591 
I can also be reached by leaving a message with the Royal Free renal unit office: 
Tel: 020 7794 0500 Ext. 37571 
 
2. Your GP will be able to help and you should contact them if you feel as though 
you cannot cope with distressing thoughts and feelings that you may be 
experiencing. 
 
3. NHS Direct provides 24-hour telephone support for health worries; Tel: 0845 
4647. Website: www.nhsdirect.nhs.uk 
 
4. The Samaritans provide emotional support on the telephone, face to face, or by 
email, 24 hours a day; Tel: 08457 90 90 90; Website: www.samaritans.org 
 
1.9 What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
The information that comes from this study may help improve the way altruistic 







1.10 What if there is problem? 
 
Any complaint about the way you have been dealt with during the study or any 
possible harm you might suffer will be addressed. The detailed information on this 
will be given in Part 2.  
 
1.11 Will taking part in the study be kept confidential?  
 
Yes. I will follow ethical and legal practice and all information about you will be 
handled in confidence. The details are included in Part 2.  
 
If the information in Part 1 has interested you and you are considering participation, 
please read the additional information in Part 2 before making any decision.  
 
Part 2:  
 
2.1 What will happen if you don’t want to carry on with the study 
 
You may withdraw from the study at any point and your assessment, if it’s ongoing, 
to become an altruistic donor will remain unaffected. Any interview data that you 
have given would be destroyed in the event of you withdrawing from the study.  
 
2.2 What if there is a problem?  
 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should speak to me and I 
will do my best to answer your questions. I can be contact on Tel: 07549 499 591 or 
by email: Julianna.Challenor.1@city.ac.uk 
 
If you remain unhappy and wish to complain formally, you can do this with City 
University. Details can be obtained from:  
Department of Psychology  
City University 
Northampton Square 
London, EC1 0HB 




This study is covered by City University’s Public Liability and Professional Indemnity 
insurance.  
 
2.4 Will taking part in this study be kept confidential?  
 
Interviews will be recorded on a digital voice recorder. Names will not be used and 
recordings will be given an identifying number. Recordings will be transferred to CD 
and stored in a locked cabinet. 
 
The recordings will be transcribed and your name and any other identifying 
information will not appear in transcripts, ie. Interviews will be anonymised. 
 
The transcripts will only be used for the study described in this information sheet and 
once the study has been completed and marked by university assessors, recorded 
material will be deleted. Only I will have access to identifiable data.  
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2.5 Who has reviewed the study?  
 
All research in the NHS is looked at by an independent group of people, called a 
Research Ethics Committee, to protect your interests. This study has been reviewed 
and given favourable opinion by Surrey Research Ethics Committee.  
 
This study has received ethical approval from the Psychology Department of City 
University, London.  
 
2.6 Further information and contact details 
 
If you would like to discuss anything about this research and your participation 
further, please contact me:  
 
Email: Julianna.Challenor.1@city.ac.uk Phone: Tel: 07549 499 591  
 
My Research Supervisor from City University is:  





























Appendix D9 – Participant debriefing document 
  Department of Psychology  
City University 
Northampton Square 
London, EC1 0HB 
 
 
16th June, 2011 
 
 
Research Study: “What motivates altruistic kidney donors: A discourse 
analysis”. 
 
Dear,                          
 
Thank you for taking part in the research interview today. I am grateful for your time 
and value your contribution.  
 
What happens next?  
 
I’ll be transcribing the interviews and analysing them. I’m interested in the language 





Talking about subjects that are very important to us can sometimes stir up difficult 
emotions for a few days afterwards. This is normal and will usually get better after a 
day or two, but if it happens and you feel that you want to talk to someone, there are 
several things you can do:  
 
1. Following the interview, you can contact me if you need to talk through anything 
that the interview may have raised for you. Please leave a message on the following 
number and I will return your call as soon as I am able to. I can also be reached by 
leaving a message with the Royal Free renal unit office: Tel: 020 7794 0500 Ext. 
38159. I will be available for one week after the interview. 
 
2. Your GP will be able to help and you should contact them if you feel distressed 
and as though you cannot cope with any thoughts or feelings. 
 
3. If it’s out of working hours, or you do not wish to go to your GP, NHS Direct 
provides 24-hour telephone support for health worries; Tel: 0845 4647. Website: 
www.nhsdirect.nhs.uk 
 
4. The Samaritans provide emotional support on the telephone, face to face, or by 












Who is supervising this research? 
 
My Research Supervisor from City University is:  
Susan van Scoyoc, Consultant Psychologist.  
Email: susanvanscoyoc@mac.com 
 
If you would like to discuss anything about this research and your participation 
further, please contact me:  




































Appendix D10 – Participant Consent Form 
Department of Psychology  
City University 
Northampton Square 
London, EC1 0HB 




Title of Project: What motivates altruistic kidney donors: A discourse analysis 
Name of Researcher: Julianna Challenor 
 
         Please initial box  
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated 18/5/2010 
(version 1.1) for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the 
information, ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily.  
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at 
any time without giving any reason, without my medical care or legal rights being 
affected.  
 




   
Name of Patient    Date    Signature  
 
 
    
Name of Person taking consent  Date   Signature 
 
 





Appendix D11 – Semi-structured interview guide 
 
 
• I’m interested in you wanting to be an altruistic donor, will you tell me about 
it?  
- What makes you want to do it?  
- Where does the desire to do it come from?  
- Why now at this point in your life?  
 
• Tell me about your family and what it was like for you growing up.  
- Parents 
- Siblings 
- Adult relationships 
 
• What do your family/friends think of your decision?  
 
• Attitude to own body/health. 
 
• Attitude to risks. 
 
• When you think about giving your kidney to a stranger, what feelings 
accompany these thoughts?  
 
• What has it been like for you to do this interview and talk about altruistic 
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